FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘Financial Crisis’ Category

Tomorrow’s Bernanke reconfirmation hearing just got more interesting, courtesy of Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders who has stated he will put a “hold” on the Bernanke confirmation process, meaning the Senate will need to amass 60 votes in order to override and proceed with the confirmation process. Yet as the NYT notes: “though the Senate has been paralyzed by similar blocking tactics on
countless other issues, Mr. Bernanke probably has enough support in
both parties to clear the 60-vote hurdle.” It is time to call your Senators and remind them that at best only 21% of Americans favor Bernanke’s reappointment.

More from the NYT:

Senator Bernard Sanders of Vermont, said Wednesday that he would try to block the Senate from confirming Ben S. Bernanke to a second term as chairman of the Federal Reserve.

The move is unlikely to derail Mr. Bernanke’s reappointment, but it
could slow the confirmation process and give the Fed’s critics
additional opportunity to press their case. As a practical matter, it
means Senate Democratic leaders will have to line up 60 votes in favor
of Mr. Bernanke rather than a simple majority at a time when the
Federal Reserve is under increasing populist attacks from lawmakers on
both the right and the left.

Mr. Sanders, an independent, is not a member of the Senate Banking
Committee, but he has frequently accused the Federal Reserve of bailing
out Wall Street firms and the banking industry at the expense of
ordinary citizens.

“In this country, there is profound disgust
at what happened on Wall Street,” Mr. Sanders said in a telephone
interview. “People want a new direction and people are asking, where
was the Fed? How did the Fed allow this to happen, when one of their
mandates to oversee the safety and soundness of the banking system?”

Mr.
Sanders said he would place a “hold” on Mr. Bernanke’s nomination when
it reaches the Senate floor. Under Senate rules, lawmakers would need
to amass 60 votes to override Mr. Sanders and proceed with a vote on
the nomination.

As pointed out previously, Bernanke is a Bush legacy, yet is somehow supposed to represent Obama’s “change” agenda:

The Fed chairman was originally appointed by President George W. Bush
and took over the central bank in February 2006. Despite his Republican
ties, Mr. Bernanke forged a close working relationship with President Obama and his top economic advisers during the financial crisis.

And some more potential wild cards in tomorrow’s historing hearing:

Senator Christopher J. Dodd,
Democrat of Connecticut and chairman of the banking committee, has said
Mr. Bernanke was “probably” the best person to lead the Fed because he
responded valiantly to the financial crisis when it began two years ago.

But
Mr. Dodd has also proposed stripping the Federal Reserve of virtually
all its powers as a banking regulator, and consolidating all the
federal government’s bank regulatory efforts in a new agency. In an
Op-Ed article last Sunday in The Washington Post, Mr. Bernanke sharply
criticized Mr. Dodd’s proposal.

Senator Richard C. Shelby
of Alabama, the top Republican on the Senate Banking Committee, has
also been sharply critical of the Federal Reserve but has not yet said
how he would vote on Mr. Bernanke’s nomination.

Even with Zero Hedge polling indicates a mere 11% of our readers would support Bernanke’s reconfirmation, a different poll by Rasmussen finds a comparable result: only 21% favor Bernanke as Chairman.

And here is a reminder of the confirmation whip count in the Senate Banking Committee:

Definite no: 2
Lean no: 3
No indication: 6
Lean yes: 7
Definite yes: 5
Definite no: 2

Bernie Sanders (I-VT):

Senator Bernard Sanders, a Vermont independent who isn’t on the banking committee, said Nov. 29 on ABC television’s “This Week” that he will “absolutely not vote for Mr. Bernanke” and that the Fed chief is “part of the problem.”

Jim Bunning (R-KY):

Jim Bunning, the Kentucky Republican who was the only senator to oppose Bernanke’s first nomination in 2005, hasn’t changed his views.

‘His job rating would be zero minus F,’ Bunning said in an interview yesterday. ‘He has catered to the big banks, to the Wall Street elitists, to every major money concern in the country and in the world.’

It is possible that one or both of these Senators will place a “hold” on the nomination.  Such a procedural move would at least delay a vote on Bernake, which would provide opponents of his reconfirmation time to organize.  For more details on what a “hold” is, check Tom Coburn’s website (no one places more holds than Coburn).

Lean no: 3
Jim DeMint (R-SC):

“He’s [Bernanke's] going to face some tough questions because he’s got a lot to answer for,” leading Fed critic Sen. Jim DeMint said through a spokesman. “The Fed’s mission is to guard the value of the dollar and to focus on employment, and right now their track record is looking very poor.”

Richard Shelby (R-AL):

Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), the top Republican on the Banking committee, would not say how he would vote on Bernanke’s nomination, only encouraging reporters to stay tuned for the chairman’s hearing this week.

“I used to be a big defender of the Fed,” he said, adding he believes the institution has “utterly failed” in its role for regulating financial institutions.”

David Vitter (R-LA): As a support of auditing the Fed, everything I have heard is that Vitter is a no–and is even possibly willing to put a hold on Bernake.  Still, lacking a public statement to that effect, I won’t put him in the “definite no” category.

No indication:  6
Michael Bennet (D-CO):  No word for Bennet one way or the other.  His primary challenger, Andrew Romanoff, might be an interesting way to move Bennet on this one.

Mike Crapo (R-ID): Praised Bernanke’s nomination in 2005, but no word on where he stands now.

Herb Kohl (D-WI)

Three said they’re undecided, including Wisconsin’s Herb Kohl, Jon Tester of Montana and Jeff Merkley of Oregon.

Kay Baily Hutchinson (R-TX): I can’t find any indication on Hutchison, one way or the other.

