FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘Barney Frank’ Category

Barney Frank: The Liar Is (Again) In The House

Posted by Karl Denninger

Will this man ever take responsibility for what he does?

Many second liens have little value because of the plunge in home prices, Rep. Frank wrote, adding: “Yet because accounting rules allow holders of these seconds to carry the loans at artificially high values, many refuse to acknowledge the losses and write down the loans.”

How did that happen Mr. Frank?

Oh yeah, I remember!  Your committee pressured FASB to drop “mark to market” accounting requirements last year!

That is, YOU were personally responsible for this crap.

Remember the subcommittee hearing chaired by your fool-in-chief Mr. Kanjorski?  I remember that circus show of horrors well.  In case you’ve forgotten, let me help jog your memory:

Washington, DC – Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski (D-PA), Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, today announced that the Subcommittee will hold a hearing to examine the mark-to-market accounting rules that many contend have exacerbated the current troubles in the financial industry and in the broader economy. The standard requires companies to value assets they hold at current market values. For assets that are frozen and have a diminished current market value but may recover value in the future, the standard has proven problematic. Companies are then forced to write-down billions in assets, which can lead to further write-downs elsewhere.

Like second mortgages, for instance?

Yeah.

This hearing was what prompted those banks to mark those loans to fantasy values, a practice they are still continuing to this day, even though if the first is underwater and goes into foreclosure the second is in fact worth zero. 

Therefore, a first that is both underwater and is late by 60 days or more is almost certain to either short sale or foreclose ultimately, and under mark to market rules the second would have to be written off.

But your committee, which sits over the subcommittee on Capital Markets, effectively bludgeoned FASB into legalizing the accounting fictions that you now complain about.

Indeed, the testimony of FASB was that:

The fact that fair value measures have been difficult to determine for some illiquid instruments is not a cause of current problems, but rather a symptom of the many problems that have contributed to the global crisis, including lax and fraudulent lending, excess leverage, the creation of complex and risky investments through securitization and derivatives, the global distribution of such investments across rapidly growing unregulated and opaque markets that lack a proper infrastructure for clearing mechanisms and price discovery, faulty ratings, and the absence of appropriate risk management and valuation processes at many financial institutions.

None of which, I might add, your Committee has bothered to address.

Having done nothing but bleat and ram down the throat of FASB changes in accounting standards that have legalized outright balance sheet fraud, you now have the temerity to complain about the results, when I and many others said at the time this would be precisely what would happen.

The solution to the problem is, of course, to reverse the outcome of that idiotic hearing and restore mark-to-market accounting forthwith for all bank assets.

Go look in the mirror Mr. Frank – you made this mess yourself, and while you’re at it drag that clown-car occupant Kanjorski with you.

Origins of an American Kleptocracy

Submitted by Marla Singer

Some days ago we wondered aloud at the blank check extended to Fannie and Freddie along with the suspiciously convenient timing of those announcements on Christmas Day.  Back then we wondered if we had been told the entire story.  To wit:

So.  Let us summarize:

We do not expect the GSEs to grow their portfolios at all, so we are fixing the bloated portfolio problem by easing the portfolio caps to permit a quarter trillion dollar expansion thereof.

We do not expect either of the GSEs to need more help from the Treasury, so we are responding to the underutilized $400 billion “lifeline” the GSEs have with the Treasury ($111 of which is currently used) by expanding it to… infinity.

Oh, and though they have collectively lost nearly $200 billion, we are paying the CEOs around $6 million each.

Great work team!  It’s already almost 11:00.  Let’s go to lunch.

The other shoe having now dropped, Bloomberg has joined in our skepticism:

Taxpayer losses from supporting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will top $400 billion, according to Peter Wallison, a former general counsel at the Treasury who is now a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

“The situation is they are losing gobs of money, up to $400 billion in mortgages,” Wallison said in a Bloomberg Television interview. The Treasury Department recognized last week that losses will be more than $400 billion when it raised its limit on federal support for the two government-sponsored enterprises, he said.

