FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘Credit Conditions’ Category

The end of debt-based affluence: welcome to The Last Christmas in America (TLCIA).

Almost 35 years ago, as unemployment rose toward 10%, the January 1975 cover of Ramparts  magazine blared: The End of Affluence: The Last Christmas in America.(TLCIA)

The article wasn’t referring to the religious celebration; it was referring to the postwar concept of Christmas as the frenzied, exhausting  year-end pinnacle of our one true secular faith, Consumption, a final orgy of   buying and binging.

It is instructive to recall how the Federal government responded  to unemployment, high inflation and rising  budget deficits in the early 1970s: it began fudging numbers, manipulating data to mask the politically inconvenient realities of rising inflation, unemployment and deficits by playing switcheroo with Social Security Trust Funds, inflation data, etc.–games it continues to play in 2011 to cloak reality from the media-numbed public.

The market was not so easily fooled. The Bear market, reflecting the “real”  recession, lasted 16 years, from 1967 to 1982. Now statistics are echoing that last great recession: rising prices for essentials, systemically high unemployment and stagnant wages while the corporate media and the organs of statistical manipulation (a.k.a. the sprawling, putrid public-private cesspool of the Ministry of Propaganda) trumpet “the return of growth” and skyrocketing corporate profits.

(Today’s propaganda:housing starts blip up due to statistical noise, and though starts are less than half pre-recession levels, this is heralded as “evidence” that “strong growth is back.”)

The difference between the postwar boom of 1946 and the boom that followed 1982 is the last boom was based on the explosive expansion of debt.People didn’t save and invest in productive assets; they went into debt to consume more and to become a “bigger” persona via the miracle of credit.

I often use this chart to make this point: if credit had expanded along with GDP, then we’d be considerably less indebted.  Instead, it required a vast expansion of debt–some $30 trillion more than the rise in GDP–to fuel the 1982-2000 boom.

A funny thing happens when you depend on expanding debt to fund your consumption:eventually the cost of servicing your rising debt reaches the limit of your income, and you can’t borrow any more, unless interest rates decline so you can leverage your income into higher debt.

Here’s a chart of household debt: that little reversal in debt expansion sent the economy into a tailspin.

Lowering interest rates extends the era of debt-based consumption, but it only puts off the inevitable crash when the ability to borrow runs out. Eventually the cost of servicing this lower-interest debt absorbs all your disposable income, and the borrowing skids to an abrupt stop.

Two other bad things can make this dominance of debt servicing worse:your income can decline, and the value of your assets can decline.  In this unfortunate situation, you’re ability to service your existing debts is crimped by a loss of disposable income, and you’re paying for assets whose worth has fallen below the  debt taken on to buy the assets.

Income has declined significantly in the wake of the 2008 crisis/recession:

And here’s the key asset of the middle class, housing:

This double-whammy of lower income and lower asset valuations is exactly where we are now.This is why the Fed’s campaign to lower interest rates to zero and make it easy to borrow more have been as successful as pushing on a string; the economy is choking on over-indebtedness and overleveraging of stagnating income. There is no escape from this vortex except refusing more debt and writing off existing debt, wiping it off the balance sheets as an asset, driving lenders, banks and those holding debt as assets into insolvency.

As we saw yesterday, the velocityof money–that is, money actually being borrowed and spent or invested in the real economy–has plummeted to zero.

We all know the 16-year recession/malaise back in 1967-1982 had a “happy ending”:  huge new oil fields were discovered in Alaska, the North Sea, West Africa and elsewhere, ushering in a renewed era of cheap, abundant petroleum. President Reagan “saved” Social Security for a generation by raising contributions paid by employer and employees, and he heralded a “lower taxes, higher permanent deficits” ideology that is now accepted as the norm: deficits don’t matter, even when they reach the trillions, because our good friends the Gulf Oil Exporters and Asian exporters will buy all our debt forever, keeping interest low forever.

(And if they drop the ball, then the Federal Reserve will print money and buy the Treasury bonds. Sweet! We don’t need any external buyers, just the  Federal Reserve.)

