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Archive for March 11th, 2010

Russia, Greece, Chile, and the Narcissism of Harvard Debt Lords

 

Russia, Greece, Chile, and the Narcissism of Harvard Debt Lords

By Damon Vrabel  

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Today marks the beginning of a new administration in Chile as Harvard economist and billionaire Sebastián Piñera eked out a narrow victory in January.  Interestingly this is related to the rest of the world as we also see today Greek police, dressed in the Darth Vader costumes used in every country, cracking down hard on their poor countrymen.  They have been robbed by the elite financier/politician tag-teams that roam the world attacking whichever country and currency they choose. 

Since almost every currency is just a debt-based instrument, the tag-teams are quite successful.  Despite the claims of neoclassical economics and the theories of Harvard Business School, having a debt-based currency means that governments are not in charge of their countries.  We are living in a world governed by the bond market, billionaires, and elite financial institutions, not governments.  The future is grim if this isn’t changed.

People who dismiss this will learn the painful lesson in due course.  Most countries, especially the United States, are now stuck under incomprehensible levels of debt just waiting for financiers to attack.  National foreclosure is coming.  Those who paid attention when it happened to southeast Asian countries, Russia, Argentina, Mexico, and others know what is coming.  People who are paying attention now to Greece can see what is coming—the end of cash transactions, the loss of sovereign land, the privatization of resources, massive taxation, the end of support for the lower classes, and an active police state. 

Plutocracy: Government by the Wealthy Few

The Greek protesters are chanting “no sacrifice for plutocracy” while being tear gassed and beaten.  It certainly isn’t the catchiest phrase I’ve ever heard, but it is precisely accurate.  The private sector rich rotate through the public sector so their nexus of power cannot be threatened.  The citizens of Iceland understood this and luckily took their power back by refusing to payoff the fraudulent loans of the foreign financiers.  Why has no other country done this?  Why have no US states, bankrupt for the same reason, done this?  In every situation other than Iceland, the politicians submit to the financiers, put their citizens in austerity, and sick the storm troopers on the poor like a pack of pit bulls. 
The reason they submit is primarily because mega banking institutions control money (see previous article on Wall Street http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/20368). 

But politicians also submit because they are willing accomplices.  They increase deficits and participate in the game that builds up the leverage in the first place, which makes a few people very rich. Then when debt deflation or a currency attack occurs, they continue playing the game.  We have seen this in the United States over the last several years as presidents let the near-billionaire Harvard boys Robert Rubin and Hank Paulson setup the game, not to mention the not as rich Ivy Leaguers like Larry Summers and Tim Geithner.  So far trillions have been stripped from the American people.  But we are only at half time.  You will know when the 2nd half has started when you look outside your front window and see the picture from Greece above.

The few politicians and financiers I am talking about have been playing this game together for a long time.  They are bred in a world separate from you and me.  They live in the same elite enclaves, attend the same private prep schools, go to the same Ivy League colleges, business schools, and law schools, and then spread out between New York and Washington DC to continue their self-serving partnership.  Again, I’m talking about a small group, not 95% of the graduates of these institutions. 

A useful indicator for whether someone is part of the select few or not is narcissism.  Are they ruthless overachievers for a paycheck?  Is class status important to them?  Do they have contempt for the average person?  Do they strive to become part of the oligarchic elite in clubs like the Council on Foreign Relations? The answer is yes to all of those questions for some very key names we have seen over the last several years:

Robert Rubin – CFR, Harvard, Goldman, Treasury, Citi
Hank Paulson – CFR, Harvard, Goldman, Treasury
Larry Summers – CFR, Harvard, Treasury, World Bank
Tim Geithner – CFR, Dartmouth, Treasury, Fed, IMF
Jamie Dimon – CFR, Harvard, Chase, Fed

The list could go on for a while.  It includes both the private sector folks getting fabulously rich from our monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy over the last 30 years, and the government officials who are making the policy.  In fact the officials making the policy ARE the rich private sector few who benefit from it—the definition of plutocracy and oligarchy.

You will not see people on this list who would be true public servants: 

Brooksley Born – tried to stop the Harvard boys under Clinton
William Black – defended the country in the S&L scandal
Janet Tavakoli – explains the public-private fraud better than almost anyone
Eliot Spitzer – could be the modern Teddy Roosevelt going after the plutocrats

People like this are capable of compassion and concern for fellow human beings.  They can see through Ivy League schmarm and are not controlled by a desire to be part of the inside clique.  They do not suffer from narcissism, which is easy to detect as you see them talk on TV (actually Spitzer is narcissistic, but he is the type that wants to fight the establishment narcissists, so he is a real public servant).  If these people ran Treasury, SEC, FDIC, Justice, and other regulatory agencies, we might have a country with a future for the average person.  Instead we only see the connected few in these positions. 

Harvard Economists, Debt Lords, and Billionaires in Government

In the US, the Harvard economists and billionaires who want to run things have to hide behind lawyers and corporate institutions or be appointed to unelected positions like Treasury Secretary because our citizens would never vote for them.  But something has changed in Chile where for decades they voted for public servants who have worked to eliminate poverty but have now put a Harvard economist and billionaire in office. 

How did Sebastián Piñera become a billionaire?  The same way the most powerful people in the world make money—by using debt to suck wealth from the population creating all the value.  He founded credit card company Bancard and helped put the Chilean people in debt to the Anglo banking model.  Will someone like this serve the public interest?

Well, here’s a scary thought experiment:  would Jamie Dimon, CEO of the biggest debt machine in the US and insider on the NY Federal Reserve Board, be a president who cares about you?  Any narcissist who can lecture lower class Americans to pay their debts, the source of his wealth, while his firm is in the process of tripling credit card rates and kicking them out of their homes has no business coming anywhere close to the public sector.  This is the type of guy who now runs Chile.  Of course with Rubin, Paulson, and their protégé Geithner in Treasury, this is also the type of guy who has run the US for several years.

