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Archive for March 3rd, 2010
Michigan Unemployment Payments May Fuel More Unemployment
March 3rd, 2010 | 
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Michigan Unemployment Payments May Fuel More Unemployment
Michigan has led the nation in unemployment for 19 months. Experts fear this will put even more strain on Michigan businesses, slowing hiring even more.
As of February 2010, Michigan owed the federal government $3.5 billion it has borrowed to help pay unemployment benefits, according to the state.
Michigan paid $7.1 billion in benefits to the 680,000 unemployed Michigan residents in 2009 and had to borrow $2.4 billion to cover that year’s expense. That state’s unemployment rate was 14.6 percent in December 2009, the highest in the nation. Nevada was second at 13.0 percent.
In Michigan, businesses carry the entire burden of paying unemployment benefits for the first 26 weeks and then share the cost with the state for the first 13-week extension. The federal government pays for its extensions as part of the stimulus package.
Businesses will be taxed more to pay back the billions they owe the federal government.
“Unemployment insurance taxes are payroll taxes. As such, they are disincentives to hire workers and they diminish the take-home wages of existing employees when they are increased,” said Charlie Owens, state director of the National Federation of Independent Businesses. “It is a certainty that these taxes will increase to cover Michigan’s debt to the federal government and this will exacerbate our high unemployment, creating a vicious cycle of decline.”
The state has paid out more in benefits than it has collected in taxes to pay those benefits since 2001, said Norm Isotalo, spokesman for the Michigan Department of Energy, Labor and Economic Growth. The state expects it will have to borrow another $1 billion through 2010.
Fred Radtke, president of F.A.R. management, an unemployment consulting business in Clinton Township, said the federal bill will linger for years.
“I would be shocked, absolutely shocked if we could pay this off in five years,” Radtke said. “I’ve been doing this 32 years. This is as bad as I’ve ever seen it.”
Radtke said in some instances, businesses could see their unemployment payments per employee rise from $56 to $140 in three years.
“It’s a big problem,” Radtke said.
Milton Friedman on Minimum Wage
Milton Friedman discusses the effects of minimum wage, dispelling the myth that it is a Good Thing.
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50 Years of Research on the Minimum Wage:
Posted in Economic Crisis, Economy, Milton Friedman, Minimum Wage, Unemployment, Unemployment Benefits | 
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Homeless New Yorkers Living In Tent City In New Jersey
The recession has left many Americans in urgent need of shelter and with nowhere to go, forcing some to retreat to the woods. In the countryside, just one hour’s drive from Manhattan, a shanty town of tents has sprung up. Anastasia Churkina meets the people for whom camping out, has become a way of life.
I ask you: How long will we allow our government to rob from its citizens and transfer the money to the insolvent banks that created this horrifying mess? As long as the government continues to transfer our money to the Ponzi banks, this will continue and we will see more and more people living in tents….if they’re lucky enough to have a tent.
Whadda 'Ya Mean It's Not Over?
Whadda ‘Ya Mean It’s Not Over?
Posted by Karl Denninger
In the report, the panel, that includes Rob Johnson of the United Nations Commission of Experts on Finance and bailout watchdog Elizabeth Warren, warns that financial regulatory reform measures proposed by the Obama administration and Congress must be beefed up to prevent banks from continuing to engage in high risk investing that precipitated the near collapse of the U.S. economy in 2008.
The report warns that the country is now immersed in a “doomsday cycle” wherein banks use borrowed money to take massive risks in an attempt to pay big dividends to shareholders and big bonuses to management – and when the risks go wrong, the banks receive taxpayer bailouts from the government.
The crisis of 2008 was predictable. Unless we go far beyond current legislative proposals the next crisis is inevitable.
146 pages of rather dry reading, but worth it.
I have only one argument with the paper’s base premise, and that lies here:
This cycle will not run forever. One day soon, we’ll have the boom and bust phases, but when we try the usual bailouts, they won’t work. The destructive power of the down-cycle will overwhelm the restorative ability of the government, just like it did in 1929-31, when both the financial shock and the government capacity to respond were on a much smaller scale. The result, presumably, will be something that looks and feels very much like a Second Great Depression.
The error is in thinking that the “restorative power” of government has worked this time.