Wallison continues:

“It was always safe to buy these notes,” he said. The U.S. government was always going to stand behind them. They’re as good as Treasury notes.”

We are no longer sure this is the most inspiring comparison. Wallison also chimes in via the Wall Street Journal and points to a darker vein shot through the GSE story:

New research by Edward Pinto, a former chief credit officer for Fannie Mae and a housing expert, has found that from the time Fannie and Freddie began buying risky loans as early as 1993, they routinely misrepresented the mortgages they were acquiring, reporting them as prime when they had characteristics that made them clearly subprime or Alt-A.

In general, a subprime mortgage refers to the credit of the borrower. A FICO score of less than 660 is the dividing line between prime and subprime, but Fannie and Freddie were reporting these mortgages as prime, according to Mr. Pinto. Fannie has admitted this in a third-quarter 10-Q report in 2008.

But because of Fannie and Freddie’s mislabeling, there were millions more high-risk loans outstanding. That meant default rates as well as the actual losses after foreclosure were going to be outside all prior experience. When these rates began to show up early in 2007, it was apparent something was seriously wrong with assumptions on which AAA ratings had been based.

Losses, it was now certain, would invade the AAA tranches of the mortgage-backed securities outstanding. Investors, having lost confidence in the ratings, fled the MBS market and ultimately the market for all asset-backed securities. They have not yet returned.

It has become conventional wisdom, perhaps even cliche, to pin the origins of the credit crisis on the big banks or, AIG or even the practice of financial modeling.  Certainly, these actors have received the most play in the media, and have now endured the focus of populist ire for more than a year.  We now think that the analysis leading commentators to focus blame on these entities is fatally flawed.

We have seen no credible data that any of the large banks or other underwriters of mortgage backed securities (“MBSs”) or collaterized debt obligations (“CDOs”) or firms like AIG selling protection on same actually misrepresented the character of underlying collateral.  This is in direct contrast to the allegations of Edward Pinto as printed by the Wall Street Journal.  If Pinto is correct such that the mis-marking of mortgages by the GSEs and the discovery thereof destroyed confidence in the accuracy of ratings in mortgage backed securities and their derivatives (and it seems probable to suspect that he is) then it seems almost beyond question that the policies (or policy malfeasance) of Fannie and Freddie, and not the actions of large banks or firms like AIG are the proximate cause of not just the credit crisis, but also the continuing multi-act, multi-bailout farce that continues to be passed off to the public as necessary “stimulus.”

It takes only a cursory examination to suspect that misdirection plays a key part in the latest act of the ongoing crisis theater of the absurd.  Misdirection to distract attention from the key complicity of GSEs in the crisis.  Misdirection to deflect scrutiny away from the political personalities from both sides of the aisle responsible.  Misdirection to conceal what could only be described as the most damaging acts of accounting and securities fraud in the history of accounting, securities or fraud.

Precious few assumptions are required to come to conclusions laying responsibility for the largest economic disaster in recent memory at the feet of the GSEs.

First, that the GSEs had substantial influence over the mortgage market.

This is a no-brainer with the GSEs either holding or guaranteeing 51% of outstanding home mortgage debt in 2003.  To put this in perspective, that figure was around 33% of the GDP of the entire United States in 2003.  Read that last line again.  Anyone wishing to play in the market had to compete with the rates set by Fannie and Freddie.

Second, that the GSEs artificially depressed rates (read: underpriced risk).

