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Damn those deadbeat borrowers…

From the Allstate vs JP Morgan lawsuit:

Allstate selected a random sample of loans from each offering in which it invested to test Defendants’ representations on a loan-level basis. Using techniques and methodologies that only recently became available, Allstate conducted loan-level analyses on nearly 26,809 mortgage loans underlying its Certificates, across 17 of the offerings at issue here.

For each offering, Allstate attempted to analyze 800 defaulted loans and 800 randomly-sampled loans from within the collateral pool. These sample sizes are more than sufficient to provide statistically-significant data to demonstrate the degree of misrepresentation of the Mortgage Loans’ characteristics. Analyzing data for each Mortgage Loan in each Offering would have been cost-prohibitive and unnecessary. Statistical sampling is an accepted method of establishing reliable conclusions about broader data sets, and is routinely used by courts, government agencies, and private businesses. As the size of a sample increases, the reliability of its estimations of the total population’s characteristics increase as well. Experts in RMBS cases have found that a sample size of just 400 loans can provide statistically significant data, regardless of the size of the actual loan pool, because it is unlikely that such a sample would yield results markedly different from results for the entire population.

Specifically, Allstate did the following:

To determine whether a given borrower actually occupied the property as claimed, Allstate investigated tax information for the sampled loans. One would expect that a borrower residing at a property would have his or her tax bills sent to that address, and would take all applicable tax exemptions available to residents of that property. If a borrower had his or her tax records sent to another address, that is good evidence that he or she was not actually residing at the mortgaged property. If a borrower declined to make certain tax exemption elections that depend on the borrower living at the property, that also is strong evidence the borrower was living elsewhere.

A review of credit records was also conducted. One would expect that people have bills sent to their primary address. If a borrower was telling creditors to send bills to another address, even six months after buying the property, it is good evidence he or she was living elsewhere.

A review of property records was also conducted. It is less likely that a borrower lives in any one property if in fact that borrower owns multiple properties. It is even less likely the borrower resides at the mortgaged property if a concurrently-owned separate property did not have its own tax bills sent to the property included in the mortgage pool.

A review of other lien records was also conducted. If the property was subject to additional liens but those materials were sent elsewhere, that is good evidence the borrower was not living at the mortgaged property. If the other lien involved a conflicting declaration of residency, that too would be good evidence that the borrower did not live in the subject property.

In a nutshell, as Allstate summarizes, it was lies all the way:

the disclosed underwriting standards were systematically ignored in originating or otherwise acquiring non-compliant loans. For instance, recent reviews of the loan files underlying some of Allstate’s Certificates reveal a pervasive lack of proper documentation, facially absurd (yet unchecked) claims about the borrower’s purported income, and the routine disregard of purported underwriting guidelines. Based on data compiled from third-party due diligence firms, the federal Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) noted in its January 2011 report:

The Commission concludes that firms securitizing mortgages failed to perform adequate due diligence on the mortgages they purchased and at times knowingly waived compliance with underwriting standards. Potential investors were not fully informed or were misled about the poor quality of the mortgages contained in some mortgage-related securities. These problems appear to be significant.

Some of the unbelievable findings are presented below. They speak for themselves…and, again in any normal non-banana republic, would lead to at least several criminal prosecutions. In America? No way.

Not surprisingly, the performance of loans issued by JPM and its acquisition Bear, deteriorated rapidly post issuance:

Read more at ZeroHedge

Allstate vs JP Morgan 2-16-2011

ZeroHedge

4closureFraud

May Jamie Dimon Get His Wish

Posted by Karl Denninger

Looting Main Street

How the nation’s biggest banks are ripping off American cities with the same predatory deals that brought down Greece

MATT TAIBBI

If you want to know what life in the Third World is like, just ask Lisa Pack, an administrative assistant who works in the roads and transportation department in Jefferson County, Alabama. Pack got rudely introduced to life in post-crisis America last August, when word came down that she and 1,000 of her fellow public employees would have to take a little unpaid vacation for a while. The county, it turned out, was more than $5 billion in debt — meaning that courthouses, jails and sheriff’s precincts had to be closed so that Wall Street banks could be paid.

As public services in and around Birmingham were stripped to the bone, Pack struggled to support her family on a weekly unemployment check of $260. Nearly a fourth of that went to pay for her health insurance, which the county no longer covered. She also fielded calls from laid-off co-workers who had it even tougher. “I’d be on the phone sometimes until two in the morning,” she says. “I had to talk more than one person out of suicide. For some of the men supporting families, it was so hard — foreclosure, bankruptcy. I’d go to bed at night, and I’d be in tears.”

