Archive for January 29th, 2010
Secret Banking Cabal Emerges From AIG Shadows
Secret Banking Cabal Emerges From AIG Shadows
Commentary by David Reilly
Jan. 29 (Bloomberg) — The idea of secret banking cabals that control the country and global economy are a given among conspiracy theorists who stockpile ammo, bottled water and peanut butter. After this week’s congressional hearing into the bailout of American International Group Inc., you have to wonder if those folks are crazy after all.
Wednesday’s hearing described a secretive group deploying billions of dollars to favored banks, operating with little oversight by the public or elected officials.
We’re talking about the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, whose role as the most influential part of the federal-reserve system — apart from the matter of AIG’s bailout — deserves further congressional scrutiny.
The New York Fed is in the hot seat for its decision in November 2008 to buy out, for about $30 billion, insurance contracts AIG sold on toxic debt securities to banks, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Societe Generale and Deutsche Bank AG, among others. That decision, critics say, amounted to a back-door bailout for the banks, which received 100 cents on the dollar for contracts that would have been worth far less had AIG been allowed to fail.
That move came a few weeks after the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department propped up AIG in the wake of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s own mid-September bankruptcy filing.
Saving the System
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner was head of the New York Fed at the time of the AIG moves. He maintained during Wednesday’s hearing that the New York bank had to buy the insurance contracts, known as credit default swaps, to keep AIG from failing, which would have threatened the financial system.
The hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform also focused on what many in Congress believe was the New York Fed’s subsequent attempt to cover up buyout details and who benefited.
By pursuing this line of inquiry, the hearing revealed some of the inner workings of the New York Fed and the outsized role it plays in banking. This insight is especially valuable given that the New York Fed is a quasi-governmental institution that isn’t subject to citizen intrusions such as freedom of information requests, unlike the Federal Reserve.
This impenetrability comes in handy since the bank is the preferred vehicle for many of the Fed’s bailout programs. It’s as though the New York Fed was a black-ops outfit for the nation’s central bank.
Geithner’s Bosses
The New York Fed is one of 12 Federal Reserve Banks that operate under the supervision of the Federal Reserve’s board of governors, chaired by Ben Bernanke. Member-bank presidents are appointed by nine-member boards, who themselves are appointed largely by other bankers.
As Representative Marcy Kaptur told Geithner at the hearing: “A lot of people think that the president of the New York Fed works for the U.S. government. But in fact you work for the private banks that elected you.”
And yet the New York Fed played an integral role in the government’s bailout of banks, often receiving surprisingly free rein to act as it saw fit.
Consider AIG. Let’s take Geithner at his word that a failure to resolve the insurer’s default swaps would have led to financial Armageddon. Given the stakes, you might think Geithner would have coordinated actions with then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Yet Paulson testified that he wasn’t in the loop.
“I had no involvement at all, in the payment to the counterparties, no involvement whatsoever,” Paulson said.
Bernanke’s Denials
Fed Chairman Bernanke also wasn’t involved. In a written response to questions from Representative Darrell Issa, Bernanke said he “was not directly involved in the negotiations” with AIG’s counterparty banks.
You have to wonder then who really was in charge of our nation’s financial future if AIG posed as grave a threat as Geithner claimed.
Questions about the New York Fed’s accountability grew after Geithner on Nov. 24, 2008, was named by then-President- elect Barack Obama to be Treasury Secretary. Geither said he recused himself from the bank’s day-to-day activities, even though he never actually signed a formal letter of recusal.
That left issues related to disclosures about the deal in the hands of the bank’s lawyers and staff, rather than a top executive. Those staffers didn’t want details of the swaps purchase to become public.
New York Fed staff and outside lawyers from Davis Polk & Wardell edited AIG communications to investors and intervened with the Securities and Exchange Commission to shield details about the buyout transactions, according to a report by Issa.
That the New York Fed, a quasi-governmental body, was able to push around the SEC, an executive-branch agency, deserves a congressional hearing all by itself.