It has not. Instead of being a restorative power, it has instead been simple hiding of the facts – or, if you prefer a more-simple word for it, lies.
We have hidden, rather than fixing, balance-sheet deterioration. We are permitting insolvent financial institutions to continue to operate in the belief that they can “earn their way out of the hole” over time, effectively imposing a monstrous (more than $1 trillion annually, or 7% of GDP) tax on the economy. Then we have imposed another 9% tax on the economy in the form of government borrowing to paper over the lack of final demand.
Taken together, this is a 16%-of-GDP tax addition to the tax burden already imposed, and there is no evidence that it will abate.
The report talks of raising capital requirements to somewhere between 15-25% of assets for financial institutions. But that’s a chimera too – not all assets are the same. As I wrote in my piece of November 13th of last year, there is a much simpler way to compute capital requirements that is not subject to regulatory arbitrage or games: do not permit institutions to make any loan that is unsecured unless the unsecured portion of that loan is backed, dollar for dollar, by a dollar of actual capital.
Regulatory arbitrage is better thought of as bribery. The solution to eliminating bribery is to eliminate all the places where one can stuff a pile of cow dung under the carpet. If the decaying fish is on the kitchen table for all to see, and the stench cannot be concealed, then it becomes extremely difficult to buy people off.
This means an end to all credit derivatives that are not exchange-traded (not “registered”), so that nightly mark-to-market accounting is enforced by a real party at interest – the exchange which has to make good on them. It means an end to “naked shorting” in all of its forms. It means an end to the creation of synthetic instruments unless the person you sell them to receives a prospectus disclosing why and how that derivative came into existence – and at who’s behest it happened.
At the core of this problem, along with essentially every banking crisis in the past, is a refusal to speak publicly about the truth of financial institutions: they provide no actual constructive contribution to GDP.
That is, they produce nothing.
Financial intermediation – when it works properly – is by definition a function of matching buyers and sellers of money. That is, by definition it is a parasitic function that draws its “income” off the transactional stream of commerce.
But a parasite is only “successful” if it is able to remain healthy without significantly impairing its host. The most-obvious violation of this principle, of course, is a parasite that kills its host – that organism has failed in its essential purpose if it fails to reproduce before the host dies.
In terms of economic systems failure is more graduated. Certainly a financial system that kills the underlying economy has failed in its essential purpose. But one that imposes regressive and ridiculous effective tax rates – even when not called a tax – has taken the intermediation function and turned it into a death-spiral of vampirism.
Such is the system we have today. Banks are considered an economic force in their own right – not because they add something to GDP (they’re incapable of doing so) but because they are able to control the rise, fall, birth and death of others. The financial intermediation function has become an end in of itself, instead of being a necessary piece of “lubrication” for commerce to proceed. This in turn has led to ridiculous and even outrageous acts, such as the SEC Complaint alleges occurred in Jefferson County, Alabama:
Charles LeCroy and Douglas MacFaddin, the two former managing directors, privately agreed with certain County commissioners to pay more than $8.2 million in 2002 and 20)3 to close friends of the commissioners who either owned or worked at local broker-dealers.
3. Although labeled as payments for work on the transactions, their true purpose was to ensure that County officials selected the broker-dealer, J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., as County bond underwriter, and the bank, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as County swap provider.
The common word for what is alleged, my friends, is bribe.
Yet when these sorts of things are uncovered the government, in an attempt to “not upset the apple cart” of the vampiric Wall Street mechanism, sues - instead of prosecuting! As with most of these suits this one will likely to be settled with a fine, where if you or I engaged in the same sort of corrupt practice alleged here we’d be sitting behind a set of bars for a decade or more.
The solution to these problems is not found in incrementalism. Rather, it is found in formal and legal recognition of the essential purpose of financial entities – and enforcing the boundaries of same.
In short, financial institutions are intermediaries. Their purpose and function thus inherently must come with fiduciary duty, since without that duty they have no purpose in the economy at all.
Breaches of that duty must be dealt with through harsh sanction, as the essence of their purpose and action cannot inherently come from a desire to profit, but rather their purpose is to help others profit through productive enterprise.
Viewed in this context there is nothing difficult about regulation of these entities.