Homes stood empty, businesses were boarded up, and parts of already-blighted Birmingham began to take on the feel of a ghost town. There were also a few bills that were unique to the area — like the $64 sewer bill that Pack and her family paid each month. “Yeah, it went up about 400 percent just over the past few years,” she says.

The sewer bill, in fact, is what cost Pack and her co-workers their jobs. In 1996, the average monthly sewer bill for a family of four in Birmingham was only $14.71 — but that was before the county decided to build an elaborate new sewer system with the help of out-of-state financial wizards with names like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase. The result was a monstrous pile of borrowed money that the county used to build, in essence, the world’s grandest toilet — “the Taj Mahal of sewer-treatment plants” is how one county worker put it. What happened here in Jefferson County would turn out to be the perfect metaphor for the peculiar alchemy of modern oligarchical capitalism: A mob of corrupt local officials and morally absent financiers got together to build a giant device that converted human shit into billions of dollars of profit for Wall Street — and misery for people like Lisa Pack.

And once the giant shit machine was built and the note on all that fancy construction started to come due, Wall Street came back to the local politicians and doubled down on the scam. They showed up in droves to help the poor, broke citizens of Jefferson County cut their toilet finance charges using a blizzard of incomprehensible swaps and refinance schemes — schemes that only served to postpone the repayment date a year or two while sinking the county deeper into debt. In the end, every time Jefferson County so much as breathed near one of the banks, it got charged millions in fees. There was so much money to be made bilking these dizzy Southerners that banks like JP Morgan spent millions paying middlemen who bribed — yes, that’s right, bribed, criminally bribed — the county commissioners and their buddies just to keep their business. Hell, the money was so good, JP Morgan at one point even paid Goldman Sachs $3 million just to back the fuck off, so they could have the rubes of Jefferson County to fleece all for themselves.

Birmingham became the poster child for a new kind of giant-scale financial fraud, one that would threaten the financial stability not only of cities and counties all across America, but even those of entire countries like Greece. While for many Americans the financial crisis remains an abstraction, a confusing mess of complex transactions that took place on a cloud high above Manhattan sometime in the mid-2000s, in Jefferson County you can actually see the rank criminality of the crisis economy with your own eyes; the monster sticks his head all the way out of the water. Here you can see a trail that leads directly from a billion-dollar predatory swap deal cooked up at the highest levels of America’s biggest banks, across a vast fruited plain of bribes and felonies — “the price of doing business,” as one JP Morgan banker says on tape — all the way down to Lisa Pack’s sewer bill and the mass layoffs in Birmingham.

Once you follow that trail and understand what took place in Jefferson County, there’s really no room left for illusions. We live in a gangster state, and our days of laughing at other countries are over. It’s our turn to get laughed at. In Birmingham, lots of people have gone to jail for the crime: More than 20 local officials and businessmen have been convicted of corruption in federal court. Last October, right around the time that Lisa Pack went back to work at reduced hours, Birmingham’s mayor was convicted of fraud and money-laundering for taking bribes funneled to him by Wall Street bankers — everything from Rolex watches to Ferragamo suits to cash. But those who greenlighted the bribes and profited most from the scam remain largely untouched. “It never gets back to JP Morgan,” says Pack.

If you want to get all Glenn Beck about it, you could lay the blame for this entire mess at the feet of weepy, tree-hugging environmentalists. It all started with the Cahaba River, the longest free-flowing river in the state of Alabama. The tributary, which winds its way through Birmingham before turning diagonally to empty out near Selma, is home to more types of fish per mile than any other river in America and shelters 64 rare and imperiled species of plants and animals. It’s also the source of one of the worst municipal financial disasters in American history.

Back in the early 1990s, the county’s sewer system was so antiquated that it was leaking raw sewage directly into the Cahaba, which also supplies the area with its drinking water. Joined by well — intentioned citizens from the Cahaba River Society, the EPA sued the county to force it to comply with the Clean Water Act. In 1996, county commissioners signed a now-infamous consent decree agreeing not just to fix the leaky pipes but to eliminate all sewer overflows — a near-impossible standard that required the county to build the most elaborate, ecofriendly, expensive sewer system in the history of the universe. It was like ordering a small town in Florida that gets a snowstorm once every five years to build a billion-dollar fleet of snowplows.