Then the U.S. created and launched two revolutionary technologies which both created new wealth around the globe: the personal computer (microprocessor and cheap RAM) and the Internet (TCP/IP, Ethernet, and the commercialization of Tim Berners-Lee’s World Wide Web with free browsers) spawning the generation-long boom of the 1980s and 90s.

Beneath the surface of this innovation-driven boom, however, the real engine of growth was debt and the financialization and globalization of the economy.

But when the wheels fell off that debt-fueled boom in 2000, the U.S. did not create a new engine of wealth: it opted instead for a devilishly insidious simulacrum of wealth: debt which rose at an exponential rate throughout the economy.

Borrowed money and phony financial legerdemain (mortgage-backed securities, derivatives based on the MBS, etc. etc.) from 2000-2007 created what I have  termed a “bogus prosperity”: no actual new wealth was created, only a brief and doomed bubble of debt-based housing valuations was inflated which followed the classic model set down by the Tulip Craze in Holland hundreds of years ago: insane boom, crushing bust.

We have to revisit the early 1970s for a reality check.  In post-industrial America circa 1970, a huge surplus of food was grown by a mere 2%  of the workforce. The cornucopia of manufactured goods was produced by about 20% of  the workforce (hence the phrase “post-industrial”), and other than essential government services like the Armed Forces, police and the courts, the rest of society’s work was either service-oriented paper-pushing relating to affluence (insurance), do-good selfless work (Peace Corps, churches) or leisure-related: entertainment, films, travel, amusement parks, stereos, etc.

This was not all fantasy.A friend of mine supported an entire  house of hippies in  late-60s Pittsburgh on his union steelworker job, and had plenty of money left to save for his trip to San Francisco. (As I recall, the rent for the big old house was less than $200 per month.) Hippies were the first ardent dumpster-divers/scavengers, driven not by poverty but by the idea that since that our society generated so much waste and surplus, why bother working?

As noted here many times before, the purchasing power of American wage-earners reached a plateau around 1973 and has been declining ever since.

One key point which is usually overlooked when comparing “The Last Christmas in America” circa 1974 and TLCIA circa 2011: the wealth distribution in the U.S. was much flatter then.CEOs of financial institutions did not earn $10 million each; there were no hedge funds with chiefs pulling down $600 million each (yes, that was the average “compensation” for the top ten fund managers at the hedgies’ glorious peak), and even minimum wage ($1.60/hour in the late 60s, I know because my wage stub recorded it) bought far more goods (purchasing power) then than minimum wage does now.

Not only was gasoline cheap, but housing was far and away cheaper than it is today. Just about any G.I./Vet could buy a house with his/her V.A. benefits (3% down), and anyone else could scrimp and save for a few years and then buy a house for 2 or 3 times their annual wage at an interest rate around 6%.

Meanwhile, in TLCIA circa 2011, obscene “compensation packages” are defended as “free enterprise.” Well, what did we have in 1973? Unfree enterprise?Amidst all the ideologically convenient defenses of heavily skewed “compensation,” we have to admit that the dream of affluence combined with leisure was based on the presumption of society’s wealth being distributed somewhat evenly, not by a Communist central state but by the “free enterprise” system and modest common-sense government regulation  (limited work hours,  minimum wage, etc.) which protected employees from the excessive exploitation of the late 19th century and early 20th century Monopoly Capitalists.

That dream seemed at hand in 1970. Now, after “the limits to growth” were mocked by those expecting ever larger oil fields to provide endless abundant cheap oil, we find that Peak Oil was merely put off a generation; there have been no new discoveries of super-massive oil fields since the early 1970s, and the supposedly abundant alternative petroleum sources like shale oil are horrendously costly to exploit, for they require vast quantities of energy (mostly natural gas at the moment) to be consumed to extract the oil.

Now we face a future which might well be called the End of Work for up to a third of the current workforce.Since agriculture employs about 2% of the workforce, industrial/factory production about 11%, essential transportation and essential government each a bit more, we have to ask: in an economy in which 70% of GDP is consumer spending, how many jobs are actually essential? How much actual wealth is being created/produced in the U.S. and sold overseas? Is giving people with Medicare coverage handfuls of costly and often ineffective medications and endless MRI  tests actually creating wealth, or it mostly squandering it?