Jeff Merkley:

Three said they’re undecided, including Wisconsin’s Herb Kohl, Jon Tester of Montana and Jeff Merkley of Oregon.

Jon Tester:

Three said they’re undecided, including Wisconsin’s Herb Kohl, Jon Tester of Montana and Jeff Merkley of Oregon.

Lean Yes:  7
Robert Bennett (R-UT)

Utah’s Robert Bennett said he’ll probably vote in favor

Sherrod Brown (D-OH):

“He’s been far from perfect,” Senator Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, said in an interview yesterday. “He was not quick enough responding last year to many of these issues that we care about, particularly in housing. I want him to focus on jobs. But I think he’s generally done a decent job.”

Tom Carper (D-DE):

“Sens. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), Tom Carper (D-Del.) and Mark Warner (D-Va.) all said they’d wait until hearing from Bernanke.”

Bob Corker (R-TN)

Corker noted that he leans toward supporting a second term for the Fed chairman, who was nominated in August to a second term by President Barack Obama, but acknowledged gripes toward the Fed chairman on the left and the right.”

Chris Dodd (D-CT, chair):

I’m inclined to be supportive. I think he’s done a far better job in the last couple of years than he did initially.

Charles Schumer (D-NY):

Sens. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), Tom Carper (D-Del.) and Mark Warner (D-Va.) all said they’d wait until hearing from Bernanke.

Mark Warner (D-VA): Over email, a spokesman for Mark Warner told me “Senator Warner is inclined to be supportive of Bernanke’s reappointment, but he’s certainly not a fan of expanding the role or the power of the Fed as part of financial re-reg.”

Definite Yes: 5
Daniel Akaka (D-HI):  Bloomberg reports Akaka is a yes.

Evan Bayh (D-IN):  Bayh was the first prominent Democrat to support Bernanke in 2005.  According to Bloomberg, also support him in 2009.

Judd Gregg (R-NH):

Judd Gregg, a New Hampshire Republican, said Nov. 20 he will “absolutely” vote for Bernanke.

Mike Johanns (R-NE):

Among Republicans, Nebraska’s Mike Johanns said Bernanke “will have my support.

Tim Johnson (D-SD):

Sen. Tim Johnson (D-S.D.) — a favorite of Wall Street — told HuffPost that he has decided to vote to confirm Bernanke.

By Economic Forecasts & Opinions

Stock markets around the world cracked on Friday with the Dow Jones industrial average down more than 150 points (Fig. 1), and commodities plunging as Dubai debt woes unnerved investors, and sent tremors of uncertainty throughout all markets.

The crisis flared after Dubai, a part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) federation, asked to delay interest payment for six months on $60 billion of debt issued by the state-run conglomerate Dubai World and its main property unit Nakheel.

Concerns that a government-backed investment company risked default ripped through world markets. Investors read it as a sign of yet another sovereign implosion after Iceland and Ireland, and recoiled from risk and piled into dollars.

Las Vegas on Steroids

Dubai World has served as Dubai’s main driver of growth, operating ports, transportation groups, spearheading real-estate & infrastructure projects both at home and abroad. Its real-estate subsidiary Nakheel built Dubai’s iconic palm-tree-shaped island, packed with luxury villas and hotels, many still under construction. Real estate and construction accounts for about 23% of Dubai’s GDP.

With little oil, Dubai financed much of this rapid real estate development with debt. After incurring its estimated $80-$90 billion of debt in a four-year construction boom to transform its economy into a regional financial and tourism hub, Dubai suffered the world’s steepest property slump in the first global recession since World War II.

Deutsche Bank estimates that Dubai’s property prices, both commercial and residential, have halved since August last year, and could fall a further 15-20% this year.

U.S. Banks Less Exposed

Most analysts believe U.S. banks are probably less exposed than European rivals to a potential debt default by Dubai World, but a lack of transparency and the interconnection of the modern financial system make it difficult to know which institutions are ultimately exposed.

Dubai World’s largest creditors are reportedly domestic banks in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. MarketWatch noted data from the Bank for International Settlements which put cross-border banking exposure for the UAE as a whole at $123 billion at the end of June. Of that total, European banks hold 72%, with the United States and Japan only holding 9% and 7% of the exposure, respectively. The United Kingdom is by far the biggest creditor with a share of 41%.

Reminder of Other Risks

On a global scale, Dubai World’s debt problem seems relatively minor, but it illustrates the impact from one tiny country in an increasingly interconnected world. The Dubai news also cast doubt over the strength of the U.S. economic recovery, and the prospects for a bottoming of property prices.

Commercial Real Estate

As pointed out in my previous article that the commercial real estate sector posed a much greater threat than the over-hyped “mother of all carry trades.”  The Dubai debt crisis further reinforces this viewpoint.

The potential for contagion from Dubai’s debt woes could further unhinge an already fragile U.S. commercial real estate sector, whose values have already fallen 42.9% from their 2007 peak, close to the lowest since 2002, according to Moody’s. (Fig. 2) The latest Moody’s projection is for prices to bottom at 45-55% below their peak, but could drop as much as 65% from their peak in a “stress case”.

As commercial property values fall, debt defaults rise. The $3.4 trillion outstanding in debt backed by commercial real estate poses a real threat to the recovery. Trepp LLC reported that last month, delinquencies on U.S. commercial real estate loans that were packaged into commercial mortgage-backed securities reached 4.8%, more than six times the year earlier level. Hotel loans, at 8.7% distressed, have begun falling into delinquency faster than any other kind of commercial real estate debt.