The original cost estimates for the new sewer system were as low as $250 million. But in a wondrous demonstration of the possibilities of small-town graft and contract-padding, the price tag quickly swelled to more than $3 billion. County commissioners were literally pocketing wads of cash from builders and engineers and other contractors eager to get in on the project, while the county was forced to borrow obscene sums to pay for the rapidly spiraling costs. Jefferson County, in effect, became one giant, TV-stealing, unemployed drug addict who borrowed a million dollars to buy the mother of all McMansions — and just as it did during the housing bubble, Wall Street made a business of keeping the crook in his house. As one county commissioner put it, “We’re like a guy making $50,000 a year with a million-dollar mortgage.”

To reassure lenders that the county would pay its mortgage, commissioners gave the finance director — an unelected official appointed by the president of the commission — the power to automatically raise sewer rates to meet payments on the debt. The move brought in billions in financing, but it also painted commissioners into a corner. If costs continued to rise — and with practically every contractor in Alabama sticking his fingers on the scale, they were rising fast — officials would be faced with automatic rate increases that would piss off their voters. (By 2003, annual interest on the sewer deal had reached $90 million.) So the commission reached out to Wall Street, looking for creative financing tools that would allow it to reduce the county’s staggering debt payments.

Wall Street was happy to help. First, it employed the same trick it used to fuel the housing crisis: It switched the county from a fixed rate on the bonds it had issued to finance the sewer deal to an adjustable rate. The refinancing meant lower interest payments for a couple of years — followed by the risk of even larger payments down the road. The move enabled county commissioners to postpone the problem for an election season or two, kicking it to a group of future commissioners who would inevitably have to pay the real freight.

But then Wall Street got really creative. Having switched the county to a variable interest rate, it offered commissioners a crazy deal: For an extra fee, the banks said, we’ll allow you to keep paying a fixed rate on your debt to us. In return, we’ll give you a variable amount each month that you can use to pay off all that variable-rate interest you owe to bondholders.

In financial terms, this is known as a synthetic rate swap — the spidery creature you might have read about playing a role in bringing down places like Greece and Milan. On paper, it made sense: The county got the stability of a fixed rate, while paying Wall Street to assume the risk of the variable rates on its bonds. That’s the synthetic part. The trouble lies in the rate swap. The deal only works if the two variable rates — the one you get from the bank, and the one you owe to bondholders — actually match. It’s like gambling on the weather. If your bondholders are expecting you to pay an interest rate based on the average temperature in Alabama, you don’t do a rate swap with a bank that gives you back a rate pegged to the temperature in Nome, Alaska.

Not unless you’re a fucking moron. Or your banker is JP Morgan.

In a small office in a federal building in downtown Birmingham, just blocks from where civil rights demonstrators shut down the city in 1963, Assistant U.S. Attorney George Martin points out the window. He’s pointing in the direction of the Tutwiler Hotel, once home to one of the grandest ballrooms in the South but now part of the Hampton Inn chain.

“It was right around the corner here, at the hotel,” Martin says. “That’s where they met — that’s where this all started.”

They means Charles LeCroy and Bill Blount, the two principals in what would become the most important of all the corruption cases in Jefferson County. LeCroy was a banker for JP Morgan, serving as managing director of the bank’s southeast regional office. Blount was an Alabama wheeler-dealer with close friends on the county commission. For years, when Wall Street banks wanted to do business with municipalities, whether for bond issues or rate swaps, it was standard practice to reach out to a local sleazeball like Blount and pay him a shitload of money to help seal the deal. “Banks would pay some local consultant, and the consultant would then funnel money to the politician making the decision,” says Christopher Taylor, the former head of the board that regulates municipal borrowing. Back in the 1990s, Taylor pushed through a ban on such backdoor bribery. He also passed a ban on bankers contributing directly to politicians they do business with — a move that sparked a lawsuit by one aggrieved sleazeball, who argued that halting such legalized graft violated his First Amendment rights. The name of that pissed-off banker? “It was the one and only Bill Blount,” Taylor says with a laugh.

Blount is a stocky, stubby-fingered Southerner with glasses and a pale, pinched face — if Norman Rockwell had ever done a painting titled “Small-Town Accountant Taking Enormous Dump,” it would look just like Blount. LeCroy, his sugar daddy at JP Morgan, is a tall, bloodless, crisply dressed corporate operator with a shiny bald head and silver side patches — a cross between Skeletor and Michael Stipe.