As a fellow Harvard Business School alum, guys like Jamie Dimon and Hank Paulson embarrass and disgust me by furthering the financial empire system beyond reasonable means to keep lining their wallets while impoverishing the American Republic and conquering other nations.  There are more just like them in the select club.  But even worse than these MBAs chasing paychecks is the Harvard economist Larry Summers who creates the economic structure within which the MBAs operate.  He tore down Glass-Steagall and led the free market jihad against any and all regulation in derivatives, which setup the Wall Street structure that brought us to the crash of 2008.  He and his colleague Andrei Shleifer tried to privatize Russia in 1998 and hand it over to the wealthy oligarchs, while Shleifer was personally profiting from insider trades on Russian companies.  Then while he was president of the institution, he had Harvard pay the legal settlement for Shleifer, infuriating other Harvard professors.  Summers also helped put Mexico in debt and reinforce the plutocratic regime there in the peso crisis of 1994. 

These people need to be stopped.  It should be clear by now that Harvard MBAs voraciously pursuing paychecks running mega financial institutions, after Harvard economists have rigged the regulatory system, can do a lot of damage.  The citizens of Iceland have realized this and set the example.  If other countries fail to follow, their populations face a future clash with their police just as Greece is experiencing today.  Why the police agree to make war against their own people in order to protect rich guys is a topic for another article, but it could all be avoided if countries would just reassert their sovereignty. 

  • Start phasing out debt-based currencies by creating sovereign ones that are an asset to the people.  Pass usury laws at the same time to prevent banks from jacking up rates to suck up this extra money and creating a financial catastrophe.
  • Put people like Born, Black, Tavakoli, and Spitzer in charge.
  • Breakup the Wall Street banks.  Also end their cartel by nationalizing the Federal Reserve, thereby passing power back to the states and state-chartered banks.
  • Push your state governments to spend asset money into the system (see the Minnesota Transportation Act).  California and Illinois are about to be pushed into Greece’s foreclosure situation.  It does not need to happen if only the governments would do their constitutional duty.
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EXPLOSIVE: Lehman – Where Are The Cops?

EXPLOSIVE: Lehman – Where Are The Cops?

Posted by Karl Denninger

Sarbanes-Oxley was supposed to prevent crap like this:

From the paper:

Lehman employed off-balance sheet devices, known within Lehman as “Repo 105” and “Repo 108” transactions, to temporarily remove securities inventory from its balance sheet, usually for a period of seven to ten days, and to create a materially misleading picture of the firm’s financial condition in late 2007 and 2008.2847

Oh yeah, that’s legal?  It’s not supposed to be!

Lehman regularly increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days prior to reporting periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage and balance sheet.2850  Lehman’s periodic reports did not disclose the cash borrowing from the Repo 105 transaction – i.e., although Lehman had in effect borrowed tens of billions of dollars in these transactions, Lehman did not disclose the known obligation to repay the debt.2851  Lehman used the cash from the Repo 105 transaction to pay down other liabilities, thereby reducing both the total liabilities and the total assets reported on its balance sheet and lowering its leverage ratios.

Isn’t that special?

It gets better, as you might expect.

The Examiner concludes that colorable claims of breach of fiduciary duty exist against Richard Fuld, Chris O’Meara, Erin Callan, and Ian Lowitt, and that a colorable claim of professional malpractice exists against Arthur Anderson Ernst & Young.2915  (strikethrough mine, not in the original)

It is stated that Government Regulators (FRBNY and The SEC) had “no knowledge” of these practices.  Perhaps true.  But this calls into question why we’re hearing of this just now, and whether other firms have or are at present doing the same sort of thing.

There also appears to be a colorable claim that Lehman Management was fully-aware of what was going on:

Although interview statements given to the Examiner were inconsistent at times, no reasonable dispute exists that each of Lehman’s Chief Financial Officers from late 2007 to September 2008 possessed some knowledge of and/or involvement with multiple aspects of Lehman’s Repo 105 program, including the existence of firm-wide Repo 105 limits, the volume of Repo 105 activity Lehman engaged in at quarter?end, and Lehman’s efforts to manage its balance sheet using Repo 105 transactions.

Well that’s special.

But we’re just getting warmed up.

Remember, The Feral Reserve is supposed to by the “uber-regulator” and the “safety and soundness” manager for the financial system.

They did a great job, right?  Well…

For example, when

the Examiner questioned Lehman executives and other witnesses about Lehman’s financial health and reporting, a recurrent theme in their responses was that Lehman gave full and complete financial information to Government agencies, and that the Government never raised significant objections or directed that Lehman take any corrective action.

True?  Let’s see what the Examiner had to say:

Although various Government agencies had information that raised serious questions about Lehman’s reported liquidity and about the sufficiency of its capital and liquidity to withstand stress scenarios, the agencies generally limited their activities to collecting data and monitoring.

Oh.  They looked but didn’t act.  I see.

Indeed, they looked pretty closely….

After March 2008 when the SEC and FRBNY began onsite daily monitoring of Lehman, the SEC deferred to the FRBNY to devise more rigorous stress?testing scenarios to test Lehman’s ability to withstand a run or potential run on the bank.5753 The FRBNY developed two new stress scenarios: “Bear Stearns” and “Bear Stearns Light.”5754 Lehman failed both tests.5755 The FRBNY then developed a new set of assumptions for an additional round of stress tests, which Lehman also failed.5756 However, Lehman ran stress tests of its own, modeled on similar assumptions, and passed.5757 It does not appear that any agency required any action of Lehman in response to the results of the stress testing.