They must be forced to hold one dollar of capital against each dollar of unsecured lending that is outstanding, no matter to who or on what terms.
They must be held to a fiduciary duty of care with all of their clients, irrespective of which “side” of a transaction they, or their client, happens to be on.
This inherently bars all proprietary trading activities by these institutions since doing so is an inherent and inseparable violation of that fiduciary responsibility toward the persons whom they serve. It cannot be otherwise.
Incidents of bribery, blackmail and dishonesty – irrespective of the form it comes in – must be dealt with both quickly and severely, since all such acts inherently damage the very persons who they have that fiduciary duty toward.
If we had taken this approach to financial entities there would have been no ENRON, no LTCM, no Internet Bubble, no Housing Bubble, no Greece, no AIG, no Lehman and no Bear Stearns Hedge Funds.
All of the financial crises since the 1980s – each and every one of them - would not have happened.
The answers to the problems are simple, if we choose to open our eyes and consider the only actual function that financial entities perform in our economic picture.
If you’re wondering why employment is not rebounding, why The Federal Reserve’s own data shows collapsing government tax revenues along with final demand in the toilet while spending is skyrocketing, you need only look at the financial system’s vampiric behavior and our government’s refusal to deal with those acts as they should for the answer.
For as long as we fail in this regard we will condemn ourselves to an ever-increasing “duty” or “tax” that is diverted by these institutions. This is an inherently unstable configuration and, as the financial system’s effective tax rate is now reaching toward 40% of the economy as a whole (including the inputed taxes from bailouts and handouts) we are rapidly moving toward the “over-center” point (50%) where the cycle becomes self-reinforcing – and collapse becomes inevitable.
The time to do the right thing has basically run out.
Posted in Banks, Corruption, Economic Crisis, Economy, Elizabeth Warren, Financial System |
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Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!
Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!
Submitted by Reggie Middleton
There are broad indications hinting that Italy and Greece are not the only countries that have used SWAP agreements to manipulate its budget and deficit figures. France and Portugal may be two other European economies which have resorted to similar manipulations in the past in order to qualify as part of single currency member nations (Euro Zone). Below is a small subset of the research that I have been gathering as I construct a global sovereign default model. This model is very comprehensive and thus far has indicated that quite a few (as in more than two or three) nations of significance have an 90% probability of defaulting on their debt in the near to medium term. More on this later, now let’s dig into what we have found that looks like gross manipulation of the numbers in order to hide debt in several European countries. Here’s a quick quiz. What well known (in name only) Italian American has a significant chunk of the European Union Sovereign nations apparently modeled their financial engineering from?
Charles Ponzi (March 3, 1882 – January 18, 1949) was an Italian swindler, who is considered one of the greatest swindlers in American history. His aliases include Charles Ponei, Charles P. Bianchi, Carl and Carlo. The term “Ponzi scheme” is a widely known description of any scam that pays early investors returns from the investments of later investors. He promised clients a 50% profit within 45 days, or 100% profit within 90 days, by buying discounted postal reply coupons in other countries and redeeming them at face value in the United States as a form ofarbitrage.[1][2] Ponzi was probably inspired by the scheme of William F. Miller, a Brooklyn bookkeeper who in 1899 used the same scheme to take in $1 million.[3]
I think I’ll call it the Pan-European Ponzi. Conspiracy theorists are going to love this post.
Like Italy (see below), Portugal has also been known for years to take advantage of derivatives contracts to dress up its budget numbers in the late 1990s. In a recent press article (Debt Deals Haunt Europe) Deutsche Bank’s spokesman Roland Weichert commented that the bank has executed currency swaps on behalf of Portugal between 1998 and 2003. He also said that Deutsche Bank’s business with Portugal included “completely normal currency swaps” and other business activity, which he declined to discuss in detail. He also added that the currency swaps on behalf of Portugal were within the “framework of sovereign-debt management,” and the trades weren’t intended to hide Portugal’s national debt position (yeah okay!).
Though the Portuguese finance ministry declined to comment on whether Portugal has used currency swaps such as those used by Greece, it said Portugal only uses financial instruments that comply with European Union rules. Thus, if the use of these instruments complied with European Union rules, then there is nothing wrong with them, right??!! The word “if” is probably one of the most abused words in the English language. As my lawyer use to tell me as I once abused the word, “If Grandma had balls, she’d be Grandpa, wouldn’t she?”