The scheme they operated went something like this: LeCroy paid Blount millions of dollars, and Blount turned around and used the money to buy lavish gifts for his close friend Larry Langford, the now-convicted Birmingham mayor who at the time had just been elected president of the county commission. (At one point Blount took Langford on a shopping spree in New York, putting $3,290 worth of clothes from Zegna on his credit card.) Langford then signed off on one after another of the deadly swap deals being pushed by LeCroy. Every time the county refinanced its sewer debt, JP Morgan made millions of dollars in fees. Even more lucrative, each of the swap contracts contained clauses that mandated all sorts of penalties and payments in the event that something went wrong with the deal. In the mortgage business, this process is known as churning: You keep coming back over and over to refinance, and they keep “churning” you for more and more fees. “The transactions were complex, but the scheme was simple,” said Robert Khuzami, director of enforcement for the SEC. “Senior JP Morgan bankers made unlawful payments to win business and earn fees.”

Given the shitload of money to be made on the refinancing deals, JP Morgan was prepared to pay whatever it took to buy off officials in Jefferson County. In 2002, during a conversation recorded in Nixonian fashion by JP Morgan itself, LeCroy bragged that he had agreed to funnel payoff money to a pair of local companies to secure the votes of two county commissioners. “Look,” the commissioners told him, “if we support the synthetic refunding, you guys have to take care of our two firms.” LeCroy didn’t blink. “Whatever you want,” he told them. “If that’s what you need, that’s what you get. Just tell us how much.”

Just tell us how much. That sums up the approach that JP Morgan took a few months later, when Langford announced that his good buddy Bill Blount would henceforth be involved with every financing transaction for Jefferson County. From JP Morgan’s point of view, the decision to pay off Blount was a no-brainer. But the bank had one small problem: Goldman Sachs had already crawled up Blount’s trouser leg, and the broker was advising Langford to pick them as Jefferson County’s investment bank.

The solution they came up with was an extraordinary one: JP Morgan cut a separate deal with Goldman, paying the bank $3 million to fuck off, with Blount taking a $300,000 cut of the side deal. Suddenly Goldman was out and JP Morgan was sitting in Langford’s lap. In another conversation caught on tape, LeCroy joked that the deal was his “philanthropic work,” since the payoff amounted to a “charitable donation to Goldman Sachs” in return for “taking no risk.”

That such a blatant violation of anti-trust laws took place and neither JP Morgan nor Goldman have been prosecuted for it is yet another mystery of the current financial crisis. “This is an open-and-shut case of anti-competitive behavior,” says Taylor, the former regulator.

With Goldman out of the way, JP Morgan won the right to do a $1.1 billion bond offering — switching Jefferson County out of fixed-rate debt into variable-rate debt — and also did a corresponding $1.1 billion deal for a synthetic rate swap. The very same day the transaction was concluded, in May 2003, LeCroy had dinner with Langford and struck a deal to do yet another bond-and-swap transaction of roughly the same size. This time, the terms of the payoff were spelled out more explicitly. In a hilarious phone call between LeCroy and Douglas MacFaddin, another JP Morgan official, the two bankers groaned aloud about how much it was going to cost to satisfy Blount:

LeCroy: I said, “Commissioner Langford, I’ll do that because that’s your suggestion, but you gotta help us keep him under control. Because when you give that guy a hand, he takes your arm.” You know?

MacFaddin: [Laughing] Yeah, you end up in the wood-chipper.

All told, JP Morgan ended up paying Blount nearly $3 million for “performing no known services,” in the words of the SEC. In at least one of the deals, Blount made upward of 15 percent of JP Morgan’s entire fee. When I ask Taylor what a legitimate consultant might earn in such a circumstance, he laughs. “What’s a ‘legitimate consultant’ in a case like this? He made this money for doing jack shit.”

As the tapes of LeCroy’s calls show, even officials at JP Morgan were incredulous at the money being funneled to Blount. “How does he get 15 percent?” one associate at the bank asks LeCroy. “For doing what? For not messing with us?”

“Not messing with us,” LeCroy agrees. “It’s a lot of money, but in the end, it’s worth it on a billion-dollar deal.”

That’s putting it mildly: The deals wound up being the largest swap agreements in JP Morgan’s history. Making matters worse, the payoffs didn’t even wind up costing the bank a dime. As the SEC explained in a statement on the scam, JP Morgan “passed on the cost of the unlawful payments by charging the county higher interest rates on the swap transactions.” In other words, not only did the bank bribe local politicians to take the sucky deal, they got local taxpayers to pay for the bribes. And because Jefferson County had no idea what kind of deal it was getting on the swaps, JP Morgan could basically charge whatever it wanted. According to an analysis of the swap deals commissioned by the county in 2007, taxpayers had been overcharged at least $93 million on the transactions.