Write-downs and losses at banks around the world have risen to more than $1.7 trillion since 2007 as the credit crisis undermined the value of assets owned by financial institutions, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Any further deleveraging and the resulting credit tightening from commercial real estate would impede the financial sector and probably derail the U.S. economy sending it into another recession. 

Housing Market Mortgage Crisis

So far, the appearance of recovery in the housing sector is being driven primarily by reduced prices combined with federal programs to lower mortgage rates with the goal of bringing more buyers into the market.

Based on a study released by Zillow.com, the foreclosure crisis has moved beyond subprime mortgages and into the prime mortgage market. (Fig. 3) While subprime borrowers are still a factor in the current foreclosure epidemic, it’s becoming increasingly apparent that the weak labor market is the driving force behind the mortgage crisis we face today.

According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, one in seven U.S. home loans was past due or in foreclosure as of Sept. 30, putting that quarterly delinquency measure at its highest level since t

he report’s inception, 1972, and up from one in ten at the beginning of the year.

The continued surge in delinquencies suggests that a recovery in the housing market could be hindered by the weak job market as well as by further fallout from the easy money and loose lending practices of the past. The foreclosures and delinquencies are expected to keep rising well into 2010, not leveling off until the unemployment rate starts to moderate.

In a study by First American CoreLogic found that one in four of all U.S. mortgage-borrowers owe more than the value of their properties in the 3rd quarter. And many experts didn’t expect U.S. home prices to hit bottom until early 2011, perhaps falling another 5-10%, as more foreclosures get pushed onto the market.

Negative equity is another outstanding risk hanging over the mortgage market.

Dubai Is No Lehman

The circumstances behind Dubai’s moves are murky, making it hard to gauge the exact risk to the pertaining bonds and Dubai’s own general creditworthiness. UBS cautioned that Dubai’s overall debt “might be higher than the generally assumed $80 billion to $90 billion, due to potential off-balance sheet liabilities. These could include unlimited and unquantifiable amount of credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives against the underlying assets, and once unraveled, could potentially erupt into a subprime-like crisis.

The current expectation; however, is that there’s a good chance that Dubai’s problems will probably prove a local issue. Most likely, Dubai, or its neighboring emirate, Abu Dhabi, won’t risk tarnishing their images and reputation further, and will come up with a reasonable resolution.

Even if Dubai goes into sovereign default, the amount is probably not enough on its own to threaten the financial system since any actual losses would be a fraction of the total. So, the problems in Dubai are unlikely to be as serious as last year’s Lehman Brothers collapse, nor is it a reflection on the ability of emerging markets to lead a global economic recovery.

Rational Expectations?

But Dubai could well spur a broader crisis of investor confidence in overly leveraged economies as market confidence world-wide is still fragile from the severity of the financial crisis.  The debts of many emerging markets have risen even further as the countries governments have fought the ravages of the global recession by issuing more stimulus debt to fill the gap voided by private investment.

The spread of credit-default swaps on developing-nation’s bonds jumped 14 basis points after the Dubai news broke, the most in a month, to 3.24 percentage points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI+ Index. There is also a clear sign of potential contagion effects of global risk aversion on basically all risky assets, with the dollar and yen being the prime beneficiaries.

Rational expectations or not, for now, the Dubai crisis is simply a reminder that the severe global recession has relegated much debt to near junk status, and there still remains a high degree of uncertainty as to the percentage recoverable on all outstanding debt which is going to be coming due over the next 5 years.

Despite some seminal signs of green shoots in the news headlines during this 9 month liquidity driven rally in many asset classes around the globe, we should be reminded that all that glitters is not gold, and that the global economic recovery is still on shaky ground.

#  “I know the odds are against me, but if there’s a win I’m gonna find it!”  ~Goku  #

Economic Forecasts & Opinions

Janet Tavakoli: Why Meltdown Risk Now Is Greater Than It Was in 2007

Janet Tavakoli, one of the foremost experts on structured finance and derivatives explains exactly what is happening to our financial system – in plain, easy to understand language. This video is a must-see for those struggling to figure out the answer to the question: Inflation or deflation?

CR Note: This is a guest post from albrt.

MERS v. Kansas

Although the internet discussion has died down considerably, I thought it might be helpful to offer some background and some explanation of what happened in the recent Kansas MERS case. I am not involved in the case, but I used to read Tanta’s posts about this sort of thing and I did some research, so I guess I am well-qualified to opine.

What is MERS?

MERS is part of an attempt by bankers to homogenize mortgages so they can be traded among banks more easily. In many cases the ultimate goal is to bundle the mortgages into bonds. From the MERS website:

About MERS

MERS was created by the mortgage banking industry to streamline the mortgage process by using electronic commerce to eliminate paper. Our mission is to register every mortgage loan in the United States on the MERS® System.

MERS acts as nominee in the county land records for the lender and servicer. Any loan registered on the MERS® System is inoculated against future assignments because MERS remains the nominal mortgagee no matter how many times servicing is traded. MERS as original mortgagee (MOM) is approved by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, FHA and VA, California and Utah Housing Finance Agencies, as well as all of the major Wall Street rating agencies.

Got it? I didn’t think so. MERS’ claim that its loans are “inoculated against future assignments” is an unmixed, but also unenlightening metaphor. Inoculation most commonly means exposing someone to a pathogenic organism or other immunologically active material in order to promote the development of antibodies. I can’t think of anything in the MERS process that can be profitably compared to either a pathogen or an antibody.

What actually happens is that a MERS mortgage is recorded once, usually with MERS shown as the “nominee” of the lender. MERS then tracks loan assignments, including both repayment rights and servicing rights. The output of the tracking system is approximately as good as the input from the lenders. When something happens, MERS is supposed to notify the interested parties.

