FedUpUSA

Archive for December, 2009

Submitted by James Bianco of Bianco Research

•    The Wall Street Journal – Fed Proposes Tool to Drain Extra Cash
The Federal Reserve on Monday proposed selling interest-bearing term deposits to banks, a move the U.S. central bank would make when it decides to drain some of the liquidity it pumped into the economy during the financial crisis. The new facility is intended to help ensure that the Fed can implement an exit strategy before a banking system awash with Fed money triggers inflation. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has described term deposits as “roughly analogous to the certificates of deposit that banks offer to their customers.” Under the plan, the Fed would issue the term deposits to banks, potentially at several maturities up to one year. That would encourage banks to park reserves at the Fed rather than lending them out, taking money out of the lending stream.The central bank said the proposal “has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term.” “The Federal Reserve has addressed the financial market turmoil of the past two years in part by greatly expanding its balance sheet and by supplying an unprecedented volume of reserves to the banking system,” it said. “Term deposits could be part of the Federal Reserve’s tool kit to drain reserves, if necessary, and thus support the implementation of monetary policy.” Michael Feroli, an economist at J.P. Morgan Chase, said “it’s another step forward in the exit-strategy infrastructure, but it’s been well flagged in advance, so it’s not a surprise.” When Fed officials decide to tighten credit, they would likely use the term-deposits program ahead of — or in conjunction with — adjusting their traditional policy lever, the target for the federal funds interest rate at which banks lend to each other overnight. The Fed also said Monday that its balance sheet rose slightly to $2.2 trillion in the week ending Dec. 23. The Fed’s total portfolio of loans and securities has more than doubled since the beginning of the financial crisis. As part of its efforts to fight the downturn, the central bank is buying $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, a program it says will end in March. The Fed now holds $910.43 billion in mortgage-backed securities, it said Monday.

•    Bloomberg.com – Fed Proposes Term-Deposit Program to Drain Reserves
The Federal Reserve today proposed a program to sell term deposits to banks to help mop up some of the $1 trillion in excess reserves in the U.S. banking system.  The plan, subject to a 30-day comment period, “has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term,” the central bank said in a statement released in Washington. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is preparing tools and strategies to shrink or neutralize the inflationary impact from the biggest monetary expansion in U.S. history. Central bankers are also conducting tests of reverse repurchase agreements and discussing the possibility of asset sales. Term deposits may help the central bank “assert operational control over the federal funds rate” once officials decide to lift the overnight bank lending rate from the current range of zero to 0.25 percent, said Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP LLC in Jersey City, New Jersey. Excess cash “would be locked up” rather than put downward pressure on the federal funds rate, he said.The Fed won’t begin raising interest rates until the third quarter of 2010, according to the median estimate of 62 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News in the first week of December.

•    The Financial Times – Fed to offer term deposits to banks
The US Federal Reserve plans to offer term deposits to banks as part of its “exit strategy” from the exceptionally loose monetary policy used to fight the recession. In a consultation paper released on Monday the Fed said it planned to change its rules so that it could pay interest on money locked up at the central bank for a defined period. The Fed added that the well-flagged rule change – designed to allow it more influence over the $1,100bn in excess reserves held by banks – was part of “prudent planning. . . and has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term”. It is one of a number of measures that has been outlined over the past few months by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Fed, as an option to drain liquidity from the financial system in a manner that protects the economic recovery while heading off the threat of inflation.

•    The Federal Reserve – Notice of proposed rulemaking; request for public comment.
The Board is requesting public comment on proposed amendments to Regulation D, Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, to authorize the establishment of term deposits. Term deposits are intended to facilitate the conduct of monetary policy by providing a tool for managing the aggregate quantity of reserve balances. Institutions eligible to receive earnings on their balances in accounts at Federal Reserve Banks (”eligible institutions”) could hold term deposits and receive earnings at a rate that would not exceed the general level of short-term interest rates. Term deposits would be separate and distinct from those maintained in an institution’s master account at a Reserve Bank (”master account”) as well as from those maintained in an excess balance account. Term deposits would not satisfy required reserve balances or contractual clearing balances and would not be available to clear payments or to cover daylight or overnight overdrafts. The proposal also would make minor amendments to the posting rules for intraday debits and credits to master accounts as set forth in the Board’s Policy on Payment System Risk to address transactions associated with term deposits.