JP Morgan was far from alone in the scam: Virtually everyone doing business in Jefferson County was on the take. Four of the nation’s top investment banks, the very cream of American finance, were involved in one way or another with payoffs to Blount in their scramble to do business with the county. In addition to JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns paid Langford’s bagman $2.4 million, while Lehman Brothers got off cheap with a $35,000 “arranger’s fee.” At least a dozen of the county’s contractors were also cashing in, along with many of the county commissioners. “If you go into the county courthouse,” says Michael Morrison, a planner who works for the county, “there’s a gallery of past commissioners on the wall. On the top row, every single one of ‘em but two has been investigated, indicted or convicted. It’s a joke.”

The crazy thing is that such arrangements — where some local scoundrel gets a massive fee for doing nothing but greasing the wheels with elected officials — have been taking place all over the country. In Illinois, during the Upper Volta-esque era of Rod Blagojevich, a Republican political consultant named Robert Kjellander got 10 percent of the entire fee Bear Stearns earned doing a bond sale for the state pension fund. At the start of Obama’s term, Bill Richardson’s Cabinet appointment was derailed for a similar scheme when he was governor of New Mexico. Indeed, one reason that officials in Jefferson County didn’t know that the swaps they were signing off on were shitty was because their adviser on the deals was a firm called CDR Financial Products, which is now accused of conspiring to overcharge dozens of cities in swap transactions. According to a federal antitrust lawsuit, CDR is basically a big-league version of Bill Blount — banks tossed money at the firm, which in turn advised local politicians that they were getting a good deal. “It was basically, you pay CDR, and CDR helps push the deal through,” says Taylor.

In the end, though, all this bribery and graft was just the table-setter for the real disaster. In taking all those bribes and signing on to all those swaps, the commissioners in Jefferson County had ­basically started the clock on a financial time bomb that, sooner or later, had to explode. By continually refinancing to keep the county in its giant McMansion, the commission had managed to push into the future that inevitable day when the real bill would arrive in the mail. But that’s where the mortgage analogy ends — because in one key area, a swap deal differs from a home mortgage. Imagine a mortgage that you have to keep on paying even after you sell your house. That’s basically how a swap deal works. And Jefferson County had done 23 of them. At one point, they had more outstanding swaps than New York City.

Judgment Day was coming — just like it was for the Delaware River Port Authority, the Pennsylvania school system, the cities of Detroit, Chicago, Oakland and Los Angeles, the states of Connecticut and Mississippi, the city of Milan and nearly 500 other municipalities in Italy, the country of Greece, and God knows who else. All of these places are now reeling under the weight of similarly elaborate and ill-advised swaps — and if what happened in Jefferson County is any guide, hoo boy. Because when the shit hit the fan in Birmingham, it really hit the fan.

For Jefferson County, the deal blew up in early 2008, when a dizzying array of penalties and other fine-print poison worked into the swap contracts started to kick in. The trouble began with the housing crash, which took down the insurance companies that had underwritten the county’s bonds. That rendered the county’s insurance worthless, triggering clauses in its swap contracts that required it to pay off more than $800 million of its debt in only four years, rather than 40. That, in turn, scared off private lenders, who were no longer ­interested in bidding on the county’s bonds. The banks were forced to make up the difference — a service for which they charged enormous penalties. It was as if the county had missed a payment on its credit card and woke up the next morning to find its annual percentage rate jacked up to a million percent. Between 2008 and 2009, the annual payment on Jefferson County’s debt jumped from $53 million to a whopping $636 million.

It gets worse. Remember the swap deal that Jefferson County did with JP Morgan, how the variable rates it got from the bank were supposed to match those it owed its bondholders? Well, they didn’t. Most of the payments the county was receiving from JP Morgan were based on one set of interest rates (the London Interbank Exchange Rate), while the payments it owed to its bondholders followed a different set of rates (a municipal-bond index). Jefferson County was suddenly getting far less from JP Morgan, and owing tons more to bondholders. In other words, the bank and Bill Blount made tens of millions of dollars selling deals to local politicians that were not only completely defective, but blew the entire county to smithereens.