The French
In 1997, the French government received an upfront payment of £4.7 billion ($7.1 billion) for assuming the pension liabilities for France Telecom workers in return. This quick cash injection helped bring down France’s deficit, helping the country to meet the pre-condition to join the Euro zone. You may reference the 
Laurent_Paul_and Christophe_Schalck_study for a background on the deal. I don’t necessarily concur with their conclusions, but it does provide some info
For the record and according to the doc referenced above, according to the State balance sheet for 2006, total pension liabilities of civil servants have been estimated at 941 billion €, i.e. 53% of annual GDP in France. An attempt to reform all special schemes in 1995 collapsed because of severe strikes on the railways. Sounds awfully Hellenic in nature, doesn’t it??? I, for one, believe that Greece is getting a bad rap, and not becaue it is being falsely accused but because it is just a lot sloppier at covering up its shenanigans than its European neighbors.
Now, back to France. A transaction similar to the France Telecomm deal took place in 2006 with La Poste which still employs 200,000 civil servants, but is now facing the same evolution as France Telecom in 1997. But an important difference with France Telecom is the obvious insufficiency of the lump sum paid by the postal company (2 billion €) compared to the amount of pension liabilities transferred (70 billion € at the end of 2006). This low amount is explained by the weak financial position of the company. Thus, the balance of the transaction is guaranteed by 1) additional contributions by the postal company which will be paid until 2010, the scheduled year of the complete liberalization of the
postal services; and 2) the annual contribution by the State Budget the amount of which should progressively increase, from 0.5 billion € in 2006 to 2 billion € in 2020.
Click to enlarge
As you can see, the French government has accepted 301 billion euros of pension liabilities for 16.2 billion dollars of upfont payments. Who want’s to bet if these liabilities are drastically underfunded? Either cut Greece some slack or jump into France’s ass. We shouldn’t have it both ways!
As public entities replace the public company for the payment of pensions and the collection of contributions, the tax burden can be increased significantly: around 0.1% of GDP each for the EDF-GDF, France Telecom and La Poste transactions. Overall, transfers of pension liabilities
implemented since 1997 have supposedly increased the French tax burden by 0.3% of GDP.
Is France the only one doing this? You know the answer to that question.
The Greeks (again)…
According to people familiar with the matter interviewed by China Securities Journal, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. did as many as 12 swaps for Greece from 1998 to 2001, while Credit Suisse was also involved with Athens, crafting a currency swap for Greece in the same time frame.
Under its “off-market” swap in 2001, Goldman agreed to convert yen and dollars into euros at an artificially favorable rate in the future. This helped Greece to use that “low favorable rate” when it recorded its debt in the European accounts-pushing down the country’s reported debt load.
Moreover, in exchange for the good deal on rates, Greece had to pay Goldman (the amount wasn’t revealed). And since the payment would count against Greece’s deficit, Goldman and Greece came up with another twist: Goldman effectively loaned Greece the money for the payment, and Greece repaid that loan over time. And the two sides structured the loan as another kind of swap. So, the deal didn’t add to Greece’s debt under EU rules. Consequently, Greece’s total debt as a percentage of GDP fell from 105.3% to 103.7%, and its 2001 deficit was reduced by a tenth of a percentage point in GDP terms, according to people close to Goldman.
Another action that smacks of Hellenic manipulation, at least to the staff of BoomBustBlog: for years it apparently and simply omitted large portions of its military-equipment spending from its deficit calculations. Though, European regulators eventually prevailed on Greece to count everything and as a result, in 2004, there was a massive revision of Greek deficit figures from 2000 (a budget deficit of 2.0% of GDP in 2000 to beyond the 3% deficit limit in 2004), by then Greece had already gained entrance to the euro. As in my trying to prepare for the coming sovereign debt crisis, timing is everything, isn’t it???
The Italians
As discussed in a recent ZeroHedge article, a 1996 Italian currency swap, arranged by J.P. Morgan, allowed Italy to receive large payments upfront that helped keep its deficit in line, with the downside of greater payments later.