This is equally trivial to find given that this precise mandate has been the express purpose of the GSEs since at least 1993.  The GSEs were not tasked with increasing the capacity for mortgage lending.  They were tasked with making loans “affordable.”  They used a number of tools to do so, but the key elements were acting as a proxy for quasi-government guarantees and bundling mortgages into risk tiers to act as a sort of clearing house for securitization pools.  It is often said that providing a guarantee (particularly governmental) reduces risk.  This is, of course, a fantasy.  All that explicitly or implicitly tax dollar backed guarantees do is socialize risk.  However, they manage to do so without requiring consolidation of the resulting liabilities on the government’s balance sheet.  Convenient that, yes?  A guarantee is a subsidy.  Period.  Failing to understand this is what permitted the political class to mislead the American public into thinking that cheap loans for everything from housing to small businesses to education (the next fiscal disaster on the horizon) come with no cost.  (Or that cheap debt wouldn’t pump up the price of everything from education to housing).  Today’s pundits seem to enjoy blaming “moral hazard” (by which they mean “corporate moral hazard”) for the crisis.  Oddly, government guarantees, particularly those that everyone assumes will be costless, are not typically part of this definition.

These assumptions, on their own should be sufficient to indict the GSEs, the totally unqualified and unaccountable recipients of political payoffs who occupied the executive offices of these fiscal singularities1 and their other supporters (including the voters who continued year after year to return these jokers to public office) on charges of gross negligence.

If, as Pinto suggests, we add purposeful misrepresentation of underlying collateral to the mix three things become apparent:

First, absent some intervening criminal act by actors farther downstream (and we may yet find some), we have isolated absolutely the cause of all that followed.

Second, it becomes quite easy to construct a criminal case for literally millions of counts of accounting, securities, wire and mail fraud against the GSEs.  To the extent executives at Fannie and Freddie signed off on financial statements disclosing the portion of their balance sheets that held “AAA” securities and these had been purposefully misidentified we should be exploring prosecution for violations under e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley.  (Given, however, Rham Emanuel’s involvement in Freddie and Fannie, we aren’t holding our breath).

Third, given the presence of blatant government price fixing in more than a third of the entire economy, the United States hasn’t been anything like a “free market” since before 2003.

It should shock you that literally a third of the U.S. economy should become a playground for the social experiments of any political group of any party affiliation.

It probably will not shock you (since you are reading Zero Hedge) to find what may be the largest example of securities fraud ever directly connected to elected officials of the United States and their cronies.

Taking a step back, it should shock you that power over literally a third of the U.S. economy should ever have been allowed to become concentrated in two entities with blatantly socialist aims and under the control of executives with no relevant qualifications of any note other than loose purse strings on their political contribution satchels.

What should grip readers with even more substantial alarm is the combination of blank checking for Fannie and Freddie backstops, and the shifty manner in which these disclosures were made.  Is it possible anymore to doubt that the administration simply lied through its teeth while promising us it expects no need of increased credit lines for the GSEs while simultaneously expanding same literally to infinity?

Given that Fannie, Freddie and the FHA have now taken up the mandate of supporting housing prices at any cost (to the taxpayer via endless bailouts and unlimited credit) is it possible in any way to credit the current “upturn” to fundamentals?  When we factor in similar capture of the FDIC and the like, where does this leave us, exactly?

Permit us to ask a few questions:

1.  Why are Fannie and Freddie still operating in any way whatsoever?

2.  Given that their credibility for reliable (or even remotely non-fiction) financial disclosure nears complete obliteration, who is likely to buy anything from these entities in the future?  (If you said “The Fed” you may advance to the bonus round).  Surely the conflict of interest implicit in government ownership does nothing to improve the situation.  Perhaps the news that the Fed plans to issue securities to shrink its balance sheet and reverse “quantitative easing” describes an attempt to securitize the tattered reputation of the GSEs?  Will the Fed simply aggregate its balance sheet and issue tranches?  Does that make the Fed simple the collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) of last resort?  Who will do the rating?  Who will be writing protection on CDO Fed Tranch A-1 (AAA)?

3.  Given that neither entity is currently monitored by an Inspector General (despite what used to be statutory language so mandating) and both entities are completely captured by the current administration, how can it be anything other than insanity to expect any result from these entities other than the formation (or expansion) of a ravenous fiscal black hole?

4.  Given increasing government control beyond Fannie and Freddie that now extends far beyond 33% of GDP, what can we expect if we continue to permit political parties of any stripe to exercise command and control influence over what is now probably a simple majority of our economy?