We might also ask: how much of the consumer economy is superfluous if wage-earners shift values and decide saving is more important than consuming? How many malls, storefronts, internet retailers, restaurants, fast-food joints, etc. can a newly-frugal economy support?  How many dog-walkers, derivative salespeople, nail shops, carpenters, financial planners, realtors, etc. does an economy need if the FIRE economy (finance, insurance and real estate) is shrinking?

Based on the tremendous size of the service economy, construction, finance and government, I have estimated that 30 million jobs out of the current 139 million-strong workforce are superfluous.  Many government positions are essential: police, meat inspectors, rangers, tax collectors, meter maids, etc., but as Mish so thoroughly illustrated in his detailed analysis of the California state budget ($120 billion or so), dozens of State agencies could be eliminated without any visible effect on the economy except to the wage-earners who lost their jobs.

If 20 million jobs disappear (7 million have already vanished since 2008), so do all the taxes  those wage-earners paid; if 5 million homes go through foreclosure, the inflated property taxes the owners once paid will disappear, too. Once businesses close, it’s not just wages which disappear: all the junk-fees governments levy disappear, too: the business taxes, the licensing fees, the permits, transaction fees, etc.

Does anyone think all these taxes and levies can fall and government employment will be funded by some other source?  Yes, the Federal government can borrow apparently limitless sums  at low interest rates; but soon, the surplus money which has piled up in exporters’ accounts will be gone, and the  endless borrowed trillions will actually start costing real money–money that will be diverted from government employment to pay the interest on all that wonderful debt everyone loved when they got a piece of it.

So how does a society deal with the End of Debt-Driven Consumerism, the End of Cheap Oil  and the End of Work when it also means The End of Affluence, even for many of those with jobs?  How does government deal with declining tax revenues and rising interest rates?

The death throes of the debt-based consumerist lifestyle are already visible beneath the glossy propaganda of “rising revenues this Christmas season.” Those revenues were obtained by selling goods at below cost, in the absurd hope that income-strapped, over-indebted consumers would make profitable “impulse buys.” As Mish has documented, the “impulse buys” are being returned even before Christmas to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Fed is desperately attempting to re-inflate the debt bubble by lowering interest and mortgage rates and buying up all sorts of semi-toxic/impaired  debt. What the Fed dreads is the reality we all feel and see: fear of the future  due to diminished wealth and insecure incomes.If your assets have fallen in value,  you feel poorer because you are poorer. Borrowing more at any interest rate will not make anyone feel wealthier.

People who fear their income may plummet due to layoffs or their hours being cut are not in the euphoric mood to borrow more, and banks which cannot dare to lose more money loaning to people who will default have cut off credit to millions of  previously rabid consumers of debt.

Ask yourself this simple question: how much stuff could people buy if they could only spend surplus cash, after all their expenses and debt servicing payments were paid in full?

And let’s not forget that much of what is purchased in this consumerist frenzy is needless, superfluous crap.  My wife saves the most egregiously gift-buying-frenzy advertising circulars, and one from Bed, Bath & Beyond caught my eye.

There is no difference between this “1001 Best Gifts” from BB&B and a parody of consumerist excess.Hmm, how about an “executive standing valet” rack of wood and plastic for $99.99?

To make this poor-quality contraption, a forest somewhere in a Third-World kleptocracy  was cut down and precious, irreplaceable oil was burned shipping the lumber to China and from that factory to the U.S. across 6,000 miles of Pacific Ocean.

We know this spindly piece of garbage will break in a matter of days, weeks or maybe if the owner is especially careful, months; then the legs will break loose of the base, the towel bar will pull out, etc. and the “we cut down a priceless rain forest to make this” piece of human handiwork will be put on the curb where a diesel-burning garbage truck will haul it to the landfill along with all the spoiled food Americans throw out.

The 16-bottle wine cellar/cooler from China (labeled Cuisinart for your consuming pleasure) for $199.99 might come in handy storing something once it’s unplugged–but a cardboard box will probably do just as well.