So let’s see what we got here.  They ran two sets of stress tests and the firm failed both.  Not satisfied with the results they then designed a third set, which the firm also failed (we can reasonably presume the third had less stringent requirements than the other two!)

Instead of applying any of these three, FRBNY, which was run by one MR. TIMOTHY GEITHNER, NOW OUR TREASURY SECRETARY WHO REPORTED TO ONE BEN BERNANKE, instead took Lehman’s word that all was ok and did nothing.

Wait a minute. In the spring of 2009 we were told that all the big banks ran “Stress Tests” of Geithner’s design.  But Treasury didn’t actually run them and didn’t actually get and process the data – they told the banks to do so

Uh, that’s exactly what Lehman did, right?  And Lehman passed its own “internally computed” stress test but failed all three of the externally-computed ones.

Do you still accept that all these other banks are solvent?  What about the facts we do know – such as the inconvenient fact that between them the “big banks” have something like $150 billion of Home Equity lines behind an underwater and delinquent first mortgage, which is, by the way, worth zero yet being carried at or near full value……

Nor did it end there.

The SEC inspection revealed significant problems at Lehman. The SEC found that Lehman’s Price Valuation Group was understaffed; and it found that Lehman’s asset pricing function was overly “process driven.”5761 But the SEC did not release its findings or formally present them to Lehman prior to Lehman’s demise.

So The SEC knew, and they too did nothing.

It’s worse.  While Geithner is implicated as being “concerned” about Lehman in the paper, the most-troubling part the narrative is here:

The challenge for the Government, and for troubled firms like Lehman, was to reduce risk exposure, and the act of reducing risk by selling assets could result in “collateral damage” by demonstrating weakness and exposing “air” in the marks.5823

Air?

Uh, that’s an apparent admission that FRBNY and Tim Geithner specifically knew that the marks that these banks were taking on their assets was materially and intentionally false.

Where have we seen this of late?  Oh yeah – in all those banks that have failed of late, with 25-40% discounts to their claimed balance sheet values when the marks are actually reduced to losses to the deposit fund by the FDIC!

So let’s see here.  We now have:

  1. Geithner, and presumably everyone under him, knew the marks on these assets were fictions months before Lehman failed, yet they intentionally concealed this fact from the market and took no action (nor did the SEC) to disclose this intentional misdirection.

  2. The misdirection and false claims in this regard are almost certainly continuing today, as evidenced by the FDIC seizures literally on an every-week basis.

How about Bernanke?  While he maintains (as did Geithner) that primary responsibility lay with the SEC, he also said:

Our concern was about the financial system, and we knew the implications for the greater financial system would be catastrophic, and it was.”

What does all this say about the stability of things now?

Yeah, I know, everyone’s “too big to fail.” 

But what if the truth is that they’re “too big to bail“, for instance, if one of the “big four” was to get in trouble today due to a recognition in the marketplace that not only is this what blew up Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, but that the same chicanery with “asset values” is continuing even today, and as such one cannot be reasonably certain that liquidity provided today will be repaid tomorrow?

Why is it that if the implications would be catastrophic (and they were), both the SEC and FRBNY knew that Lehman had insufficient liquidity long before the collapse (and they did) neither the SEC, The Federal Reserve or FRBNY did a damn thing to blow the whistle on this crap and put a stop to it?

This report sets out a damning case against the pseudo-government and government actors, who it is alleged were well-aware of critical weaknesses in Lehman’s risk controls and liquidity months before it collapsed, yet none of them did a damn thing about it until days before the bankruptcy filing.

Why should any of the clown-car riders who clearly knew that this situation existed for literal months before it blew up, yet did nothing, still retain their jobs and, in Geithner’s case, obtain a promotion?  These people are unqualified for supervisory positions involving anything more complicated than handing out towels in the men’s room.

The key question facing the nation this evening is not, however, the past.  It is the future.  We have over 100 literal instances in which banks have been seized by the FDIC since Lehman blew up in which their balance sheet “asset values” have been shown by the FDIC’s own DIF loss projections to be abject fictions, yet none of these institutions have been flagged to investors or the public, no indictments or civil complaints have been brought by the SEC or Department of Justice, and they have remained operating for months with these bogus values exhibited for bank examiners and regulators to see.

IF – and I stress IF – these fictions are also present in our large banking institutions, and there is NO REASON TO BELIEVE THEY ARE NOT, it is simply a matter of time before one or more of them detonates in a similar if not identical fashion.  Since these firms are all much larger than Lehman and neither the FDIC or Treasury has a spare $500 billion laying around for the potential payout to depositors that might be necessary in such an instance, we cannot reasonably assume that the risk of financial Armageddon has in fact passed until we know for a fact that all fictional balance sheets are excised and all off-sheet exposures accounted for.

LOLZ Courtesy of LOLFed

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Europe's Banks Brace for UK Debt Crisis

 

Europe’s Banks Brace for UK Debt Crisis

UniCredit has alerted investors in a client note that Britain is at serious risk of a bond market and sterling debacle and faces even more intractable budget woes than Greece.

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor

Big Ben - Europe's banks brace for UK debt crisis

No turning back: Sterling is going to fall further over coming months, warns Unicredit

The Italian-German group, Europe’s second largest bank, said Britain’s tax structure will make it hard to raise fresh revenue quickly enough to restore confidence in UK public finances.

“I am becoming convinced that Great Britain is the next country that is going to be pummelled by investors,” said Kornelius Purps, Unicredit ‘s fixed income director and a leading analyst in Germany.