In addition, to curbing their current deficits, countries are now using these swap agreements to push off their loan liabilities (related to swap agreements) to a later date through securitization, and Greece is one such example.
Under the 2001 deal brokered by Goldman, Greece swapped dollar- and yen-denominated debt for Euros at below-market exchange rates. The result was that the country got paid €1 billion ($1.35 billion) upfront on the swap in exchange for an obligation to buy the swaps back later. In 2005, this obligation was in turn securitized as part of a 20-year debt issue, further pushing off the day of reckoning.
Moreover, one of the key reasons why such manipulations continued is the apparent ignorance of the EU’s Eurostat, which knew enough about these deals to tighten the rules governing their accounting-albeit only after they had served their purpose – the Ponzi! When Italy’s then-Prime Minister Romano Prodi miraculously achieved a four-percentage-point improvement in Italy’s budget deficit in time to usher the country into the common currency, Italy’s use of accounting gimmicks was widely discussed, and then promptly ignored. As at that time, everyone was only too eager to look the other way in the drive to get the single currency up and running.
It wasn’t until 2008-a decade after the deals became popular-that Eurostat was able to revise its rules to push countries to include swaps in their debt and deficit calculations. Still, till date too little is known about countries’ continued exposure to the deals that are already out there.
Overall, though there is less evidence to support that there are more such swap deals that happened during the late 90′s till early part of this decade, the data below showing a sharp decline in interest payments as a percentage of GDP particularly for Belgium (apart from Greece and Italy), hints that there are considerably more of these deals to be discovred. The questions is, will they be discovered before or after the respective sovereign issues record debt to the suckers sovereign fxed income investors.
Notice the extremely supercalifragilisticexpealidocious reductions Belgium, Greece and Italy have made in their interest payments from 1993 to 2000 in this graphic made pre-2000. If one didn’t know better, one would have thought theses countries actually used magic to make such reductions. Hell, Italy practicaly cut their debt service (projected, of course) in half. It really makes one wonder. I’m just saying…
According to DERIVATIVES AND PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT by Gustavo Piga, “The political stakes of the 1997 budget package were enormous. Therefore, it was no surprise that many countries were accused of ‘creative window-dressing’ in their budget through the use of accounting tricks to reach the desired goal. One contentious item was interest expenditure, which is the interest expense that governments sustain to finance their deficit and roll over their debt. Interest expenditure represents a high percentage of public spending and GDP in the European Union. It is highly variable over time, especially when compared to other components of the budget. Because of its relevance and because it is subject only to minimal scrutiny during budget law discussions (and many times even after its realization during the fiscal year), interest expenditure is an ideal target for reaching fiscal stabilization goals without incurring excessive political protest or opposition”.
Oh, do you mean like this???
- Can China Control the “Side-Effects” of its Stimulus-Led Growth? Let’s Look at the Facts - Explains the potential fallout of the excessive fiscal stimulus in China. While not European, it is quite likely to kick off the daisy chain effect.
- The Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis - introduces the crisis and identified it as a pan-European problem, not a localized one.
- What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect
- The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis: If I Were to Short Any Country, What Country Would That Be.. - attempts to illustrate the highly interdependent weaknesses in Europe’s sovereign nations can effect even the perceived “stronger” nations.
- The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis, Pt 4: The Spread to Western European Countries
- The Depression is Already Here for Some Members of Europe, and It Just Might Be Contagious!
- The Beginning of the Endgame is Coming???
- I Think It’s Confirmed, Greece Will Be the First Domino to Fall
Posted in Banks, CDS, Corruption, Credit Default Swaps, Economic Crisis, Economy, Financial System, France, Greece, Italy, Sovereign CDS, Sovereign Debt, Sovereign Default, Sovereign Risk |
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ANALYSIS-US Taxpayers Hit as TARP Takes a New Turn
ANALYSIS-US Taxpayers Hit as TARP Takes a New Turn
* Taxpayers take roughly 80 pct loss on a TARP investment
* Deal shows new stage for bank rescue plan
* US Treasury often forced to pick among terrible options
By Dan Wilchins and David Lawder
NEW YORK/WASHINGTON, March 3 (Reuters) – A small Midwestern bank has negotiated with the U.S. Treasury for taxpayers to essentially buy the bank’s shares at an above-market-value price, in an unusual transaction reflecting how the government’s bank investments are entering a new phase.