I for one will not mourn the last debt-consumerist Christmas in America. Good riddance to the flaunting of borrowed money and the heedless, desperate purchase of valueless “goods” as gifts for an insolvent nation awash in too much of everything but common sense, integrity, gratitude, accountability and healthy living.

Charles Hugh Smith – Of Two Minds

Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner
to Hill Leadership on Administration’s Exit Strategy for TARP

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury released the
text of identical letters sent today from Secretary Tim Geithner to
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senator Harry Reid outlining the
Administration’s exit strategy for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA). The text of the letter to Speaker Pelosi follows.

December 9, 2009

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker          
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker:

I am writing to update you on the status of the Obama
Administration’s financial policies, including programs initiated under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), the results they have
achieved, the challenges ahead, and our plan for exiting TARP.

These policies are working.  When the Obama Administration took
office, the financial system was extremely fragile and the economy was
contracting sharply.  The Administration’s financial and economic
policies have helped to shore up confidence in our financial system. 
Credit is starting to flow again to consumers and businesses, and the
economy is growing.  Further, private capital is replacing public
capital in our major institutions.

As a result of improved financial conditions and careful stewardship
of the program, losses on TARP investments are likely to be
significantly lower than previously expected.  We now expect a positive
return from the government’s investments in banks.  These banks will
soon have repaid nearly half of the TARP funds they received.  We also
expect to recover all but $42 billion of the $364 billion in TARP funds
disbursed in FY2009.  Further, we plan to use significantly less than
the full $700 billion in EESA authority.  As a result, we expect that
TARP will cost taxpayers at least $200 billion less than was projected
in the August Mid-Session Review of the President’s Budget.

But significant challenges remain.  Too many American families,
homeowners, and small businesses still face severe financial pressure. 
Although the economy is recovering, foreclosures are increasing, and
unemployment is unacceptably high.  Businesses are still cautious in
the face of uncertainty about the strength of the recovery, and many
small businesses face very difficult credit conditions.  Although bank
lending standards are starting to ease, many categories of bank lending
continue to contract.  This contraction has hit small businesses very
hard because they rely heavily on such lending, and do not have the
ability to substitute credit from securities issuance.  Commercial real
estate losses also weigh heavily on many small banks, impairing their
ability to extend new loans.

Further, the recovery of our financial system remains incomplete. 
And near-term shocks to that system could undermine the economic
recovery we have seen to date.

Exit Strategy for TARP

Our exit strategy for TARP balances the mandate of EESA to address
these challenges with the need to exercise fiscal discipline and reduce
the burden on current and future taxpayers.  There are four broad
elements to our strategy.

First, we will continue terminating and winding down many of the
government programs put in place last fall.  In September, Treasury
ended its Money Market Fund Guarantee Program, which guaranteed at its
peak over $3 trillion of assets.  The program incurred no losses, and
generated $1.2 billion in fees.  The Capital Purchase Program, through
which the majority of TARP investments in banks have been made, is
effectively closed.  Before this Administration took office, nearly
$240 billion in TARP funds had been committed to banks.  Since January
20, we have committed about $7 billion to banks, much of which went to
small institutions.  Major U.S. banks subject to the “stress test”
conducted last spring have raised over $110 billion in high-quality
capital from the private sector.  And banks will soon have repaid $116
billion of TARP funds

Second, we will limit new commitments in 2010 to three areas.

• We will continue to mitigate foreclosure for responsible American
  homeowners as we take the steps necessary to stabilize our housing
  market.
• We recently launched initiatives to provide capital to small
  and community banks, which are important sources of credit for small
  businesses.  We are also reserving funds for additional efforts to
  facilitate small business lending.
• Finally, we may increase our commitment to the Term
  Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which is improving
  securitization markets that facilitate consumer and small business
  loans, as well as commercial mortgage loans.  We expect that increasing
  our commitment to TALF would not result in additional cost to taxpayers.