Mr Purps said the UK had been cushioned at first by low debt levels but the pace of deterioration has been so extreme that the country can no longer count on market tolerance.

“Britain’s AAA-rating is highly at risk. The budget deficit is huge at 13pc of GDP and investors are not happy. The outgoing government is inactive due to the election. There will have to be absolute cuts in public salaries or pay, but nobody is talking about that,” he told The Daily Telegraph.

“Sterling is going to fall further over coming months. I am not expecting a crash of the gilts market but we may see a further rise in spreads of 30 to 50 basis points.”

Yields on 10-year gilts have already crept up to 4.14pc, compared to 3.94pc for Italian bonds, 3.48pc for French bonds, and 3.19pc for German Bunds, though part of this reflects worries about higher inflation in Britain.

Ian Stannard, currency strategist at BNP Paribas, said markets are fretting over how the UK will cover its deficit following the pause in quantitative easing by the Bank of England. The Bank has absorbed £200bn of debt, more than total Treasury issuance over the last year.

“The UK may have difficulty in attracting extra investors to fill the gap. We think they will have to do more QE as recovery falters,” he said.

BNP Paribas expects sterling to drop to $1.31 against the dollar this year and reach parity against the euro despite troubles in Club Med. “We’re very bearish on the UK,” he said.

Big global banks are divided over Britain’s economic prospects . Goldman Sachs is betting on a turbo-charged recovery as the delayed effects of sterling devaluation kick in. Britain’s trump card is an average debt maturity of 14.1 years, nearly three times US maturities and double those of France. This greatly reduces the risk of a “roll-over” crisis.

UniCredit said Greece is better placed than the UK in coming months even if deficits look comparable. “The polls point to a minority government in the UK, while Greece’s government can count on a majority to push austerity measures through parliament. Secondly, the British tax system offers less leverage for a rise in revenue,” he said.

Paradoxically, Greek tax evasion creates scope for a surge in revenues from tougher enforcement. “It is not out of the question that we will see a positive surprise in Greece: is there any such hope for Britain?” said Mr Purps.

Still, while it is arguable whether a hung Parliament in Britain will lead to policy drift, analysts said Greece was in trouble already. The country was brought to a standstill on Thursday by the second general strike in weeks. Police clashed with rioters , again reducing Athens to a fog of tear gas. Observers said that did not augur well for a nation that has hardly begun its three-year ordeal of draconian cuts.

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The "Repo 105" Scam: How Lehman Fooled Everyone (Including Allegedly Dick Fuld) And How Other Banks Are Likely Doing This Right Now

The “Repo 105″ Scam: How Lehman Fooled Everyone (Including Allegedly Dick Fuld) And How Other Banks Are Likely Doing This Right Now

Submitted by Tyler Durden

Presenting a detailed look at “Repo 105″ – the next soundbite sure to fill the airwaves over the next weeks and months, as more and more banks are uncovered to be using this borderline criminal accounting gimmick to make their leverage ratios look better. This is the first time we have heard this loophole abuse by a bank, be it defunct (Lehman) or existing (everyone else). There should be an immediate investigation into how many other banks are currently taking advantage of this artificial scheme to manipulate and misrepresent their cap ratio, and just why the New York Fed can claim it had no idea of this very critical component of the Shadow Economy.

From the report:

Lehman employed off?balance sheet devices, known within Lehman as “Repo 105” and “Repo 108” transactions, to temporarily remove securities inventory from its balance sheet, usually for a period of seven to ten days, and to create a materially misleading picture of the firm’s financial condition in late 2007 and 2008. Repo 105 transactions were nearly identical to standard repurchase and resale (“repo”) transactions that Lehman (and other investment banks) used to secure short?term financing, with a critical difference: Lehman accounted for Repo 105 transactions as “sales” as opposed to financing transactions based upon the overcollateralization or higher than normal haircut in a Repo 105 transaction. By recharacterizing the Repo 105 transaction as a “sale,” Lehman removed the inventory from its balance sheet.
Lehman regularly increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days prior to reporting periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage and balance sheet. Lehman’s periodic reports did not disclose the cash borrowing from the Repo 105 transaction – i.e., although Lehman had in effect borrowed tens of billions of dollars in these transactions, Lehman did not disclose the known obligation to repay the debt. Lehman used the cash from the Repo 105 transaction to pay down other liabilities, thereby reducing both the total liabilities and the total assets reported on its balance sheet and lowering its leverage ratios. Thus, Lehman’s Repo 105 practice consisted of a two?step process: (1) undertaking Repo 105 transactions followed by (2) the use of Repo 105 cash borrowings to pay down liabilities, thereby reducing leverage. A few days after the new quarter began, Lehman would borrow the necessary funds to repay the cash borrowing plus interest, repurchase the securities, and restore the assets to its balance sheet.
Lehman never publicly disclosed its use of Repo 105 transactions, its accounting treatment for these transactions, the considerable escalation of its total Repo 105 usage in late 2007 and into 2008, or the material impact these  transactions had on the firm’s publicly reported net leverage ratio. According to former Global Financial Controller Martin Kelly, a careful review of Lehman’s Forms 10?K and 10?Q would not reveal Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions. Lehman failed to disclose its Repo 105 practice even though Kelly believed “that the only purpose or motive for the transactions was reduction in balance sheet;” felt that “there was no substance to the transactions;” and expressed concerns with Lehman’s Repo 105 program to two consecutive Lehman Chief Financial Officers – Erin Callan and Ian Lowitt – advising them that the lack of economic substance to Repo 105 transactions meant “reputational riskto Lehman if the firm’s use of the transactions became known to the public. In addition to its material omissions, Lehman affirmatively misrepresented in its financial statements that the firm treated all repo transactions as financing transactions – i.e., not sales – for financial reporting purposes.