And here’s the kicker. Last year, when Jefferson County, staggered by the weight of its penalties, was unable to make its swap payments to JP Morgan, the bank canceled the deal. That triggered one-time “termination fees” of — yes, you read this right — $647 million. That was money the county would owe no matter what happened with the rest of its debt, even if bondholders decided to forgive and forget every dime the county had borrowed. It was like the herpes simplex of loans — debt that does not go away, ever, for as long as you live. On a sewer project that was originally supposed to cost $250 million, the county now owed a total of $1.28 billion just in interest and fees on the debt. Imagine paying $250,000 a year on a car you purchased for $50,000, and that’s roughly where Jefferson County stood at the end of last year.

Last November, the SEC charged JP Morgan with fraud and canceled the $647 million in termination fees. The bank agreed to pay a $25 million fine and fork over $50 million to assist displaced workers in Jefferson County. So far, the county has managed to avoid bankruptcy, but the sewer fiasco had downgraded its credit rating, triggering payments on other outstanding loans and pushing Birmingham toward the status of an African debtor state. For the next generation, the county will be in a constant fight to collect enough taxes just to pay off its debt, which now totals $4,800 per resident.

The city of Birmingham was founded in 1871, at the dawn of the Southern industrial boom, for the express purpose of attracting Northern capital — it was even named after a famous British steel town to burnish its entrepreneurial cred. There’s a gruesome irony in it now lying sacked and looted by financial vandals from the North. The destruction of Jefferson County reveals the basic battle plan of these modern barbarians, the way that banks like JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs have systematically set out to pillage towns and cities from Pittsburgh to Athens. These guys aren’t number-crunching whizzes making smart investments; what they do is find suckers in some municipal-finance department, corner them in complex lose-lose deals and flay them alive. In a complete subversion of free-market principles, they take no risk, score deals based on political influence rather than competition, keep consumers in the dark — and walk away with big money. “It’s not high finance,” says Taylor, the former bond regulator. “It’s low finance.” And even if the regulators manage to catch up with them billions of dollars later, the banks just pay a small fine and move on to the next scam. This isn’t capitalism. It’s nomadic thievery.

[From Issue 1102 — April 15, 2010]

Do we have another Harry Markopolos here, describing in detail the manipulation of the gold market by J.P. Morgan to the CFTC? How does this square with the testimony today from the CFTC Commissioners, who seem to indicate that the markets are functioning extremely well, and that investor can have full confidence in them?

I am led to understand that Mr. McGuire had offered to testify before the CFTC today, and that he was refused admittance. I do not know him, or the position he is in within the trading community. I cannot therefore assess his credibility or the validity of any evidence which he may present or possess. But I have the feeling that nothing will come of this.

Remember, there was no action on the Madoff scandal until AFTER his fraud collapsed, and the government was forced to acknowledge his existence. Harry Markopolos was dismissed by the arrogant bureaucrats at the SEC for years because of Madoff’s power and standing with the trading establishment, and those who had an interest in his scheme, if nothing else, to be silent to promote ‘confidence’ in the markets.

This is much, much bigger than the Madoff scandal if true. Frankly, I do not expect the facts to ever reach the light of day. The implications are far too political.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT BY BILL MURPHY, CHAIRMAN OF THE GOLD ANTI-TRUST ACTION COMMITTEE

HEARINGS ON THE METALS MARKETS, MARCH 25, 2010

On March 23, 2010 GATA Director Adrian Douglas was contacted by a whistleblower by the name of Andrew Maguire. Mr. Maguire, formerly of Goldman Sachs, is a metals trader in London. He has been told first hand by traders working for JPMorganChase that JPMorganChase manipulates the precious metals markets and they bragged how they make money doing so.

In November 2009 he contacted the CFTC enforcement division to report this criminal activity. He described in detail the way in which JPM signals to the market its intention to take down the precious metals<. Traders recognize these signals and make money shorting the metals along side JPM. He explained how there are routine market manipulations at the time of option expiry, Non-farm payroll data releases, and Comex contract rollover as well as other ad hoc events.

On February 3 he gave two days advance warning by email to Mr Eliud Ramirez, a senior investigator of the Enforcement Division, that the precious metals would be attacked upon the release of the non-farm payroll data on February 5. Then on February 5 as it played out exactly as predicted further emails were sent to Mr. Ramirez in real time while the manipulation was in progress.

It would not be possible to predict such a market move in advance unless the market was manipulated.

In an email on that day Mr. Maguire said “It is ‘common knowledge’ here in London amongst the metals traders it is JPM’s intent to flush out and cover as many shorts as possible prior to any discussion in March about position limits. I feel sorry for all those not in this loop. A serious amount of money was made and lost today and in my opinion as a result of the CFTC allowing by your own definition an illegal concentrated and manipulative position to continue”

Expiry of the COMEX APRIL call options is today. There was large open interest in strikes from $1100 to $1150 in gold. As always happens month after month HSBC and JPM sell short in large quantities to overwhelm all bids and make unsuspecting option holders lose their money. As predicted in advance by GATA the manipulation started on March 19th when gold was trading at $1126. By last night it traded at $1085.