In some cases MERS will act for the interested parties in lawsuits. If a MERS lender wants MERS to file a foreclosure suit, the lender is supposed to find the original note, endorse it in blank, and give it to a certifying MERS officer before the foreclosure is filed. That makes MERS a “holder” of the note, even if MERS is not actually the owner of the note. Being a holder is generally sufficient to allow MERS to foreclose.

Tanta explained how endorsement works here. MERS apparently has more computers involved, but when it comes time to produce the note in litigation it still amounts to pretty much the same thing. Pathogens and antibodies aside, MERS can’t really provide protection from all the potential errors and problems that came up when loans were being traded and securitized at warp speed all over the country. Many of the cases where MERS has gotten in trouble involved a misplaced note, but it is generally not clear that the problem was MERS’ fault, and it is not all that much different from what happens when a non-MERS lender files a foreclosure suit without having the original note handy.

This should be enough background to understand what happened (and did not happen) in the recent Kansas Supreme Court case.

The Kansas Supreme Court case

In Landmark National Bank v. Kesler , Landmark held a first mortgage and foreclosed on Mr. Kesler’s property. Landmark obtained a default judgment and was able to sell the property for more than the balance due on the first mortgage.

There was also a second mortgage on the property. The document for the second mortgage showed an outfit called “Millennia” as the lender, and showed MERS as the lender’s nominee. The document said notice should be sent to the lender, and did not say much about the nominee. Landmark sent notice of the foreclosure suit to Millennia, but not to MERS.

As it turned out, the second mortgage had been sold to an outfit called “Sovereign,” so Millennia no longer had an interest in the case. After the foreclosure judgment and sale, but before the distribution of the proceeds from the sale, Sovereign entered the case and tried to set aside the foreclosure judgment. Sovereign’s problem was that it never recorded anything to show that it held an interest in the property, so it really didn’t have much of an argument that it was entitled to notice of the foreclosure.

In order to address this problem, MERS joined in the case a couple of months later. MERS was essentially on Sovereign’s side, arguing that even if Sovereign wasn’t entitled to notice, MERS was on the original mortgage and was entitled to notice, and MERS would have notified Sovereign if MERS had received notice.

Not surprisingly, the judge held Sovereign was not entitled to notice because it didn’t register the assignment of the loan in the public records. The judge also held MERS was an agent of the lender at most, and did not have a sufficient interest to be able to show up late and overturn the judgment.

The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the judge’s decision, based in part on the conclusion that MERS didn’t own an interest in the note or the mortgage. This is what got a lot of attention on the internets, but most commentators seem to have missed the point. The court did not say the mortgage was invalidated because MERS separated the mortgage from the note. The court said MERS did not appear to own either the mortgage or the note. Part of the reason for the court’s conclusion was that you can’t separate a mortgage from the note it secures.

The key to the Kansas decision, like most judicial decisions, is in the details. The actual mortgage document required notice to the lender, not to MERS. The mortgage document listed MERS as a “nominee,” but never really defined what a nominee was or provided any basis for arguing that a nominee is entitled to notice above and beyond the notice given to the lender.

The only broad effect of this decision is that the court refused to make a special exception for MERS mortgages and require precautionary notice to MERS regardless of what the document said. Most MERS mortgages do say that MERS should get notice. If the mortgage document says that, most courts will enforce it.

There are other cases discussing MERS, some of which provide more general information than the Kansas case. One I would recommend is a decision by bankruptcy judge Linda Riegle on a group of bankruptcy cases in Nevada. The essence of Judge Riegle’s decision is that MERS isn’t entitled to any special status, and needs to have the note in order to take any action on it. The decision is available on Westlaw under the name Hawkins at 2009 WL 901766. Substantially the same decision is publicly available under the case name Mitchell, No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR .

What is the problem?

Mortgages are complicated. Most mortgage primers start with the distinction between states maintaining a “title” theory of mortgages and states maintaining a “lien” theory. This is mostly nonsense, as summed up by an eminent commentator nearly a hundred years ago: “There is no complete adoption of a logical theory in any of the American jurisdictions.” Manley O. Hudson, Law of Mortgages Real & Chattel, in 8 Modern American Law, at 297 (E. A. Gilmore & W. C. Wermuth eds. 1917).

So there are really two basic problems reflected in the MERS cases: (1) mortgages are complicated, and (2) the creation of MERS did not really reduce the complications, it just papered over them.

1. Mortgages are complicated

Mortgages are not homogenous. Not at any level. The borrowers are different, the mortgaged real estate is different, the practices of the banks are different, state laws are different, and federal government involvement is different for different types of lenders and borrowers. An important corollary of principle number one is that whatever a lender does, and whatever MERS does on behalf of lenders, will have different effects in different cases.

As Tanta wisely noted a few years ago, it is very difficult to see how an increasingly centralized industry can deal with all these details, and do it cheaply enough to make a profit when interest rates are at five percent and spreads are thin. In order to do it cheaply enough, the industry got rid of most of its Tanta-caliber people and replaced them with inexperienced temps, or perhaps with MERS. The main reason it worked for a few years was because problem mortgages could be refinanced so easily, and fees could be charged for each refinancing.

2. The creation of MERS did not really reduce the complications.

MERS undoubtedly provides some useful services to banks, but it does not “inoculate” them from dealing with necessary administrative costs. The administrative costs, especially in a lousy market, will probably make high-velocity mortgage loan trading and securitizing an unprofitable venture. As Tanta said, “the true cost of doing business is belatedly showing up.”