Comment

We believe the proposal of this new tool signals the Federal Reserve is still flailing around trying to look busy so everyone is assured they have a plan.  The fact is they have no plan and are still throwing everything on the wall to see what sticks. From the November 4 FOMC minutes:

Participants expressed a range of views about how the Committee might use its various tools in combination to foster most effectively its dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability. As part of the Committee’s strategy for eventual exit from the period of extraordinary policy accommodation, several participants thought that asset sales could be a useful tool to reduce the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and lower the level of reserve balances, either prior to or concurrently with increasing the policy rate. In their view, such sales would help reinforce the effectiveness of paying interest on excess reserves as an instrument for firming policy at the appropriate time and would help quicken the restoration of a balance sheet composition in which Treasury securities were the predominant asset. Other participants had reservations about asset sales–especially in advance of a decision to raise policy interest rates–and noted that such sales might elicit sharp increases in longer-term interest rates that could undermine attainment of the Committee’s goals. Furthermore, they believed that other reserve management tools such as reverse RPs and term deposits would likely be sufficient to implement an appropriate exit strategy and that assets could be allowed to run off over time, reflecting prepayments and the maturation of issues. Participants agreed to continue to evaluate various potential policy-implementation tools and the possible combinations and sequences in which they might be used. They also agreed that it would be important to develop communication approaches for clearly explaining to the public the use of these tools and the Committee’s exit strategy more broadly.

The Federal Reserve first hinted at term deposits almost two months ago, although exactly what they were talking about was left vague until now.

Remember that the Federal Reserve has to withdraw over a trillion dollars of excess liquidity.  The easiest way to do this is to sell hundreds of billions of MBS, Treasuries and agencies.   As the bold highlighted passage above implies, they are scared to death of doing this, so they propose complicated schemes to withdraw liquidity like reverse repos and now term deposits.

We have argued that these schemes will not work.  They cannot be done in the sizes necessary or enough to even matter.  The Federal Reserve could possibly drain tens of billions of dollars via these schemes, but collectively that will amount to a rounding error when the goal is to withdraw over a trillion in excess reserves.

The Federal Reserve does not want to admit defeat, so they continue pursuing these strategies that will not make a difference.  We believe they also do it to “look busy” as they are taking measurements and notes as to how to withdraw all the liquidity they have pumped in.  They think this will give the market comfort that someone is on the case and that inflation expectations will not get out of control.  The market is not buying this.  Inflation expectations, s measured by TIPS inflation breakeven rates, are going vertical.

Reinvestment Risk

As to term deposits, the Federal Reserve is proposing an illiquid short term instrument for banks to invest in.  Banks would buy these instruments and “lock up” the excess reserves they now have.  This would have the same effect as draining excess reverses.  The maturities of these instruments would be as long as one year.

It is unclear if there will be a secondary market for these instruments, and if so, how liquid it will be.
Without a secondary market, buyers of these instruments face huge reinvestment risk.  The future course of short term interest rates is arguably to the most uncertain it has been in decades.  Will the Federal Reserve stay near zero until 2012 or will they be forced to raise rates in the first half of 2010?  Given all this uncertainty, who wants to lock up money in something that cannot be sold before maturity?  This is especially true given the Federal Reserve’s statement that the “maximum-allowable rate for each auction of term deposits would be no higher than the general level of short- term interest rates.”