Beyond these limited new commitments, we will not use remaining EESA
funds unless necessary to respond to an immediate and substantial
threat to the economy stemming from financial instability.  As a nation
we must maintain capacity to respond to such a threat.  Banks are still
experiencing significant new credit losses, and the pace of bank
failures, which tend to lag economic cycles, remains elevated.  At the
same time, many of the Federal Reserve and FDIC programs that have
complemented TARP investments are ending.  This creates a financial
environment in which new shocks could have an outsized effect –
especially if an adequate financial stability reserve is not
maintained.  As we wind down many of the government programs launched
initially to address the crisis, it is imperative that we maintain this
capacity to respond if financial conditions worsen and threaten our
economy.  However, before using EESA funds to respond to new financial
threats, I would consult with the President and Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board and submit written notification to the Congress.  This
capacity will bolster confidence and improve financial stability,
thereby decreasing the probability that it will need to be used.  This
is the third element of our exit strategy.

In order to accomplish these goals, pursuant to Section 120(b) of
EESA, I certify that I am hereby extending the authority provided under
the Act to October 3, 2010.  This extension is necessary to assist
American families and stabilize financial markets because it will,
among other things, enable us to continue to implement programs that
address housing markets and the needs of small businesses, and to
maintain the capacity to respond to unforeseen threats, as described
above.

While we are extending the $700 billion program, we do not expect to
deploy more than $550 billion.  We also expect up to $175 billion in
repayments by the end of next year, and substantial additional
repayments thereafter.  The combination of the reduced scale of TARP
commitments and substantial repayments should allow us to commit
significant resources to pay down the federal debt over time and slow
its growth rate.

Even with this extension, we expect that TARP will cost taxpayers at
least $200 billion less than was projected in the August Mid-Session
Review of the President’s Budget, including $25 billion in potential
costs from new TARP commitments in 2010.  We expect that the vast
majority of these potential costs would come from mitigating
foreclosure for responsible American homeowners as we take the steps
necessary to stabilize our housing market.

The final element to our exit strategy is how we manage equity
investments acquired through EESA while protecting taxpayers.  We will
continue to manage those investments in a commercial manner and seek to
dispose of them as soon as practicable.  We will exercise our voting
rights only on core issues such as election of directors, and we will
not interfere in the day-to-day management of individual companies.  In
addition, as the steward of taxpayers’ funds, Treasury will continue to
manage investments in a manner that ensures accountability,
transparency and oversight.  And we will work with recipients of EESA
funds and their supervisors to accelerate repayment where appropriate. 
We want to see the capital base of our financial system return to
private hands as quickly as possible, while preserving financial
stability and promoting economic recovery.

History suggests that exiting prematurely from policies designed to
contain a financial crisis can significantly prolong an economic
downturn.  We must not waver in our resolve to ensure the stability of
the financial system and to support the nascent recovery that the
Administration and the Congress have worked so hard to achieve. 
Improvements in the financial performance of EESA programs put us in a
better position to address the economic and financial challenges many
Americans still face.  I look forward to continuing to work with you to
achieve these
goals.                                                               

Sincerely,

Timothy F. Geithner

Identical copy of this letter sent to:
            The Honorable Harry Reid

cc:       The Honorable Barney Frank
           The Honorable Spencer Bachus
           The Honorable David Obey
           The Honorable Jerry Lewis

by Marla Singer and Geoffrey Batt

Buried in the depths of page 26 of the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program’s (SIGTARP’s) November 17, 2009 report “Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties” hidden in footnotes 33 and 34 is something of a mystery.  It might be the beginning of an interconnected financial chain involving Dubai, the Federal Reserve, AIG, Basel I, Eastern Europe and even Switzerland and which, even if it doesn’t worry you, probably should.  Or it might be nothing at all.

Consider first “footnote 33,” that reads as follows:

The first Basel Accord, known as Basel I, was issued in 1988; it focused on the capital adequacy of financial institutions. The capital adequacy risk—the risk that a financial institution will be hurt by an unexpected loss—categorizes the assets of financial institution into five risk categories (0 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent). Banks that operate internationally are required to have a risk weight of 8 percent or less….