This is how much the gold cartel fears the enforcement division. They thumb their noses at you because in over a decade of complaints and 18 months of a silver market manipulation investigation nothing has been done to stop them. And this is why JPM’s cocky and arrogant traders in London are able to brag that they manipulate the market.

It is an outrage and we are making available the emails from our whistleblower, Andrew Maguire available to the Press wherein he warns in advance of a manipulative event.

Additionally Mr. Maguire informed us that he has taped recordings of his telephone communications with the CFTC for which we are taking the appropriate legal steps to acquire.

From Bloomberg, Citigroup Stock Sale Discount Prompts Treasury to Delay Disposal of Stake :

Dec. 17 (Bloomberg) — Citigroup Inc.,
the last of the four largest U.S. banks to seek funds to exit a
taxpayer bailout, raised $17 billion by selling stock for a price so
low that the U.S. delayed plans to shrink its one-third stake in the
lender.

Citigroup sold 5.4 billion shares at
$3.15 apiece, less than the $3.25 the government paid when it acquired
its stake in September. The New York-based bank said the Treasury won’t
sell any of its shares for at least 90 days.

Investors demanded a bigger discount from Citigroup than Bank of America Corp. or Wells Fargo & Co.,
which together raised more than $31 billion this month to exit the
Troubled Asset Relief Program. Wells Fargo, which trumped Citigroup’s
bid to buy Wachovia Corp. last year, leapfrogged its rival by
completing a $12.25 billion share sale Dec. 15. JPMorgan Chase &
Co. repaid $25 billion in June.

“The market cast its vote and they’re low down on the ballot,” said Douglas Ciocca,
a managing director at Renaissance Financial Corp. in Leawood, Kansas.
“Citigroup needs to show steps to reinstall the quality of the brand.”

With
the sale, Citigroup’s common shares outstanding increased to 28.3
billion. That’s up from 22.9 billion as of Sept. 30 and 5 billion at
the end of 2007.

“More shares outstanding means less value per share,” said Edward Najarian,
an analyst at International Strategy and Investment Group in New York,
who has a “hold” rating on the shares. “The whole structure of their
deal to pay back TARP wasn’t very good for common shareholders and that
is being reflected in the pricing.”

I think
one of the most important points are being missed. Most of these banks
swore that they didn’t need TARP. Despite this, in order to return it,
they must go back out to the capital markets. Why do you have to hit
the market to return a loan that you said you didn’t need, unless you
needed it? This obvious lie has went unchallenged.

It gets
worse. Citi is diluting the hell out of it shareholders, as well as all
of the other TARP banks that are selling shares. Some may even be
taking on debt. They are doing this primarily to gain the freedom to
declare bonuses at higher rates despite uncertain credit condition
surrounding the toxic assets that caused the problem in the first
place. Why in the world would any lender or shareholder agree to
dilution and/or higher debt service “primarily” to pay higher bonuses
to employees in the highest compensated (as a percent of net revenue)
industry in the world???

Imagine if you ran this business, you
have rocky times during a recession with revenues in nearly all aspects
of your business down save the blatant risk taking of trading, and you
go to your bank and say I need a big loan so I can pay myself a $20
million bonus increase.
Do you think Citibank would give you this
loan? They expect it from their shareholders. The same goes for
Goldman, JPM, BAC, etc.

Also from Bloomberg: Weak Banks Should Face Curbs on Bonuses, Dividends, Basel Regulator Says

Dec. 17 (Bloomberg) — Global regulators urged national
authorities to limit bonus and dividend payments by banks with
weakened capital safety nets as part of proposals to reduce
risks to the financial system.

Banks should increase the quality of the capital they hold
to cope with losses, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
said in a report on bank capital and liquidity published today.
Banks with depleted capital buffers shouldn’t use predictions of
recovery to justify generous dividends to investors and
employees, the committee said.

Global regulators have been wrestling with plans to
increase supervision of banks following the worst economic
crisis since World War II. The Group of 20 Nations agreed in
April that banks should be required to hold more and better
quality capital to reduce risks to the financial system.

“It’s not acceptable for banks which have depleted their
capital buffers to try and use the distribution of capital as a
way to signal their financial strength,” the committee’s
statement said. “The proposed framework will reduce the
discretion of banks which have depleted their capital buffers to
further reduce them through generous distributions of
earnings.”