The general level of short-term interest rates is set on known instruments that have generations of history and active secondary markets.  If the Federal Reserve wants to introduce a new, and wholly unknown instrument with an uncertain secondary market and offer no interest rate premium, then we cannot see how this will work beyond a token amount after some arm twisting to get them sold.  The Federal Reserve will have to offer a premium for uncertainty and illiquidy to make this fly in any major way, something they said they will not do.

Complicated Is Simple

The Federal Reserve owns 80% of AIG.  With each passing day it looks like the Federal Reserve is adopting AIG Financial Product’s business practices.  That is, when faced with a financial problem, they create complicated tools (like CDS).  When critics says these new products will not work, tell them they do not know what they are talking about and create even more complicated tools to dazzle everyone.  Once the tools are so complicated that no one understands them, you will be hailed as an expert with no peer.  You might even be named TIME’s Person of the Year.

Inquiring minds are reading Clarity and Valuation by John Hussman.

Last week, the dividend yield on the S&P 500 dropped below 2%, versus a historical average closer to double that level. While part of the reason for the paucity of yield in the current market can be explained by the 20% plunge in dividend payouts over the past year, as financial companies have cut or halted dividends to conserve cash, the fact is that current payouts are not at all out of line with their historical relationship to revenues, and even a full recovery of the past year’s dividend cuts would still leave the yield at a paltry 2.5%. The October 1987 crash occurred from a yield of 2.65%, which was, at the time, the lowest yield observed in history, matched only by the 1972 peak prior to the brutal 1973-74 bear market.

Those two periods had a few other things in common. In the weeks immediately preceding the market downturn, stocks were overbought, had advanced significantly over prior weeks, bond yields were creeping higher, and investment advisory bearishness had dropped below 19%. All of those features should be familiar, because we observed them at the 1987 and 1972 peaks, and we observe them now.

On the basis of normalized profit margins, the average price/earnings ratio for the S&P 500, prior to 1995, was only about 13. Higher historical “norms” reflect the addition into that average of extremely high “recession P/Es,” based on dividing the S&P 500 by extremely low, but temporarily depressed earnings. For example, the P/E for the S&P 500 currently is 86, because earnings have been devastated, but it would be foolish to take that figure at face value, and equally foolish to work it into a historical “average” P/E. The pre-1995 norm of 13 for price-to-normalized earnings is important, because at present – and again, we are not using current depressed earnings, but properly normalized values – the S&P 500 P/E would currently be over 20. That’s higher than 1987 and 1972, and about even with 1929. Of course, valuations have been regularly higher in the period since the late 1990′s (and not surprisingly, subsequent returns, even after the recent advance, have been dismal overall, with the S&P 500 posting a negative total return for the past decade).

So overvalued, check. Overbought, check. Overbullish, check. Upward pressure on yields, check. Market internals? – certainly mixed, but not bad – and there’s the wild card.

It’s important to recognize that when I quote probabilities, I am generally using a form of Bayes’ Rule. So when I say, for example, that I estimate a probability of about 80% of fresh credit difficulties accompanied by a market plunge over the coming year, that figure is based on various combinations of historical evidence, and what has (and has not) happened afterward, and how often. As a side note, a “market plunge” in this context need not be a “crash.” In the context of a credit-driven crash and rebound (which is what I believe we’ve observed), a typical post-rebound correction would be about -28%, but even that would take stocks to less than 20% above the March lows.

From current valuations, durable market returns appear very unlikely. As I noted last week, whatever merit there might be in stocks is decidedly speculative. That doesn’t mean that the returns must be (or even over the very short term, are likely to be) negative. What it does mean is that whatever returns emerge are unlikely to be durably positive. Market gains from these levels will most probably be given back, possibly very abruptly.

Stocks Higher? New Bull Market?

New bull market for the new year? Famed bond investor El-Erian of Pimco says don’t bet on it.

Homes are selling at their fastest clip in nearly three years, the unemployment rate is falling and stocks are up 66 percent since their March lows — the best performance since the 1930s.