The goal of the people who created MERS was to design a system that has traction in local recording systems, and is flexible enough that it could be made to work under the law of every state. The MERS system probably meets this goal when it is done right. In theory, using the term “nominee” gives MERS flexibility in defining the duties and obligations of the relationship. It may also give MERS some flexibility in explaining how the court should treat a nominee after something has gone wrong, as the law of the jurisdiction or the facts of a particular case seem to require. Unfortunately for MERS, experienced judges are wise to this trick and will most likely to continue placing reasonable limits on the ability of MERS to claim it is all things to all lenders.

But setting all the cleverness of the MERS system aside, the system still requires the last lender in the chain to endorse the note over to MERS before the foreclosure can begin. If the lenders have been ignoring their paperwork because they think they are “inoculated against future assignments,” it is possible the lenders are worse off than they would have been without MERS. From what I can see, that is not the case. The way lenders were acting in 2005, if left to their own devices they would probably have lost about 90% of everything. With MERS, they probably did better than that.

So is this a nothingburger?

Sort of. MERS isn’t obscuring land titles in a way that will interfere with future transactions. If a mortgage is paid off, it should be released in the local public records. The odds that somebody screwed something up may go up a little or down a little, but a title company should be able to insure any subsequent sale.

We can also be reasonably certain the MERS cases are not going to invalidate millions of mortgages at one swipe. Because mortgages are complicated, whatever a lender does and whatever MERS does on behalf of lenders will have different effects in different cases. Most of the problems can be attributed to non-standard mortgage documents, poorly drafted foreclosure complaints, or foreclosure complaints filed prematurely without verifying the status of the mortgage and who is holding the note. These problems affect non-MERS lenders in more or less the same way they affect MERS lenders. Having MERS involved might help get things straightened out in some cases, or it might make the problem worse in some cases.

I think the important question is whether, on balance and in the aggregate, the MERS system works well enough to allow lenders to re-start the private label securitization money machine in a few years. I think the answer is probably no.

Of course, since the residential lending industry has effectively been nationalized, it would not be particularly surprising to see fundamental change on a national level that would allow the resumption of securitization. But that would probably bring us back to something like the plain vanilla Fannie and Freddie system that existed before 2000, not the insanely profitable liar loan system that Wall Street had created by 2005.

This post is intended as a tribute to Tanta, who already wrote pretty much everything you need to know to understand these issues, and did it much more cleverly than I can. I have not been able to read all the comments recently, so I apologize if I have inadvertently stolen anyone’s ideas besides Tanta’s.

Karl Denninger Speaks at the American Liberty Alliance Tour in Tallahassee, Florida – October 2, 2009

If you don’t yet fully understand what is being perpetrated upon us in this country, you will wonder no longer, after watching these videos.

Note: The videos are misnumbered, but presented here in their correct order.

Part 1:

Part 2:

? Washington’s Blog.

A 2005 letter in premier scientific journal Nature reviews the research on trust and economics:

Trust … plays a key role in economic exchange and politics. In the absence of trust among trading partners, market transactions break down.
In the absence of trust in a country’s institutions and leaders,
political legitimacy breaks down. Much recent evidence indicates that
trust contributes to economic, political and social success.

Forbes wrote an article in 2006 entitled “The Economics of Trust”. The article summarizes the importance of trust in creating a healthy economy:

Imagine
going to the corner store to buy a carton of milk, only to find that
the refrigerator is locked. When you’ve persuaded the shopkeeper to
retrieve the milk, you then end up arguing over whether you’re going to
hand the money over first, or whether he is going to hand over the
milk. Finally you manage to arrange an elaborate simultaneous exchange.
A little taste of life in a world without trust–now imagine trying to
arrange a mortgage.

 

Being able to trust people might seem like a pleasant luxury, but
economists are starting to believe that it’s rather more important than
that. Trust is about more than whether you can leave your house
unlocked; it is responsible for the difference between the richest
countries and the poorest.

 

“If you take a broad enough definition of trust, then it would
explain basically all the difference between the per capita income of
the United States and Somalia,” ventures Steve Knack, a senior
economist at the World Bank who has been studying the economics of
trust for over a decade. That suggests that trust is worth $12.4
trillion dollars a year to the U.S., which, in case you are wondering,
is 99.5% of this country’s income. ***

 

Above all, trust enables people to do business with each other. Doing business is what creates wealth. ***

 

Economists distinguish between the personal, informal trust that
comes from being friendly with your neighbors and the impersonal,
institutionalized trust that lets you give your credit card number out
over the Internet.

Similarly, market psychologists Richard L. Peterson M.D. and Frank Murtha, Ph.D. wrote in October:

Trust is the oil in the engine of capitalism, without it, the engine seizes up.

Confidence is like the gasoline, without it the machine won’t move.

Trust is gone: there is no longer trust between counterparties in the
financial system. Furthermore, confidence is at a low. Investors have
lost their confidence in the ability of shares to provide decent
returns (since they haven’t).

And two professors of finance write:

The
drop in trust, we believe, is a major factor behind the deteriorating
economic conditions. To demonstrate its importance, we launched the
Chicago Booth/Kellogg School Financial Trust Index. Our first set of
data—based on interviews conducted at the end of December 2008—shows
that between September and December, 52 percent of Americans lost trust
in the banks. Similarly, 65 percent lost trust in the stock market. A
BBB/Gallup poll that surveyed a similar sample of Americans last April
confirms this dramatic drop. At that time, 42 percent of Americans
trusted financial institutions, versus 34 percent in our survey today,
while 53 percent said they trusted U.S. companies, versus just 12
percent today.