It’s amazing that this even needs to be said.

I have written hundreds of articles documenting that unregulated, speculative derivatives (especially credit default swaps) are a primary cause of the economic crisis.

And I have pointed out that (1) the giant banks will make a killing on carbon trading, (2) while the leading scientist
crusading against global warming says it won’t work, and (3) there is a
very high probability of massive fraud and insider trading in the
carbon trading markets.

Now, Bloomberg notes that the carbon trading scheme will be centered around derivatives:

The
banks are preparing to do with carbon what they’ve done before: design
and market derivatives contracts that will help client companies hedge
their price risk over the long term. They’re also ready to sell
carbon-related financial products to outside investors.

 

[Blythe]
Masters says banks must be allowed to lead the way if a mandatory
carbon-trading system is going to help save the planet at the lowest
possible cost. And derivatives related to carbon must be part of the
mix, she says. Derivatives are securities whose value is derived from
the value of an underlying commodity — in this case, CO2 and other
greenhouse gases…

 

 

Who is Blythe Masters?

She is the JP Morgan employee who invented credit
default swaps, and is now heading JPM’s carbon trading efforts. As
Bloomberg notes (this and all remaining quotes are from the
above-linked Bloomberg article):

Masters, 40, oversees the New York bank’s environmental businesses as the firm’s global head of commodities…

 

As
a young London banker in the early 1990s, Masters was part of
JPMorgan’s team developing ideas for transferring risk to third
parties. She went on to manage credit risk for JPMorgan’s investment
bank.

Among the credit derivatives that grew from the bank’s early efforts was the credit-default swap.

Some in congress are fighting against carbon derivatives:

“People
are going to be cutting up carbon futures, and we’ll be in trouble,”
says Maria Cantwell, a Democratic senator from Washington state. “You
can’t stay ahead of the next tool they’re going to create.”

 

Cantwell,
51, proposed in November that U.S. state governments be given the right
to ban unregulated financial products. “The derivatives market has done
so much damage to our economy and is nothing more than a
very-high-stakes casino — except that casinos have to abide by
regulations,” she wrote in a press release…

However, Congress may cave in to industry pressure to let carbon derivatives trade over-the-counter:

The
House cap-and-trade bill bans OTC derivatives, requiring that all
carbon trading be done on exchanges…The bankers say such a ban would
be a mistake…The banks and companies may get their way on carbon
derivatives in separate legislation now being worked out in Congress…

Financial experts are also opposed to cap and trade:

Even
George Soros, the billionaire hedge fund operator, says money managers
would find ways to manipulate cap-and-trade markets. “The system can be
gamed,” Soros, 79, remarked at a London School of Economics seminar in
July. “That’s why financial types like me like it — because there are
financial opportunities”…

 

Hedge fund manager Michael Masters,
founder of Masters Capital Management LLC, based in St. Croix, U.S.
Virgin Islands [and unrelated to Blythe Masters] says speculators will
end up controlling U.S. carbon prices, and their participation could
trigger the same type of boom-and-bust cycles that have buffeted other
commodities…

 

The hedge fund manager says that banks will
attempt to inflate the carbon market by recruiting investors from hedge
funds and pension funds.

 

“Wall Street is going to
sell it as an investment product to people that have nothing to do with
carbon,” he says. “Then suddenly investment managers are dominating the
asset class, and nothing is related to actual supply and demand. We
have seen this movie before.”

Indeed, as I have previously pointed out, many environmentalists are opposed to cap and trade as well. For example:

Michelle Chan, a senior policy analyst in San Francisco for Friends of the Earth, isn’t convinced.

 

“Should
we really create a new $2 trillion market when we haven’t yet finished
the job of revamping and testing new financial regulation?” she asks.
Chan says that, given their recent history, the banks’ ability to turn
climate change into a new commodities market should be curbed…

 

“What
we have just been woken up to in the credit crisis — to a jarring and
shocking degree — is what happens in the real world,” she says…

 

Friends
of the Earth’s Chan is working hard to prevent the banks from adding
carbon to their repertoire. She titled a March FOE report “Subprime
Carbon?” In testimony on Capitol Hill, she warned, “Wall Street won’t
just be brokering in plain carbon derivatives — they’ll get creative.”

Yes,
they’ll get creative, and we have seen this movie before …an
inadequately-regulated carbon derivatives boom will destabilize the
economy and lead to another crash.