What’s not to like?

Plenty, according to Mohamed El-Erian, chief executive of giant bond manager Pimco. The investor says the recovery may be gaining steam but is no different than a kid who eats too much candy at one of the birthday parties his 6-year-old daughter attends.

“We’re on a sugar high,” El-Erian says. “It feels good for a while but is unsustainable.”

His point: This burst of economic activity fed by government spending and near-zero interest rates will soon peter out.

As CEO at Newport Beach, Calif.-based Pimco, El-Erian, 51, oversees nearly $1 trillion in assets, more than the gross domestic product of most countries. So when he talks, people listen.

What he’s saying now:

–Stocks will drop 10 percent in the space of three or four weeks, bringing the Standard & Poor’s 500 index below 1,000 — though he’s not predicting when.

–The unemployment rate will be hovering above 8 percent a year from now.

El-Erian says people are fooling themselves if they think all the bullish data of late means a strong recovery is in the offing. So he’s buying Treasurys and selling riskier stuff.

His bet: Investors will get scared again and want U.S.-guaranteed debt so they know they’ll get repaid.

James Paulsen, chief strategist at Wells Capital Management in Minneapolis, with $355 billion under management, has been pounding the table for months to buy stocks. Just like in the early 1980s, the recovery will take the form of a “V,” he says. The reason: Companies have cut inventories and payrolls to the bone, so just a little revenue growth could translate into a bumper crop of profits.

El-Erian says many of the bulls don’t appreciate just how much the government props still under the economy are masking its weakness. Instead of focusing on the fundamentals today, he says, they’re looking to the past, expecting a quick economic rebound because that’s what’s happened before.

We’re trained to think the “farther you fall, the higher you’ll bounce back,” El-Erian says. “We’re hostage to the V.”

El-Erian says we’ve probably seen the worst of the crisis but consumers, and not just Washington, need to start spending again for the recovery to really take hold.

He doesn’t expect that to happen soon. Like in the Great Depression, Americans are saving more and borrowing less — a shift in attitudes toward family finances that Pimco thinks will last a generation.

That, plus the impact of more regulation and higher taxes, El-Erian says, will crimp growth for years to come.

El-Erian Is An Optimist

As I see it, El-Erian is an optimist. A year from now it is extremely unlikely the unemployment rate will approach 8%. Please note El-Erian is not calling for 8% unemployment, he is only saying it will be above 8%.

How much above 8% are we talking about? Arguably, the answer to that question is another question: How nuts will Congress get with more stimulus packages? Then again, the current stimulus package did not create any lasting jobs, so why would the next one?

It is pretty clear the bulk of the current stimulus efforts is behind us. We will see the results in 4th quarter GDP, with some additional but smaller effect in the 1st quarter 2010 GDP. What then?

Hussman’s viewpoint is very similar to mine. I think the bottom may be in, but returns going forward are unlikely to be very good, and a strong pullback is very likely.

Other possibilities include a scenario in which the market goes nowhere (say +-150 S&P points) in either direction, for a number of years. There is also a 20% chance Congress and the administration totally wrecks the US dollar and stocks magically go flying.

I think the probabilities look something like this:

• 20% chance of a durable rally
• 20% chance the market meanders nowhere for as long as 5 years
• 30% chance of of a hard 25-30% correction
• 30% chance the bottom is not even in

Unlike Hussman, I have not done any statistical analysis of those estimates. Certainly his “estimate a probability of about 80% of fresh credit difficulties accompanied by a market plunge over the coming year” is reasonable enough.

Note that Hussman’s 80% probability of a plunge encompasses a plunge where the bottom holds and also where it doesn’t.

The key for me is that on average it does not pay to be fully invested here, regardless of what the stampede of bulls say. Bear in mind, the bulls were saying exactly the same thing as they are now right at the October 2007 high. I received taunts for several months for my market top call late summer of 2007, about 3% and 3 months early.