 

As trust declines, so does Americans’ willingness to invest their
money in the financial system. Our data show that trust in the stock
market affects people’s intention to buy stocks, even after accounting
for expectations of future stock-market performance. Similarly, a
person’s trust in banks predicts the likelihood that he will make a run
on his bank in a moment of crisis: 25 percent of those who don’t trust
banks withdrew their deposits and stored them as cash last fall,
compared with only 3 percent of those who said they still trusted the
banks. Thus, trust in financial institutions is a key factor for the
smooth functioning of capital markets and, by extension, the economy.
Changes in trust matter.

They quote a Nobel laureate economist on the subject:

“Virtually
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust,”
writes economist Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel laureate. When we deposit money
in a bank, we trust that it’s safe. When a company orders goods, it
trusts its counterpart to deliver them in good faith. Trust facilitates
transactions because it saves the costs of monitoring and screening; it
is an essential lubricant that greases the wheels of the economic
system.

Americans clearly don’t trust the big banks and financial companies.

Indeed, as leading economists have pointed out, the big financial institutions don’t even trust each other,
because they know that all of the other companies might have hidden
toxic assets in SIVs, overvalued their assets, gamed their books, or
otherwise tried to bury their problems.

For example, Anna Schwartz – co-author with Milton Friedman of the leading monetarist book on the Great Depression – told the Wall Street Journal:

We
now hear almost every day that banks will not lend to each other, or
will do so only at punitive interest rates…This is not due to a lack
of money available to lend, Ms. Schwartz says, but to a lack of faith
in the ability of borrowers to repay their debts. “The Fed,” she
argues, “has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity.
That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is
that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are
credible.” 

So even though the Fed has flooded the credit markets with cash,
spreads haven’t budged because banks don’t know who is still solvent
and who is not. This uncertainty, says Ms. Schwartz, is “the basic
problem in the credit market. Lending freezes up when lenders are
uncertain that would-be borrowers have the resources to repay them. So
to assume that the whole problem is inadequate liquidity bypasses the
real issue”…

 

In the 1930s, as Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Friedman argued in “A Monetary History,” the country and the Federal Reserve were faced with a liquidity crisis in the banking sector…

 

But “that’s not what’s going on in the market now,” Ms. Schwartz
says. Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their
ledgers — “all these exotic securities that the market does not know
how to value.”

 

“Why are they ‘toxic’?” Ms. Schwartz asks. “They’re toxic because
you cannot sell them, you don’t know what they’re worth, your balance
sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don’t know
whom to lend to because we don’t know who is sound.”

As financial writer Will Hutton says:

“Such
was the break down in trust and sense of panic that some of the most
familiar names in British high street banking would not lend to each
other at all or, at best, just overnight. Instead, the Bank of England
had to supply tens of billions to banks who found the normal sources of
funds blocked.

***

Unless there is a radical and government-led change in ownership,
structure, regulation and incentives so that the principles of fairness
are put at the heart of the Anglo American financial system -
proportionality of reward and fair distribution of risk – there is no
chance of the return of trust and integrity upon which long-term
recovery depends.”

Economist and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich agrees that Wall Street’s biggest problem right now is the collapse of trust:

The
problem is, government bailouts, subsidies, and insurance aren’t really
helping Wall Street. The Street’s fundamental problem isn’t lack of
capital. It’s lack of trust. And without trust, Wall Street might as
well fold up its fancy tents.

Reich also writes:

Despite
all the money going directly to the big banks, despite all the
government guarantees and loans and special tax breaks, despite the
shot-gun weddings and bank mergers, despite the willingness of the
Treasury and the Fed to do almost whatever the banks have asked, the
reality is that credit is not flowing.

 

Why? Because the underlying problem isn’t a liquidity problem. As I’ve noted elsewhere, the
problem is that lenders and investors don’t trust they’ll get their
money back because no one trusts that the numbers that purport to value
securities are anything but wishful thinking. The trouble, in a nutshell, is that the financial entrepreneurship of recent years — the derivatives, credit default swaps, collateralized debt instruments, and so on — has undermined all notion of true value.

 

Many of these fancy instruments became popular over recent years
precisely because they circumvented financial regulations, especially
rules on banks’ capital adequacy. Big banks created all these
off-balance-sheet vehicles because they allowed the big banks to carry
less capital.

In other words, I would argue that our economy is not
fundamentally stabilizing (notwithstanding a couple of temporary “green
shoots”) because the government and the financial giants are taking
actions and releasing data which encourage more distortion and less trust.

The
crisis will deepen unless honest and transparent accounting is used,
investments become transparent and understandable again, and the
government stops gaming the system for the benefit of the big boys.

As structured finance and derivatives expert Janet Tavakoli says, lack
of transparency, lying and fraud which “we’ve seen massively in the
financial system” has undermined trust, so no one wants to buy our
financial products.

As John Carney writes:

“We’re probably making things worse. Allowing insolvent
institutions to fail and requiring worthless and worth less assets to
be fully written down would provide transparency to the market.
Instead, we’re dedicated to the post-Lehman proposition of “Never
Again.” The various programs of our government continue to obscure
asset pricing and conceal insolvency. This means that you can’t trust
the market to tell you which firms are failing.

 

Twisting the arms of bankers to lend to institutions that may be
insolvent is a recipe for deepening the crisis. We’ve just been through
a period of malinvestment–we spent too much borrowed money on junk.
Borrowing more to spend on junk only digs us in deeper.

 

Bank lending won’t get going again until trust in the markets can
be restored. Fighting a Great Depression era problem probably won’t
help. More transparency, which means more write-downs and failures, is
probably necessary if we’re going to get through this. Unfortunately,
we’re still sailing in the opposite direction.”