And here is the Fed punchline, as it once again implicates Tim Geithner:

From 2003 to 2009, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner served as President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”). The Examiner described to Secretary Geithner how Lehman used Repo 105 transactions to remove  approximately $50 billion of liquid assets from the balance sheet at quarter?end in 2008 and explained that this practice reduced Lehman’s net leverage. Secretary Geithner “did not recall being aware of” Lehman’s Repo 105 program, but stated: “If this had been a bank we were supervising, that [i.e., Lehman’s Repo 105 program] would have been a huge issue for the New York Fed.”

And even though the Fed should have been fully aware of any shadow transaction be they “matched book” repos or the “105 variety, nobody had any clue. Just who the hell was regulating banks???

Jan Voigts, who was an Examining Officer in FRBNY’s Bank Supervision Department, had no knowledge of Lehman removing assets from its balance sheet at or near quarter?end via a repo trade treated as a true sale under a United Kingdom opinion letter.

Arthur Angulo, who was a Senior Vice President in FRBNY’s Bank Supervision department, likewise was unaware that Lehman engaged in repo transactions at quarter?end, under a United Kingdom true sale opinion letter, where the assets would be returned to Lehman’s balance sheet following the end of the reporting period. Angulo said that the described repo transactions appeared to go “beyond other types of [permissible] balance sheet management.” Angulo also said that he would have wanted to know about off?market transactions where Lehman accepted a higher haircutthan a repo seller normally would accept for a certain type of collateral.

Thomas Baxter, FRBNY General Counsel, had no knowledge of Repo 105 transactions, either by name or design. Baxter was generally aware of firms using quarter?end and month?end “balance sheet window?dressing,” but did not recall this being an issue linked to Lehman specifically.

Stunningly, nobody at the SEC was aware of Lehman’s Repo 105 program. And guess what: NEITHER DID DICK FULD. This is unbelievable – the criminality reaches to the very top, yet the very top denies all knowledge.

Richard Fuld, Lehman’s former Chief Executive Officer denied any recollection of Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions. Fuld said he had no knowledge that Lehman treated any kind of repo transaction as a true sale or that Lehman ever removed from its balance sheet assets transferred in a repo transaction. In addition, Fuld did not recall having seen any reports referencing the amount of the firm’s Repo 105 activity. Fuld further stated that he did not know that Lehman removed approximately $49 and $50 billion in inventory off its balance sheet at quarter?end
through the use of Repo 105 transactions in first quarter 2008 and second quarter 2008, respectively. Fuld said, however, that if he had learned that Lehman was temporarily cleansing its balance sheet of assets at quarter?end through Repo 105 transactions, it would have concerned him.

Evidence, however, suggests that Fuld is blatantly lying:

Fuld’s denial of recollection must be weighed by a trier of fact against other evidence. Fuld recalled having many conversations with his executives about reducing net leverage and emphasized to the Examiner how important it was for Lehman to reduce its net leverage. The night before the March 28, 2008 Executive Committee meeting, Fuld received materials for the meeting, including an agenda of topics including “Repo 105/108” and “Delever v Derisk” and a presentation that referenced Lehman’s quarter?end Repo 105 usage for first quarter 2008 – $49.1 billion.  The materials also were forwarded by Fuld’s assistant to other Lehman executives. It appears that Fuld did not attend the March 28 meeting, but Bart McDade recalled having specific discussions with Fuld about Lehman’s Repo 105 usage in June 2008. Sometime that month, McDade spoke to Fuld about reducing Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions. McDade walked Fuld through the Balance Sheet and Key Disclosures document (reproduced in part below) and discussed with Fuld Lehman’s quarter?end Repo 105 usage – $38.6 billion at year?end 2007; $49.1 billion at first quarter 2008; and $50.3 billion at second quarter 2008.

Based upon their conversation, McDade understood that “Fuld knew, at a basic level, that Repo 105 was used in the firm’s bond business” and that Fuld “was familiar with the term Repo 105.”3524 McDade recalled that when he advised Fuld in June 2008 that Lehman should reduce its Repo 105 usage to $25 billion, “Fuld understood that this would put pressure on traders.”3525 McDade also recalled that “Fuld knew about the accounting of Repo 105.”

Combing through the Appendix on what collateral was actually “sold” (only to be promptly bought back) in Repo 105s:

Most securities Lehman used in Repo 105 transactions were “governmental” in nature, implying a certain level of liquidity. While representing a relatively small percentage of Lehman’s total Repo 105 assets/securities, at times the nominal amount of non?”governmental” securities Lehman used in Repo 105 transactions was quite large. For example, as of February 29, 2008 (the end of Lehman’s first quarter 2008), Lehman utilized over $1 billion of highly structured securities, i.e., CLOs and CDOs, private RMBS, CMBS and asset?backed securities, in Repo 105 transactions. In the market environment that existed for Lehman in early 2008, these structured securities were likely relatively illiquid as indicated by declines in origination volumes, wider bid?offer spreads, and higher margin requirements.

In August 2008, just before it was over, the firm allowed $55 million, or seven securities, rated CCC to be included in a Repo 105 transaction.

The next chart makes it evident it that 105s were used simply to game the firm’s assets into quarter end (yellow highlights), by reducing overall asset for leverage ratio calculations.

That this scam was going unsupervised (just who the hell were the counterparties?) for many years, and that many banks are likely using it right now to fool investors, regulators, rating agencies, and the idiots at the FRBNY (who certainly also know about this), is beyond criminal. Yet that nobody will go to jail for this is as certain as the market going up another 10% tomorrow. A full investigation has to be conducted immediately into whether existing Wall Street firms, and in particular those who use Ernst & Young as auditors, are currently abusing public confidence via such transactions.