Is the top in now? No one knows, but that is not even the right question to be asking. A far better question to be asking is “Is the bottom in?” Even if it is, a major test coming of that bottom down the road is highly likely and that will gore a lot of overly complacent bulls along the way.

In 2007, Chuck Prince former CEO of Citigroup proclaimed “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”

Once again, bulls are dancing on a clifftop, oblivious to the fact that the next step might be right over the edge.

Mike “Mish” Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com

Click Here To Scroll Thru My Recent Post List

Mike “Mish” Shedlock is a registered investment advisor representative for SitkaPacific Capital Management. Sitka Pacific is an asset management firm whose goal is strong performance and low volatility, regardless of market direction.
Visit http://www.sitkapacific.com/account_management.html  to learn more about wealth management and capital preservation strategies of Sitka Pacific.

You remember the announcement that Fannie and Freddie would have an “unlimited” credit line from Treasury to cover shortfalls and buy-outs of defaulted loans from MBS, right?

Well then, read this from the forum:

After the Fannie news came out this weekend, a friend called me and his brother works for Chase Mortgage. He told me that Chase is redoing stated income loans and instead of actually appraising the home, they are going back 3 years on the homes valuation in order to get the loan processed. Then they are selling these mortgages to Fannie Mae.

Yes, that’s an anecdotal claim, but if true can someone explain to me how this isn’t out-and-out fraud?

Is Fannie requiring the actual appraisal with the loan package information they buy, or is the entire “verification” nothing more or less than a checkbox that says “yes, we have an appraisal”?

Toxic waste dumping ground?  Maybe. 

But one thing is certain – I’ve not heard of Fannie and Freddie forcing putbacks of loans they purchased from various brokers and originators where there was fraud in the original loan.

Why not?

Why should Fannie and Freddie eat this if in fact the banks breached their reps and warranties in the original tender of the paper?

And since it appears that banks have been tremendously successful in shoveling off garbage paper to Freddie and Fannie while not being held to account for their activity, one has to wonder if this anecdotal report is accurate!

The scam during the housing bubble was to intentionally overstate income (and then take some sort of exotic loan) so as to hide the fact that you couldn’t afford the house.  Your “escape” was that when (remember, houses never go down in price) the loan’s “teaser” expired you’d just go refinance.  The banks loved it (they got to hit you for another round of fees and costs) and the liars loved it – they got to live in $500,000 houses on $50,000 of income – even if they’d never actually own the place.

This, by the way, is a federal offense (lying on a mortgage application) yet The FBI and other law enforcement officials were and are under explicit orders NOT to prosecute these crimes.

Now the scam is to understate your income so as to qualify for a “better” modification – and again, the government is refusing to enforce the law:

Until recently the rules were clear: if you grossly understated your income to qualify for the program, you had to restart the loan modification process. It made sense. After all, we got into this housing mess partly because too many people were dishonest about how much they made.

….

The government needs this program to work — and fast. That’s the only way to explain the Treasury Department’s waiver of a requirement punishing borrowers who understate their income by 25 percent or more when trying to get a modification.

That means a borrower who had told a lender he made $75,000 but was found to make $100,000 doesn’t have to restart the modification process. Under the waiver announced Dec. 16, that person now gets to continue the trial period instead of being rejected immediately.

Isn’t that special?

Are you pissed yet?  You should be.  This sort of game means that the “waterfall” that I posted before goes further down than it should for a given borrower:

Yep.

This is the reality folks: Your neighbor lied about his income to get his house in the first place.  He took out a loan he couldn’t possibly repay on the original terms – an OptionARM or other “exotic” loan, and then (in many cases) HELOC’d out every penny possible and blew it on a Hummer, a Boat and a few exotic vacations.

This caused the “value” of your house to skyrocket.  Cities and states of course got lots of tax revenue as a consequence of these higher “values.”