Happy Talk: Then and Now

It
is true that consumers and small investors drive a large portion of the
economy. And it is true that consumers and small investors, in turn,
are largely driven by their perception of what is happening.

But
I would also argue that all of the happy talk in the world won’t turn
the economy around when the fundamentals of the economy are lousy, or
there has been a giant bubble and vast overleveraging, or there has
been massive fraud, or the government has gone so far into debt that it
has formed a black hole.

Happy talk did not work during the first couple of years of the Great Depression, once the speculative bubble and leverage of the Roaring 20′s burst, leading to the inevitable crash.

As economist Irving Fisher pointed out (as recounted by economist Steve Keen):

Hobbled
by this naive belief in equilibrium, the economics profession was as
unprepared for today’s crisis as it had been for the Great Depression.
Now that the crisis is well and truly with us, all
conventional “neoclassical” economists can offer is the hope that the
crisis can be overcome by a good, strong dose of confidence.

From [Irving] Fisher’s point of
view, such a belief is futile. In an economy with an excessive level of
debt and low inflation, he argued that confidence was irrelevant–and in
fact dangerously misleading, as he knew from painful personal experience.

University of Maryland professor economics professor and former Chief
Economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission Peter Morici wrote in 2006:

The
speculative frenzy of recent years is causing a major adjustment, and
the happy talk of realtors is prolonging the process. The absence of
realistic analysis about the extent of overvaluation is characteristic
in an industry that sees nothing but an upward progression for values,
but houses like any other asset can be overpriced.

Things are likely to get worse before they get better.

Morici was pointing out that there was a bubble in housing, and happy talk would not keep the bubble from bursting.

As Washington Post business writer Steven Pearlstein predicted in August 2007:

Despite
the happy talk from Washington and Wall Street investment houses –
eerily reminiscent, by the way, of the early days of the
savings-and-loan crisis of the late ’80s — these shocks [the subprime
and credit crises] will have serious consequences …

And economist James Galbraith is saying now (just as his father economist John Kenneth Galbraith said 50 years ago) – that “happy talk” won’t solve the crisis.

Indeed, the chair of the congressional oversight committee of the bailouts (Elizabeth Warren) and the senior regulator
during the S & L crisis (William Black) both say that hiding the
true state of affairs and trying to put a happy face on an economic
crisis just prolongs the length and severity of the crash

Donald
W. Riegle Jr. – former chair of the Senate Banking Committee from 1989
to 1994 – wrote (along with the former CEO of AT&T Broadband and
the international president of the United Steelworkers union) wrote recently:

It’s
almost as if the [Obama] administration is opting for a
rose-colored-glasses PR strategy rather than taking a hard-nose look at
actual consumer and employment figures and their trends, and modifying
its economic policies accordingly.

In short, happy talk and fake confidence-building exercises (like the stress tests, which Time Magazine called a con game) don’t work.

Indeed, I believe that trying to instill false confidence will actually backfire on Summers, Geithner, Bernanke and the boys and make the crisis worse.

Why?

Well, initially, as Yves Smith points out:

Team Obama has made it clear that it sees restoring confidence as paramount, when anyone
with consumer marketing experience will tell you that advertising
campaigns that make exaggerated claims about the product often don’t
simply fail (as in customers see through the hype) but often backfire
(buyers discount future ad messages about the product). The
press has had a manipulated feel, with readers on sending news stories
that have misleadingly positive stories with Panglossian headlines and
upbeat initial paragraphs that are often undercut by other material in
the same article.

So in our new branding, “the economy is no longer in a freefall” has
become “recovery.” The self-congratulatory tone among US financial
regulators (who should instead be engaging in serious
self-recrimination for failing to foresee and prevent this crisis) is
premature.

In addition, psychologists say that – until
government and business leaders prove they can behave responsibly, and
until the perpetrators of financial fraud are held accountable – real
trust will not be restored and the economy will not recover

For example, one of the leading business schools in America – the Wharton School of Business – has written an essay
on the psychological causes and solutions to the economic crisis.
Wharton points out that restoring trust is the key to recovery, and
that trust cannot be restored until wrongdoers are held accountable:

According to David M. Sachs, a training and supervision analyst at the Psychoanalytic Center of Philadelphia, the
crisis today is not one of confidence, but one of trust. “Abusive
financial practices were unchecked by personal moral controls that
prohibit individual criminal behavior, as in the case of [Bernard]
Madoff, and by complex financial manipulations, as in the case of AIG.”
The public, expecting to be protected from such abuse, has suffered a
trauma of loss similar to that after 9/11. “Normal expectations of what
is safe and dependable were abruptly shattered,” Sachs noted. “As is
typical of post-traumatic states, planning for the future could not be
based on old assumptions about what is safe and what is dangerous. A
radical reversal of how to be gratified occurred.”

 

People now feel more gratified saving
money than spending it, Sachs suggested. They have trouble trusting
promises from the government because they feel the government has let
them down.

 

He framed his argument with a fictional patient named Betty Q.
Public, a librarian with two teenage children and a husband, John, who
had recently lost his job. “She felt betrayed because she and her
husband had invested conservatively and were double-crossed by
dishonest, greedy businessmen, and now she distrusted the government
that had failed to protect them from corporate dishonesty. Not only
that, but she had little trust in things turning around soon enough to
enable her and her husband to accomplish their previous goals.

 

“By no means a sophisticated economist, she knew … that some
people had become fantastically wealthy by misusing other people’s
money — hers included,” Sachs said. “In short, John and Betty had done
everything right and were being punished, while the dishonest people
were going unpunished.”