There was a time when we hoped that the United States would learn its lesson with respect to permitting political control over large swaths of private markets.  Today that time seems very long ago, and somewhat naive.

Perhaps we are being too harsh on the likes of Barney Frank and other GSE proponents.  Adopting a slighty more relativistic economic morality, we might count Frank as one of the greatest legislators of all time.  Consider:

To the extent Mr. Frank and his ilk self-identify as advocates for low-cost housing for those ill-able to afford it, or beset by poor credit, the last 20 years have represented the largest single wealth transfer (composed primarily of real estate and flat screen TVs) to that sector known to us.  Not only that, but given the de facto nationalization of MBS portfolios (we’ll give you three guesses who have been the largest MBS buyers over the last several quarters) the GSEs and their supporters have managed to get taxpayers to pay for it all.  Of course, had they simply proposed such a measure in Congress it would have been laughed from the chamber.  And yet, it almost seems as if these individuals simply wrote a multi-trillion dollar check to their constituents that happened to be drawn on the United States Treasury.

It almost seems this way because it was this way.

1. 1. Just consider Fannie Mae’s torrid leadership history: James A. Johnson (Fannie CEO 1991-1998, Democratic luminary, Obama fundraiser, John Kerry vice presidential selection committee chair, $21 million in Fannie compensation). Franklin Raines (Fannie CEO 1999-2004, Clinton’s Director Office of Management and Budget, $90 million+ in Fannie compensation later the subject of a civil suit) Daniel Mudd (Fannie CEO 2005-2008, $80 million in Fannie compensation) Herbert M. Allison (Fannie CEO 2008-2009, National Finance Chair, John McCain Campaign).  Freddie’s record is no better.

Bankers Get $4 Trillion Gift From Barney Frank: David Reilly

Commentary by David Reilly

Dec. 30 (Bloomberg) — To close out 2009, I decided to do something I bet no member of Congress has done — actually read from cover to cover one of the pieces of sweeping legislation bouncing around Capitol Hill.

Hunkering down by the fire, I snuggled up with H.R. 4173, the financial-reform legislation passed earlier this month by the House of Representatives. The Senate has yet to pass its own reform plan. The baby of Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank, the House bill is meant to address everything from too-big-to-fail banks to asleep-at-the-switch credit-ratings companies to the protection of consumers from greedy lenders.

I quickly discovered why members of Congress rarely read legislation like this. At 1,279 pages, the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” is a real slog. And yes, I plowed through all those pages. (Memo to Chairman Frank: “ystem” at line 14, page 258 is missing the first “s”.)

The reading was especially painful since this reform sausage is stuffed with more gristle than meat. At least, that is, if you are a taxpayer hoping the bailout train is coming to a halt.

If you’re a banker, the bill is tastier. While banks opposed the legislation, they should cheer for its passage by the full Congress in the New Year: There are huge giveaways insuring the government will again rescue banks and Wall Street if the need arises.

Nuggets Gleaned

Here are some of the nuggets I gleaned from days spent reading Frank’s handiwork:

– For all its heft, the bill doesn’t once mention the words “too-big-to-fail,” the main issue confronting the financial system. Admitting you have a problem, as any 12- stepper knows, is the crucial first step toward recovery.

– Instead, it supports the biggest banks. It authorizes Federal Reserve banks to provide as much as $4 trillion in emergency funding the next time Wall Street crashes. So much for “no-more-bailouts” talk. That is more than twice what the Fed pumped into markets this time around. The size of the fund makes the bribes in the Senate’s health-care bill look minuscule.

– Oh, hold on, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Secretary can’t authorize these funds unless “there is at least a 99 percent likelihood that all funds and interest will be paid back.” Too bad the same models used to foresee the housing meltdown probably will be used to predict this likelihood as well.

More Bailouts

– The bill also allows the government, in a crisis, to back financial firms’ debts. Bondholders can sleep easy — there are more bailouts to come.