Full report

Repo 105

 Lehman Part II

Presenting The Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner Report

Submitted by Tyler Durden

We present the first two volumes (out of 9) of the massive 2,200 page compendium that represents the just declassified examiner’s report in the Lehman bankruptcy case. We will post the other volumes shortly. Below are the key findings from a quick perusal of Anton Valukas’ report, which we will be combing through over the next week. Pay particular attention to the Repo 105 scam which allows banks to materially misrepresent their leverage ratios whenever they so choose, thank you FASB, corrupt auditors (in this case E&Y) and Federal Reserve.

Some observations:

Lehman actively misrepresented its capital ratio with the benefit of Fed complicity, because instead of using traditional Repo transactions, it used “Repo 105″ which allowed repos to be treated as asset sales instead of financings. Will someone please ask uberregulator Fed how many other banks are using this borderline illegal accounting scheme RIGHT NOW to misrepresent their net leverage ratios?

  • Lehman was forced to announce a quarterly loss of $2.8 billion – resulting from a combination of write?downs on assets, sales of assets at losses, decreasing revenues, and losses on hedges – it sought to cushion the bad news by trumpeting that it had significantly reduced its net leverage ratio to less than 12.5, that it had reduced the net assets on its balance sheet by $60 billion, and that it had a strong and robust liquidity pool.
  • Lehman did not disclose, however, that it had been using an accounting device (known within Lehman as “Repo 105”) to manage its balance sheet – by temporarily removing approximately $50 billion of assets from the balance sheet at the end of the first and second quarters of 2008.  In an ordinary repo, Lehman raised cash by selling assets with a simultaneous obligation to repurchase them the next day or several days later; such transactions were accounted for as financings, and the assets remained on Lehman’s balance sheet. In a Repo 105 transaction, Lehman did exactly the same thing, but because the assets were 105% or more of the cash received, accounting rules permitted the transactions to be treated as sales rather than financings, so that the assets could be removed from the balance sheet. With Repo 105 transactions, Lehman’s reported net leverage was 12.1 at the end of the second quarter of 2008; but if Lehman had used ordinary repos, net leverage would have to have been reported at 13.9
  • Lehman did not disclose its use – or the significant magnitude of its use – of Repo 105 to the Government, to the rating agencies, to its investors, or to its own Board of Directors. Lehman’s auditors, Ernst & Young, were aware of but did not question Lehman’s use and nondisclosure of the Repo 105 accounting transactions. [And why should auditors question anything even remotely shady? After all they need to feed the monkey too.]

The case for why the Fed would be a truly horrible systemic regulator. Here is what happened at Lehman according to Valukas

  • Lehman decided to exceed the firm?wide risk appetite limit at several junctures.
  • First, though Lehman dramatically increased the limit for fiscal 2007, Lehman nevertheless approached the new limit by May 2007.
  • Then, in early October 2007, when Lehman’s risk appetite excesses were at their peak, at least some members of Lehman’s senior management discussed the limit breaches and decided to grant a temporary reprieve from the limits  based on the difficult conditions in the real estate and leveraged loan markets.
  • Rather than reduce its risk usage, Lehman cured its risk appetite overages by increasing the firm?wide risk appetite limit yet again.

The firm cooked its books:

  • Lehman also failed to apply its balance sheet limits in late 2007. Application of these limits would also have restricted Lehman’s risk?taking. Instead, Lehman dramatically increased the size of its balance sheet, and used increasingly large  volumes of Repo 105 transactions to create the appearance that the firm’s net leverage ratio remained within a reasonable range of such ratios established by the rating agencies.

The SEC was aware of the BS going on at Lehman:

  • Lehman’s stress tests suffered from a significant flaw. Although Lehman made a strategic decision in 2006 to take more principal risk, Lehman did not modify its stress tests to include the risks arising from many of its principal investments – including its real estate investments other than commercial mortgage backed securities (“CMBS”), its private equity investments, and, during a crucial period, its leveraged loan commitments.
  • The SEC was aware that Lehman’s stress tests excluded untraded investments and did not question the exclusion, because historically it had been the norm to limit stress tests only to traded positions.

The firm overindulged in speculative garbage LBO loan positions:

  • Lehman’s principal investment strategy also included participating in leveraged loan transactions. This business grew spectacularly in 2006 and the first half of 2007. Many of these loans were made to private equity firms, or sponsors, who were purchasing companies as part of leveraged buy?outs.
  • These transactions were risky for Lehman because they consumed tremendous amounts of capital, were made on terms that strongly favored the borrowers, and often involved bridge equity or bridge debt that Lehman hoped to distribute to other financial institutions (but was committed to keep for itself if it was unable to do so).

Lastly, Lehman directors can sleep well. Once again, nobody in the world is guilty for the biggest corporate bankruptcy in history:

  • The Examiner Does Not Find Colorable Claims That Lehman’s Senior Officers Breached Their Fiduciary Duty to Inform the
    Board of Directors Concerning the Level of Risk Lehman Had Assumed
  • The Examiner Does Not Find Colorable Claims That Lehman’s Directors Breached Their Fiduciary Duty by Failing to Monitor
    Lehman’s Risk?Taking Activities
  • Lehman’s Directors are Protected From Duty of Care Liability by the Exculpatory Clause and the Business Judgment Rule
  • Lehman’s Directors Did Not Violate Their Duty of Loyalty
  • Lehman’s Directors Did Not Violate Their Duty to Monitor

On the much prevalent conflict of interest of selling portfolios that one has originated (especially as pertains to Goldman’s assorted CDOs held by AIG):

  • In one memorandum, Lehman’s Head of Global Strategy expressed the concern that “the team responsible for selling down these positions is the same one that originated them.”628 But several witnesses denied there was any incentive not to sell down the portfolio because they knew that no one in GREG would be getting a 2008 bonus

Attached are Volume one of the report (just the first 240 pages, including the 45 page table of contents) and Volume two. We will upload the remainder shortly.