Later, when it became clear information would be disclosed, New York Fed legal group staffer James Bergin e-mailed colleagues saying: “I have to think this train is probably going to leave the station soon and we need to focus our efforts on explaining the story as best we can. There were too many people involved in the deals — too many counterparties, too many lawyers and advisors, too many people from AIG — to keep a determined Congress from the information.”
Think of the enormity of that statement. A staffer at a body with little public accountability and that exists to serve bankers is lamenting the inability to keep Congress in the dark.
This belies the culture of secrecy obviously pervasive within the New York Fed. Committee Chairman Edolphus Towns noted during the hearing that the bank initially refused to disclose even the names of other banks that benefited from its actions, arguing this information would somehow harm AIG.
‘Penchant for Secrecy’
“In fact, when the information was finally released, under pressure from Congress, nothing happened,” Towns said. “It had absolutely no effect on AIG’s business or financial condition. But it did have an effect on the credibility of the Federal Reserve, and it called into question the Fed’s penchant for secrecy.”
Now, I’m not saying Congress should be meddling in interest-rate decisions, or micro-managing bank regulation. Nor do I think we should all don tin-foil hats and start ranting about the Trilateral Commission.
Yet when unelected and unaccountable agencies pick banking winners while trying to end-run Congress, even as taxpayers are forced to lend, spend and guarantee about $8 trillion to prop up the financial system, our collective blood should boil.
(David Reilly is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)
Click on “Send Comment” in the sidebar display to send a letter to the editor.
To contact the writer of this column: David Reilly at dreilly14@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: January 28, 2010 21:00 EST
AIG: The Idiocy That Will Not Die
AIG: The Idiocy That Will Not Die
Posted by Karl Denninger
Why do I smell a Fannie/Freddie debacle in here?
AIG owes $25.8 billion on the line, about $2.4 billion more than last week, according to Fed data released yesterday. The draw has increased for six straight weeks. The company said in November that it may borrow additional funds from its five-year Fed credit line to make payments on maturing commercial paper.
Wait a second…. payments on maturing commercial paper? Why would they owe payments on maturing commercial paper that they purchased? I thought that companies paid to borrow, not the other way around?
Oh wait – perhaps it’s their commercial paper? Exactly what are they paying to borrow? And if it’s expiring, does this mean they can’t roll it over? How are these clowns funding themselves?
Hmmmm….. so AIG borrowed a bunch of money, perhaps from the Fed Alphabet Soup program) to support the commercial paper market, which they are now shutting down (as of February 1st), and they have a problem rolling it over in the private market? That would make sense. But if they can’t roll it over in the private market how is AIG going to be handling it’s ongoing short-term financial needs?
These sorts of arcane things may not pique the interest of most Americans, but it should. AIG is now a ward of the state, with some $180 billion in money pumped into or through them. And while their AIGFP (financial products) division was at the center of this mess, writing credit-default swaps against CDOs that couldn’t be reasonably valued in the market (due to their thin trading and no agreement on their value) with no money to back it up, the question remains – had AIGFP gone bankrupt along with the holding company would it have mattered to the regulated insurance subsidiaries?
Indeed, the entire point of structuring insurance businesses this way (every state has its own separate subsidiary) is to allow the firm to take one of their subsidiaries through bankruptcy if necessary without destroying policyholder interests in other states! Just go ask all the “Pup Company” insurance structures in Florida, for example, where you have “Joes Insurance of Florida” that is legally and financially distinct from “Joes Insurance” – very handy when a Cat 5 hurricane comes roaring across the state and lays a couple of cites waste!
I have seen nothing other than a bare assertion that we “had to” rescue AIG to prevent these policyholders from getting screwed. Indeed, over the years we have seen multiple instances where insurance company subsidiaries “blow up” and yet the impact remains contained to that specific subsidiary. This is not an accident, it is in fact by design!
So now with AIG as a ward of the state one has to, I believe, ask one simple question – how do we get out of this, and why are we continuing to pump money into AIGFP instead of severing the cord so the remainder of the company is protected?