– The legislation does create a council of regulators to spot risks to the financial system and big financial firms. Unfortunately this group is made up of folks who missed the problems that led to the current crisis.

– Don’t worry, this time regulators will have better tools. Six months after being created, the council will report to Congress on “whether setting up an electronic database” would be a help. Maybe they’ll even get to use that Internet thingy.

– This group, among its many powers, can restrict the ability of a financial firm to trade for its own account. Perhaps this section should be entitled, “Yes, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., we’re looking at you.”

Managing Bonuses

– The bill also allows regulators to “prohibit any incentive-based payment arrangement.” In other words, banker bonuses are still in play. Maybe Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. shouldn’t have rushed to pay back Troubled Asset Relief Program funds.

– The bill kills the Office of Thrift Supervision, a toothless watchdog. Well, kill may be too strong a word. That agency and its employees will be folded into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Further proof that government never really disappears.

– Since Congress isn’t cutting jobs, why not add a few more. The bill calls for more than a dozen agencies to create a position called “Director of Minority and Women Inclusion.” People in these new posts will be presidential appointees. I thought too-big-to-fail banks were the pressing issue. Turns out it’s diversity, and patronage.

– Not that the House is entirely sure of what the issues are, at least judging by the two dozen or so studies the bill authorizes. About a quarter of them relate to credit-rating companies, an area in which the legislation falls short of meaningful change. Sadly, these studies don’t tackle tough questions like whether we should just do away with ratings altogether. Here’s a tip: Do the studies, then write the legislation.

Consumer Protection

– The bill isn’t all bad, though. It creates a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency, the brainchild of Elizabeth Warren, currently head of a panel overseeing TARP. And the first director gets the cool job of designing a seal for the new agency. My suggestion: Warren riding a fiery chariot while hurling lightning bolts at Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke.

– Best of all, the bill contains a provision that, in the event of another government request for emergency aid to prop up the financial system, debate in Congress be limited to just 10 hours. Anything that can get Congress to shut up can’t be all bad.

Even better would be if legislators actually tackle the real issues stemming from the financial crisis, end bailouts and, for the sake of my eyes, write far, far shorter bills.

(David Reilly is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

Click on “Send Comment” in the sidebar display to send a letter to the editor.

To contact the writer of this column: David Reilly at dreilly14@bloomberg.net

Last Updated: December 29, 2009 21:00 EST

Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner
to Hill Leadership on Administration’s Exit Strategy for TARP

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury released the
text of identical letters sent today from Secretary Tim Geithner to
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senator Harry Reid outlining the
Administration’s exit strategy for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA). The text of the letter to Speaker Pelosi follows.

December 9, 2009

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker          
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker:

I am writing to update you on the status of the Obama
Administration’s financial policies, including programs initiated under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), the results they have
achieved, the challenges ahead, and our plan for exiting TARP.

These policies are working.  When the Obama Administration took
office, the financial system was extremely fragile and the economy was
contracting sharply.  The Administration’s financial and economic
policies have helped to shore up confidence in our financial system. 
Credit is starting to flow again to consumers and businesses, and the
economy is growing.  Further, private capital is replacing public
capital in our major institutions.

As a result of improved financial conditions and careful stewardship
of the program, losses on TARP investments are likely to be
significantly lower than previously expected.  We now expect a positive
return from the government’s investments in banks.  These banks will
soon have repaid nearly half of the TARP funds they received.  We also
expect to recover all but $42 billion of the $364 billion in TARP funds
disbursed in FY2009.  Further, we plan to use significantly less than
the full $700 billion in EESA authority.  As a result, we expect that
TARP will cost taxpayers at least $200 billion less than was projected
in the August Mid-Session Review of the President’s Budget.