The original paragraph that references the footnote reads thus:

As of September 30, 2009, AIG had $172 billion in exposure to swaps in its foreign regulatory capital portfolio.  The portfolio contains swaps purchased by financial institutions, principally in Europe, to provide regulatory capital relief under Basel I. [note 33]  AIGFP’s COO informed SIGTARP in July 2009 that they expect that most of these swaps will be terminated by the end of the first quarter 2010 as most financial institutions complete their transition to Basel II.  Currently, financial institutions are required to hold a certain level of capital against their assets, and one way for a financial institution to reduce the amount of capital is to purchase swap protection on its assets.  However, new requirements decrease the level of capital required for such assets and, in most cases, there will be limited capital benefit to holding on to the existing swaps. Nonetheless, AIG warned in a June 29, 2009, SEC filing that if credit markets deteriorate, the company may recognize unrealized losses in AIGFP’s regulatory capital credit default swap portfolio. [note 34]  AIG could continue to be at risk if the swaps in its regulatory capital portfolio are not terminated by the end of first quarter 2010 as expected. (Emphasis added).

Taken together we read the thrust of this section to mean that a number of European banks, seeking to limit their regulatory capital requirements under Basel I (read: seeking to increase their leverage) bought swap protection on their assets from AIG.  These obligations still sit with AIG and, in the event credit markets sink materially, AIG is likely to take losses on these instruments.  Not just that but:

According to an AIG SEC filing, an ongoing concern for AIGFP is whether it will have to post more collateral if credit markets continue to deteriorate.  The amount of future collateral postings is partly a function of AIG’s credit ratings, which may be affected by any further decline in AIG’s financial condition. (Emphasis added).

Simply put, AIG might also have to post more collateral.  Moreover, though AIG initially expected most of these swaps to “be terminated by the end of the first quarter 2010 as most financial institutions complete their transition to Basel II,” we see from footnote 34 that:

Subsequent to the June filing, European regulators adjusted the implementation timing of Basel II, potentially affecting the holders of AIGFP’s regulatory capital swaps to hold beyond previously anticipated termination dates.

In other words, AIG is still on the hook- and hadn’t planned to be.

This raises a number of questions:

1. If the European banks that bought swap protection from AIG are still relying on this protection to meet their capital requirements, and AIG might be unable to make good on the agreements, are these banks actually out of Basel I compliance as we type this?
2. Are the banks still able to use swap protection to reduce their collateral requirements because of the implicit or explicit backing of AIG by the Federal Reserve?
3. If this situation existed in September-November 2008, as it certainly appears to have, how exactly can the Federal Reserve claim in good faith that it lacked the leverage to negotiate with these banks from a position of strength?  (One assumes that many of the same names collecting payment from AIG were also AIG swap protection buyers of the sort mentioned in the SIGTARP report).  Failure to back up an insolvent AIG would have resulted in near-immediate Basel I non-compliance as the protection offered by these swaps, and on which these banks depended for their reduced capital requirements, evaporated- a near death sentence.
4. Or had these banks somehow, and in the middle of the credit crisis, managed to boost their capital to levels that made the swaps unimportant?
5. If so, why keep them on the books now, instead of unwinding them?
6. Since it doesn’t seem likely that a teetering AIG could make good on these agreements without substantial assistance is the Fed is currently the ultimate backstop for AIG?
7. Does this mean that the Fed is effectively underwriting these swap agreements?
8. Will the Fed post collateral if deteriorating credit conditions at AIG (today’s -$11 billion news suddenly seems especially daunting if the potential insurance shortfall has an effect on credit ratings) or general credit market issues require it?  Or are we missing something significant?  By September 30, 2008 AIG had already posted $974 million in collateral for its “Foreign Regulatory Capital” portfolio.
9. What if European banks are hit with more losses from, oh, we don’t know, say… Dubai?  Deleveraging, risk reduction and credit tightening would have an effect on LIBOR, the Eurobond market and, of course, Eastern Europe.  Might not that sort of contagion easily spread to, say, Switzerland, which enjoyed the other side of the carry trade for years by lending Swiss Franc like mad to any Eastern European mortgage borrower who could sign documents?
10. Could it be that the Fed, once again, might have to bail out the world?

Or maybe we are just missing something obvious.