 

Helping an individual recover from a traumatic experience provides
a useful analogy for understanding how to help the economy recover from
its own traumatic experience, Sachs pointed out. The public will need to “hold the perpetrators of the economic disaster responsible and take what actions they can to prevent them from harming the economy again.” In addition, the public will have to see proof that government and business leaders can behave responsibly before they will trust them again, he argued.

Note that Sachs urges “hold[ing] the perpetrators of the economic disaster responsible.” In other words, just “looking forward” and promising to do things differently isn’t enough.

Are the “perpetrators of the economic disaster” being held accountable?

So
far, Obama, Summers, Geithner, Bernanke and the crew have tried to
paper over the cause and severity of the financial crisis, instead of
honestly addressing them. They haven’t lifted a finger to hold anyone
accountable (other than a Madoff or two), but have actually thrown
billions of dollars at the perpetrators (or else appointed them to
government posts).

Indeed, William Black says that “the [government's] entire strategy is to keep people from getting the facts”.

Economist Dean Baker made a similar point, lambasting
the Federal Reserve for blowing the bubble, and pointing out that those
who caused the disaster are trying to shift the focus as fast as they
can:

The current craze in DC policy circles
is to create a “systematic risk regulator” to make sure that the
country never experiences another economic crisis like the current one.
This push is part of a cover-up of what really went wrong and does
absolutely nothing to address the underlying problem that led to this
financial and economic collapse.

 

The key fact that everyone must always remember is that the story
of the collapse was not complex. We did not need great minds sifting
through endless reams of data and running incredibly complex computer
simulations to discover the underlying problem in the economy. We just
needed some people who understood the sort of arithmetic that most of
us learned in 3rd grade.

 

If the people at the Fed, the Treasury, and in other key positions
had mastered arithmetic, and were prepared to act on their knowledge,
they would have taken steps to stem the growth of the housing bubble.
They would have prevented the bubble from growing to the point where
its inevitable collapse would bring down both the U.S. economy and the
world economy…

 

We didn’t need some super-genius to solve the mystery. We just
needed an economist who could breath and do arithmetic. But the DC
policy crowd tells us that if only we had a systematic risk regulator
this disaster could have been prevented.

 

Okay, let’s do a thought experiment. Suppose we had our systematic
risk regulator in 2002. Would this person have stood up to Alan
Greenspan and said that the country is facing a huge housing bubble the
collapse of which will sink the economy?…

 

Alan Greenspan said that there was no housing bubble; everything
was just fine. Would our systematic risk regulator have said that
Greenspan was nuts and that the whole economy was a house of cards
waiting to collapse?

 

Anyone who believes that a risk regulator would have challenged
the great Greenspan knows nothing about the way Washington works. The
government is run by people who first and foremost want to advance
their careers.

 

And, the best way to advance your career in Washington is to go
along with what everyone else is saying. If that was not completely
obvious before the collapse of the housing bubble, it certainly should
be obvious now.

 

How many people in government have lost their jobs because they
failed to see the bubble? How many people even missed a promotion? In
fact, the top financial officials in the Obama administration, without
exception, completely missed the housing bubble. One might think it was
a job requirement.

This lack of accountability among economists and economic analysts is the core problem that must be tackled.
Unless these people are held accountable for their failures in the same
way as custodians and dishwashers, there will never be any incentive to
buck the crowd and point out looming disasters like the housing bubble.

The reality is that we have a systematic risk regulator. It is called the Federal Reserve Board. They blew it completely. We
will do far more to prevent the next crisis by holding our current risk
regulator accountable for its failure (fire people) than by pretending
that we somehow had a gap in our regulatory structure and creating
another worthless bureaucracy.

Remember also that the Wharton study pointed out that
“the public, expecting to be protected from such abuse, has suffered a
trauma of loss similar to that after 9/11.”

Trying to put a happy
face on a grim situation, continuing to do things which are transparent
attempts to instill false confidence, and leaving in power the people
who caused the crisis reinforces the market’s convictions that (1)
government and business leaders are behaving irresponsibly instead of
addressing the fundamental problems and (2) there is no accountability.

Keeping
quiet about how bad things are won’t help. As numerous leading
independent economists and financial experts agree, the three things
that will help are:

1. Honestly addressing the causes of the crisis;
2. Honestly addressing the necessary – if bitter – medicine needed to get out of the crisis; and
3. Holding responsible those who caused the crisis.

Postscript: Time Magazine notes:

Traditionally, gold has been a store of value when citizens do not trust their government politically or economically.

In other words, the government’s political actions affect investments, such as gold.

It is interesting to note that Americans no longer trust their politicians, the justice system, their ability to obtain liberty, or the media. Americans know that the boys launched the war in Iraq (which will end up costing $3-5 trillion dollars) based upon justifications which turned out to be untrue. Many Americans have read that the government imported communist Soviet Union torture techniques and then said “we don’t torture”. Many Americans also know that the government spied on American citizen (even before 9/11 … confirmed here and here) while saying “we don’t spy”, and that the government apparently planned both the Afghanistan war (see this and this) and the Iraq war before 9/11.

This
is an economic, not a political, essay. But I think the lack of trust
in government concerning political issues poses an interesting
question. Specifically, is it possible that the American people’s
distrust of the government concerning the above-described issues also
bleeds over into a lack of trust in the government’s economic actions
and statements? In other words, if people discover that a government is
lying about political issues, do people trust the government’s
pronouncements about economic issues less?

I
don’t know the answer, but analyzing the possibility could provide a
researcher with an interesting project (or a PhD candidate with a
potential doctoral thesis).