But significant challenges remain.  Too many American families,
homeowners, and small businesses still face severe financial pressure. 
Although the economy is recovering, foreclosures are increasing, and
unemployment is unacceptably high.  Businesses are still cautious in
the face of uncertainty about the strength of the recovery, and many
small businesses face very difficult credit conditions.  Although bank
lending standards are starting to ease, many categories of bank lending
continue to contract.  This contraction has hit small businesses very
hard because they rely heavily on such lending, and do not have the
ability to substitute credit from securities issuance.  Commercial real
estate losses also weigh heavily on many small banks, impairing their
ability to extend new loans.

Further, the recovery of our financial system remains incomplete. 
And near-term shocks to that system could undermine the economic
recovery we have seen to date.

Exit Strategy for TARP

Our exit strategy for TARP balances the mandate of EESA to address
these challenges with the need to exercise fiscal discipline and reduce
the burden on current and future taxpayers.  There are four broad
elements to our strategy.

First, we will continue terminating and winding down many of the
government programs put in place last fall.  In September, Treasury
ended its Money Market Fund Guarantee Program, which guaranteed at its
peak over $3 trillion of assets.  The program incurred no losses, and
generated $1.2 billion in fees.  The Capital Purchase Program, through
which the majority of TARP investments in banks have been made, is
effectively closed.  Before this Administration took office, nearly
$240 billion in TARP funds had been committed to banks.  Since January
20, we have committed about $7 billion to banks, much of which went to
small institutions.  Major U.S. banks subject to the “stress test”
conducted last spring have raised over $110 billion in high-quality
capital from the private sector.  And banks will soon have repaid $116
billion of TARP funds

Second, we will limit new commitments in 2010 to three areas.

• We will continue to mitigate foreclosure for responsible American
  homeowners as we take the steps necessary to stabilize our housing
  market.
• We recently launched initiatives to provide capital to small
  and community banks, which are important sources of credit for small
  businesses.  We are also reserving funds for additional efforts to
  facilitate small business lending.
• Finally, we may increase our commitment to the Term
  Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which is improving
  securitization markets that facilitate consumer and small business
  loans, as well as commercial mortgage loans.  We expect that increasing
  our commitment to TALF would not result in additional cost to taxpayers.

Beyond these limited new commitments, we will not use remaining EESA
funds unless necessary to respond to an immediate and substantial
threat to the economy stemming from financial instability.  As a nation
we must maintain capacity to respond to such a threat.  Banks are still
experiencing significant new credit losses, and the pace of bank
failures, which tend to lag economic cycles, remains elevated.  At the
same time, many of the Federal Reserve and FDIC programs that have
complemented TARP investments are ending.  This creates a financial
environment in which new shocks could have an outsized effect –
especially if an adequate financial stability reserve is not
maintained.  As we wind down many of the government programs launched
initially to address the crisis, it is imperative that we maintain this
capacity to respond if financial conditions worsen and threaten our
economy.  However, before using EESA funds to respond to new financial
threats, I would consult with the President and Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board and submit written notification to the Congress.  This
capacity will bolster confidence and improve financial stability,
thereby decreasing the probability that it will need to be used.  This
is the third element of our exit strategy.

In order to accomplish these goals, pursuant to Section 120(b) of
EESA, I certify that I am hereby extending the authority provided under
the Act to October 3, 2010.  This extension is necessary to assist
American families and stabilize financial markets because it will,
among other things, enable us to continue to implement programs that
address housing markets and the needs of small businesses, and to
maintain the capacity to respond to unforeseen threats, as described
above.

While we are extending the $700 billion program, we do not expect to
deploy more than $550 billion.  We also expect up to $175 billion in
repayments by the end of next year, and substantial additional
repayments thereafter.  The combination of the reduced scale of TARP
commitments and substantial repayments should allow us to commit
significant resources to pay down the federal debt over time and slow
its growth rate.

Even with this extension, we expect that TARP will cost taxpayers at
least $200 billion less than was projected in the August Mid-Session
Review of the President’s Budget, including $25 billion in potential
costs from new TARP commitments in 2010.  We expect that the vast
majority of these potential costs would come from mitigating
foreclosure for responsible American homeowners as we take the steps
necessary to stabilize our housing market.