Attachment Size
Attachment Size
Lehman Valukas 1.pdf 1.31 MB
Valukas Volume 2.pdf 2.62 MB

WHY AREN’T PEOPLE BEHIND BARS FOR THIS?!!  Timothy Geithner knew about this.  Dick Fuld knew about this.  Our Treasury Secretary (then head of the New York Federal Reserve) looked the other way while this fraud went on and KNOWINGLY transferred this obligation to the taxpayers!

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Oh Mr. President and Congress (El-Erian)

 

Oh Mr. President and Congress (El-Erian)

Posted by Karl Denninger

Well now this is a rather interesting editorial:

Today, we should all be paying attention to a new theme: the simultaneous and significant deterioration in the public finances of many advanced economies. At present this is being viewed primarily – and excessively – through the narrow prism of Greece. Down the road, it will be recognised for what it is: a significant regime shift in advanced economies with consequential and long-lasting effects. To stay ahead of the process, we should keep the following six points in mind.

El-Erian goes on to list six points that make most people’s eyes glaze over.  Indeed, the entire editorial is one of those things that reminds one of Alan Greenspan and his famous “how to write 3,000 words and yet never find two people who agree on what you said.”

The final three paragraphs are worth reading though:

This leads to the sixth and final point. We should expect (rather than be surprised by) damaging recognition lags in both the public and private sectors. Playbooks are not readily available when it comes to new systemic themes. This leads many to revert to backward-looking analytical models, the thrust of which is essentially to assume away the relevance of the new systemic phenomena.

You mean things like taking in 30% of what the government spends via taxes, then dismissing this as “oh we’ll just issue some more T-bills”?

There is a further complication. Timely recognition is necessary but not sufficient. It must be followed by the correct response. Here, history suggests that it is not easy for companies and governments to overcome the tyranny of backward-looking internal commitments.

Uh, did you parse that one folks?

“…..tyranny of backward-looking internal commitments”

That’s code for “entitlements that were promised to people but cannot possibly be provided, no matter how long people howl – or how loudly.”

Where does all this leave us? Our sense is that the importance of the shock to public finances in advanced economies is not yet sufficiently appreciated and understood. Yet, with time, it will prove to be highly consequential. The sooner this is recognised (sp), the greater the probability of being able to stay ahead of the disruptions rather than be hurt by them.

Forget it.  One need only look to Greece, where telling people they have to actually go to work and produce something in order to earn a public-sector salary produces riots.

If you think we’re “more advanced” in our thinking here in the United States you’re simply insane.

Times like this require a man in the left seat with a big fat church-bell sized set of balls, and the willingness to be unpopular enough to be a one-term wonder.  This is inherently in conflict with the narcissist personality required to run for President in the first place.

Nobody who wants the job and is electable to the office is fit for it at a time like this.  I’d do it if drafted, but I’d never put up with the crap required to get there, nor am I electable – because I refuse to lie in the fashion required to obtain the office.  Stumping for votes while pointing out that promising to pay $100 trillion in Social Security and Medicare that we don’t have and can’t acquire, that if we try to print our way out of debt that “obligation” will go from $100 trillion to $250 trillion (which still can’t be paid), and that the sort of measures required to bring the economy and government back into balance – at both a state and federal level – will result in massive shifts in the economy’s balance and, in the short-term, lead to even more pain, are not popular.  To the contrary – not one person receiving those handouts would vote for me, and since they’re nearly half the population there’s not a snowball’s chance in Hades that I could carry the day at the polls.

So what’s required is a paradox.  You need a man or woman who will run for the office saying all the “right things” while lying through their teeth.  Someone who will shed that veneer the instant the election is over, then take the left seat and be a five-alarm bastard once in office, placing a big sign on the door “$ = NO!”

Someone who will take a look at The Constitution and if they can’t find whatever it is being proposed in the four corners of the text, it’s gone.  That is, Social Security and Medicare – gone.  Provide some sort of subsidy to the states with whatever we’ve actually got in the so-called “Trust Fund” (that is, distribute to them the “special Treasuries” in the so-called “box”) and immediately end FICA.  The States are then free to run the programs as they see fit.  This will instantly force accountability and a transition to a privately-owned pair of accounts, or perhaps one account that provides both functions, since people move and won’t accept anything else.

Someone who will align tax revenue with GDP permanently and radically.  This means The Fair Tax, and if Congress won’t enact it, then The President does it by executive order – by abolishing the IRS’ funding and authority!  Issue an executive order barring the DOJ and other Federal Law Enforcement from enforcing anything in The Internal Revenue Code, and suddenly Congress will become far more reasonable since in order to acquire funds they will have to do the right thing.  Radical?  Yes.  Bye-bye 16th Amendment and “K Street.”

Now go find the rest.  Departments of Education and Agriculture, as just two examples: Gone.  All State Mandates from The Federal Government: Gone.

If you can’t find it in The Constitution it goes back to The States and is regulated within their borders.  The ability of the people to freely migrate from one state to another enforces fiscal responsibility – if you behave like a jackass, such as California has done, you will be rapidly de-populated and without a tax base, your policies fail.  End of discussion.  No more Federal Welfare of any sort.  If The States want to provide it and can fund it, goody for them.  More likely what happens is that The States suddenly find that they can provide lots of workfare doing things that need done, provided they outlaw public employee unions first to disarm those thugs.