But these “values” were not real.  They were a fraud.  Remember that a transaction requires a willing (and able) buyer and seller.  Without a willing (and able) buyer, the price does not go up.

When the Ponzi ran out of suckers, people started to default en-masse.  The government panicked – so-called “wealth” was disappearing, and in addition cities and states saw their “revenue” disappear as those who can’t pay mortgages don’t pay property taxes either.

So government rides to the rescue with an alleged plan to help those who are at risk of losing their house due to unemployment and other effects not of their own doing.

What happens?  The very same people who played grift and scam on the way up do it again on the way down. 

The felonies they commit are charged not to them, but to you – by government policy.

This is not a “lie” folks – it’s a crime.  A crime that our government is not only willfully ignoring but is and has been encouraging, and forcing you, the honest American, to pay for.

And let’s be clear: while it is a “dirty secret” the US Attorney’s Manual says:

Prosecutions of fraud ordinarily should not be undertaken if the scheme employed consists of some isolated transactions between individuals, involving minor loss to the victims, in which case the parties should be left to settle their differences by civil or criminal litigation in the state courts. Serious consideration, however, should be given to the prosecution of any scheme which in its nature is directed to defrauding a class of persons, or the general public, with a substantial pattern of conduct.

Got it?

If you lie on your mortgage, the government doesn’t care – even though that was and remains one of the primary causes of both the housing bubble and now is preventing the market from being marked back down to actual fair value and clearing.

The government has in fact declared itself as an accessory to millions of felonies both before and after the fact.

Those of you counting on getting your old assembly line job back in Detroit can forget it.

The recent eight year forecast published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that 4.19 million jobs will be gained in the US in professional and business services, followed by 4 million health care and social assistance jobs, while 1.2 million will be lost in manufacturing. This is great news for website designers, Internet entrepreneurs,  registered nurses, and masseuses in California, but grim tidings for traditional metal bashers in the rust belt manufacturing states like Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio.

I’m so old now that I am no longer asked for a driver’s license to get into a night club. Instead, they ask for a carbon dating. The real challenge for we aged career advisors is that probably half of these new service jobs haven’t even been invented yet, and if they can be described, it is only in a cheesy science fiction paperback with a half dressed blond on the front cover. After all, who heard of a webmaster, a cell phone contract sales person, or a blogger 40 years ago? Where are all these jobs going to? You guessed it, China, and other lower waged, upstream manufacturing countries like Vietnam, where the Middle Kingdom is increasingly subcontracting its own offshoring.

These forecasts may be optimistic, because they assume that Americans can continue to claw their way up the value chain in the global economy, and not get stuck along the way, as the Japanese did in the nineties. The US desperately needs no less than 27 million new jobs to soak up natural population and immigration growth and get us back to a traditional 5% unemployment rate. The only way that is going to happen is for America to invent something new and big, and fast. Personal computers achieved this during the eighties, and the Internet did the trick in the nineties. The fact that we’ve done diddly squat since 2000 but create a giant paper chase explains why job growth since then has been zero, real wage growth has been negative, and American standards of living are falling.

Alternative energy and biotechnology are two possible drivers for a new economy. Unfortunately, the last administration did everything it could to stymie progress in both these fields, coddling big oil so China could steal a lead in several alternative technologies, and starving stem cell researchers of Federal cash, ceding the lead there to others. While the current crop of politicians extol the virtues of education, the reality is that we are dumbing down our public education system. How do we invent the next “new” thing, while shrinking the University of California’s budget by 20% two years in a row? If my local high school can’t afford new computers, how is it going to feed Silicon Valley with computer literate work force? The US has a “Michael Jackson” economy. It’s still living like a rock star, but hasn’t had a hit in 20 years.

China can have all the $20 a day jobs it wants. But if it accelerates its move up the value chain, as it clearly aspires to do, then America is in for even harder times. I’ll be hoping for the best, but preparing for the worst. How do you say “unemployment check” in Mandarin?