The final element to our exit strategy is how we manage equity
investments acquired through EESA while protecting taxpayers.  We will
continue to manage those investments in a commercial manner and seek to
dispose of them as soon as practicable.  We will exercise our voting
rights only on core issues such as election of directors, and we will
not interfere in the day-to-day management of individual companies.  In
addition, as the steward of taxpayers’ funds, Treasury will continue to
manage investments in a manner that ensures accountability,
transparency and oversight.  And we will work with recipients of EESA
funds and their supervisors to accelerate repayment where appropriate. 
We want to see the capital base of our financial system return to
private hands as quickly as possible, while preserving financial
stability and promoting economic recovery.

History suggests that exiting prematurely from policies designed to
contain a financial crisis can significantly prolong an economic
downturn.  We must not waver in our resolve to ensure the stability of
the financial system and to support the nascent recovery that the
Administration and the Congress have worked so hard to achieve. 
Improvements in the financial performance of EESA programs put us in a
better position to address the economic and financial challenges many
Americans still face.  I look forward to continuing to work with you to
achieve these
goals.                                                               

Sincerely,

Timothy F. Geithner

Identical copy of this letter sent to:
            The Honorable Harry Reid

cc:       The Honorable Barney Frank
           The Honorable Spencer Bachus
           The Honorable David Obey
           The Honorable Jerry Lewis

This exciting development from Firedoglake:

As Ben Bernanke’s confirmation hearing begins in the Senate Banking
Committee, a source tells FDL News that one Senate staffer and an
outside source confirmed to him that at least one Republican on the
committee will also place a hold on the Federal Reserve chairman,
throwing the process into potential turmoil and giving Chris Dodd a
difficult series of choices to make.

Dodd, who just announced his intention to vote for Bernanke’s
confirmation in the Banking Committee and on the floor of the Senate,
would be in charge of the decision to honor or ignore that hold. The
fact that Dodd tried to place a hold on the FISA Amendments Act in
2007-08, and was generally ignored by Harry Reid, just adds a layer of
irony to the process.

The source, speaking on condition of anonymity because of his work
behind the scenes on the Bernanke confirmation, told me that two
separate sources assured him that the Republican hold would be made
public after today’s hearing. One staffer said that two Republicans
would place the hold, while the other said it would just be one. The
source said that the trans-partisan nature of opposition to Bernanke,
with a conservative Republican and a socialist independent uniting to
block the appointment, shows the intensity of the feelings on the
issue. “It’s great to see everyone come together – Democrats,
Republicans, progressives and libertarians, against this Federal
Reserve, which is not federal, and not a reserve, just a group printing
money and giving it to their buddies,” the source said.

While most people think that the multiple holds would delay the
process, it’s unclear whether or not it would succeed. Dodd would
probably have the discretion to roll over the hold in committee, though
he may be reluctant to do so, experts in Senate procedure said. Harry
Reid could also seek cloture on the motion to proceed on Bernanke’s
nomination on the floor, which would require 60 votes.

At the very least, this delay and the publicity surrounding
bipartisan opposition to Bernanke would bring attention to the issue of
the Federal Reserve and the desire for transparency, like the movement
to audit the Fed. That provision has already passed in the large
financial reform bill in the House Financial Services Committee, and Barney Frank said yesterday
that he didn’t expect any changes to the bill as it passed the House,
citing the public anger over the issue of transparency. There is
language on Fed audits in the draft financial reform bill written by
Sen. Dodd, which also strips the Fed of some of its power, but it is
not the same as Bernie Sanders’ audit the Fed bill, which has as many
as 30 cosponsors.

The source, who has been working on the Federal Reserve issue for
five years, marveled at how the issue has gained so much new attention
during the financial crisis. “Up until last year, nobody knew what the
Fed was. Ron Paul got 5 co-sponsors on his audit bill when he first
introduced it, and now we have 300.”

Sen. Dodd’s office has not yet responded with a comment.