Midwest Banc Holdings Inc <MBHI.O> agreed to swap $84.8 million of preferred shares it sold to the U.S. government in 2008 for securities that will convert into about $15.5 million of common shares — roughly an 80 percent loss to taxpayers.
To some analysts, the transaction is an outrageous giveaway to an ailing bank, and its investors.
“There’s a lot of funny stuff going on here,” said James Ellman, president at hedge fund Seacliff Capital in San Francisco.
Others say it is a sign of the tough choices the Treasury faces dealing with banks that remain weak despite receiving government capital. In some cases, taxpayers must choose whether to lose 80 percent of their money, or all of it.
A Treasury official told Reuters that the deal is designed to help Midwest Banc Holdings raise private capital, which is the main goal of this phase of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
The biggest banks repaid the money they owed the U.S. Treasury last year and earlier this year, and with a few exceptions, they did so easily.
But more than 600 smaller banks are still left in the program, and owe roughly $130 billion to taxpayers.
In the latest stage of TARP negotiations, many banks will struggle to repay that money. The government will be forced to negotiate separate deals with banks that could result in losses for taxpayers.
The Chicago area, where Midwest Banc Holdings is based, could have a large number of problem lenders.
A recent presentation by rival Chicago bank MB Financial Inc <MBFI.O> said there are 157 banks in the metro area with more than $100 million of assets, and 70 of them are by one measure experiencing real credit stress.
When banks applied for the Treasury capital, they had to be deemed “healthy” by their regulators to receive taxpayer funds. So far, the only outright loss the government has taken so far on the TARP Capital Purchase Program is a $2.3 billion loss on its investment in CIT Group, which went through a bankruptcy reorganization last year.
The Treasury has said it expects its bank capital injection program overall to earn a profit, helped by preferred stock dividends and warrant sales. But the overall TARP program is expected to lose about $117 billion, from companies like insurer American International Group Inc <AIG.N>.
Chris Robling, a spokesman for Midwest Banc, declined to comment.
SHARING THE GAINS
What irks some analysts is that the government may be giving up some potential gains on Midwest Banc’s stock. The Treasury could have traded its $85 million of preferreds for common stock now worth about $85 million.
That move would have given Midwest the same amount of capital, but the bank would have issued more shares to taxpayers at a lower price, giving taxpayer’s more profit if the company’s shares rise.
“Taxpayers should be allowed to share in the upside,” Seacliff’s Ellman said.
An analyst in New York said, “The government is giving away money here.”
But others argue that issuing fewer shares to the government may be necessary if the bank is looking to sell more common shares to private investors.
The government’s mistake was investing in the bank in the first place, and its best option is now to choose the outcome that minimizes losses, said Linus Wilson, a longtime critic of TARP at University of Louisiana at Lafayette.
“We weren’t in that good a bargaining position,” Wilson said, adding that the current market value of the government’s TARP preferred shares is about $8 million.
Midwest is not alone in having renegotiated its TARP obligations. Citigroup Inc <C.N> exchanged about $25 billion of the United State’s TARP preferred shares into common stock, and another $20 billion of TARP securities into trust preferreds.
Superior Bancorp <SUPR.O> and Popular Inc <BPOP.O> last year also exchanged trust preferreds for the government’s preferreds.
And GMAC Financial Services in December swapped some of the government’s TARP preferreds for mandatory convertibles.
Midwest Banc is giving securities known as mandatory convertibles to the U.S. government, in exchange for the preferreds it sold in December 2008 plus $4.5 million in unpaid dividends on that stock.
Those securities will automatically convert into about 47.1 million common shares in seven years. The bank can convert them sooner if it sells at least $125 million of new equity for cash, and meets a few other conditions. (Reporting by Dan Wilchins and David Lawder; Editing by Tim Dobbyn) ((Reuters Messaging: dan.wilchins.reuters.com@reuters.net; +1 646 223 6320)) Keywords: MIDWESTBANC/
proudly supports:
Bill Still For President
for Congress
Michigan 11th District
By Bill Still
There is only one answer for the world economic situation; monetary reform.
1. No More National Debt
2. No More Fractional Lending
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