On monetary policy it’s simple: The Fed either honors its actual written mandate or they’re gone too.  No more BS, no more opacity.  Everything they do is public and published on The Internet. Send up a bill mandating that any gaming of economic statistics or monetary policy is a federal offense garnering you 20-to-life in the can and demand that it pass or you’ll veto every bill that comes to your desk until it does.

On Credit Default Swaps and other instruments: All trade on a public exchange.  All exchanges in the US are public, non-profit organizations.  The Federal Government will run one and The States are welcome to set them up too – but only as public non-profits.  National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) is guaranteed by law with felony criminal penalties for anyone gaming it – like offering ”Flash Orders.”  Any federally-chartered institution that fails to adhere to One Dollar of Capital is instantaneously closed – without exception.  All firms trading on a public exchange or doing business in The United States across state borders (and therefore under proper federal regulation) is required to produce full, complete and truthful financial statements, without exception.  This means the use of off-balance sheet anything is absolutely prohibited under pain of immediate delisting and felony fraud prosecution.

We adopt a national policy that tariffs are set to provide wage parity.  This will produce howling from the WTO.  Tough.  No longer will we permit wage arbitrage as a reason to offshore jobs.  This is not only Constitutional, it is the premise upon which this nation was founded in terms of how the Federal Government is supposed to acquire its funds!  Combined with The Fair Tax, which will make the United States a corporate tax haven (zero corporate and personal income tax rate) this will result in an instantaneous flood of manufacturing and high-tech jobs back into the United States – all GDP boosters.  The United States GDP would double within a decade.

Refuse to sign any budget that does not run a primary surplus, except in times of declared war.  If Congress or The Administration wants to play International Cop it either funds the entire thing on-budget and pays for it or declares war and has the ability to do so via deficit spending.

Adopt Freedom’s Vision for monetary policy.  No more debt-backed currency.  If The Fed doesn’t like being relegated to a clearing house for payments that’s too damn bad.  Tell the CFTC you’d like them to list a “boiled rope” futures contract just to underline the point.

Radical?  Yes.

The only solution long-term?  Yes.

Will it happen?  Not unless our present Administration grows a set of balls, which it does not at present possess, or someone is willing to both lie themselves into office and then do it anyway.

As a consequence what El-Erian is talking about will happen – an “unexpected” recognition of the reality that what is being done today both is unsustainable and won’t work, but we will do nothing appropriate about any of it until we find ourselves well-off the cliff and furiously pedaling in the air like Wile-E-Coyote – and at that point it will be to late to avoid the ugly consequences.

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Taunting Taxpayers

 

Taunting Taxpayers

Americans are cutting back to make it through the recession, but members of Congress aren’t.

American families and businesses alike have been tightening their belts during hard times. They’ve been doing more with less, or simply doing without.

Meanwhile, in the Wonderland that is Washington, D.C., members of Congress have been letting their belts out. As South Florida’s Sun Sentinel recently reported, federal lawmakers voted themselves a 5 percent increase in their own budgets last year. They spent those taxpayer dollars for staff salaries — sometimes in six figures — office expenses and perks. In Florida’s delegation, the perks included chauffeured car trips, pricey auto leases and an office aquarium.

This hike in congressional budgets not only came at a time when ordinary Americans were hurting. It happened in a year when the federal government was running a record deficit, and inflation had leveled off.

Florida’s two U.S. senators have annual budgets for office expenses of more than $4 million each, while the state’s 25 House members each get about $1.5 million. When their budgets are combined with their Senate and House colleagues’, the total of less than $2 billion almost gets lost amid this year’s $3.6 trillion federal budget and $1.6 trillion projected deficit. Cutting congressional office expenses won’t balance the budget.

But when lawmakers refuse to hold themselves back in tough times, it sends a message to struggling Americans: Sacrificing is for suckers.

Consider these office expenses last year from Florida House members:

Democrat Corrine Brown of Jacksonville, who represents a district where the per capita income is only two-thirds of the U.S. average, spent almost $8,000 last year for herself and her staff to ride in chauffeured cars or SUVs.

Democrat Ron Klein of Boca Raton, a self-described deficit hawk, increased his office spending by $30,000.

Democrat Alcee Hastings of Miramar spent the most on staff. He paid two of them — one his longtime girlfriend — about $160,000 each. Both fell just below the $168,000 limit for congressional staff salaries.

Republican Mario Diaz-Balart of Miami leased a Honda Odyssey minivan for $803 a month.

Republican Tom Rooney of Tequesta spent almost $2,500 on an aquarium in his office. He also spent $628 on bottled water.

Among Florida’s House members, the top 10 office spenders last year were split evenly between Republicans and Democrats. The group included four members whose districts cover parts of Central Florida: Republicans Ginny Brown-Waite of Brooksville and Cliff Stearns of Ocala, and Democrats Alan Grayson of Orlando and Ms. Brown of Jacksonville.

Republican Adam Putnam of Bartow was the most frugal member of Central Florida’s delegation. His office spent just 76 percent of its budget allotment.

A year ago House Republican leader John Boehner of Ohio called for a freeze on federal spending. He argued that it was time for Washington, D.C. to “lead by example.” Some example. Mr. Boehner’s office reportedly spent almost $25,000 on catering in last year’s third quarter. During the same period, the office of Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California spent almost $3,000 on flowers.

Some combination of tax increases and spending cuts looms ahead for Americans if the deficit is to be brought under control. Members of Congress will have no moral authority to ask those sacrifices from Americans if they don’t starting making more of their own.

See what your rep is up to: Legistorm has staff salaries, earmarks, financial disclosures, foreign gifts, trips (and who paid for them) and a rating on all members of Congress:

http://www.legistorm.com/

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