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Suspending Money Market Redemptions Is Now Legal; SEC Approves New Money Market Regulation In 4-1 Vote

Submitted by Tyler Durden

Zero Hedge discussed a month ago the disastrous prospects of what would happen if the new proposal contemplated by the SEC, which would allow the suspension of redemptions from Money Market Funds, were to pass. Well, in a nearly unanimous vote, Money Market Funds now have the ability to suspend redemptions, courtesy of the SEC’s just passed 4-1 vote. This explains the negative rate on bills: at this point, should there be another meltdown, money market investors will not, repeat not, be able to withdraw their money purely on the whim of Mary Schapiro. As the SEC noted: “We understand that suspending redemptions may impose hardships on investors who rely on their ability to redeem shares.” Too bad investors’ hardships considerations ended up being completely irrelevant.

As a reminder, here is the gist of the proposal as pertains to redemption suspension:

Proposed rule 22e–3(a) would permit a money market fund to suspend redemptions if: (i) The fund’s current price per share, calculated pursuant to rule 2a–7(c), is less than the fund’s stable net asset value per share; (ii) its board of directors, including a majority of directors who are not interested  persons, approves the liquidation of the fund; and (iii) the fund, prior to suspending redemptions, notifies the Commission of its decision to liquidate and suspend redemptions, by electronic mail directed to the attention of our Director of the Division of Investment Management or the Director’s designee. These proposed conditions are intended to ensure that any suspension of redemptions will be consistent with the underlying policies of section 22(e). We understand that suspending redemptions may impose hardships on investors who rely on their ability to redeem shares. Accordingly, our proposal is limited to permitting suspension of this statutory protection only in extraordinary circumstances. Thus, the proposed conditions, which are similar to those of the temporary rule, are designed to limit the availability of the rule to circumstances that present a significant risk of a run on the fund. Moreover, the exemption would require action of the fund board (including the independent directors), which would be acting in its capacity as a fiduciary. The proposed rule contains an additional provision that would permit us to take steps to protect investors. Specifically, the proposed rule would permit us to rescind or modify the relief provided by the rule (and thus require the fund to resume honoring redemptions) if, for example, a liquidating fund has not devised, or is not properly executing, a plan of liquidation that protects fund shareholders. Under this provision, the Commission may modify the relief ‘‘after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing,’’ in accordance with section 40 of the Act.

Is the US Goverment Preparing the Lifeboats for the Next Financial Disaster?

Zero Hedge has an interesting review of proposed rule changes by the SEC and the Obama Administration which you can read in its entirety here.

Yet new regulations proposed by the administration, and specifically by the ever-incompetent Securities and Exchange Commission, seek to pull one of these three core pillars from the foundation of the entire money market industry, by changing the primary assumptions of the key Money Market Rule 2a-7.

The primary concern seems to be the new ability of money market fund managers to freeze redemptions (withdrawals) of funds at their discretion.

“A key proposal in the overhaul of money market regulation suggests that money market fund managers will have the option to ‘suspend redemptions to allow for the orderly liquidation of fund assets.’”

If you have the time, you should sit down and read through the entire essay at ZH, because it is fascinating. I understand that many will not because of the length and density of the piece, which is really not all that bad, and fairly well written as all of their pieces tend to be. I am not so adverse to some of the other changes in the MMFs such as the tightening of durations, but that is more a quibble.

One also has to wonder if and when the government will begin to more aggressively manage the access of private citizens to their 401K’s and IRA’s and other forms of savings. Or is it just sufficient to manage the things that one might hold in them. Hard to say.

Now that the government will be forcing Americans to buy private health insurance (and presumably use it to prevent certain trasmittable diseases for the public good as your private health insurer will have your records) where will they stop? What about life insurance, long term disability insurance, and retirement plans? How about psychological counseling and sensitivity training for social malcontents? “A gram is better than a damn.”

Here is the concluding paragraph from this essay and I wanted to highlight it here because otherwise it will be overlooked by many who should read and understand it. The conclusions that the author draws about WHY the changes are being made are more important perhaps than the changes themselves. Or at least to me, because I have very little money in any US money market fund, and even that is 100% short term Treasuries. The fraud and mispricing of risk in the US financial system has become pervasive and epidemic, such that a good stiff headwind could have taken it all down, and because of a lack of serious reform, still can. Rather than fixing potential causes of the next disaster, the Obama Administration seems content to block the escape routes and issue priority passes to the big Wall Street banks and a favored few.

“At this point it is without doubt that even the government understands that when things turn sour, and they will, the run on the bank will be unavoidable: their solution – prevent money from being dispensed, when that moment comes. The thing about crises, be they liquidity, solvency, or plain-vanilla, is that “price discovery” occurs all at once, and at the very same time. And all too often, investors “discover” they were lied to, as the emperor, in any fiat system, always has no clothes.

Just like in September 2008, when the banks were forced to look at each-others’ balance sheet and realize that there are no real assets on the left backing up the liabilities on the right, so the moment of enlightenment occurs are the most importune time: just ask Hank Paulson. Had he known his action of beefing up Goldman’s FICC trading axes would have resulted in the “Ice-Nine’ing” (to borrow a Mark Pittman term) of money markets, who knows- maybe Lehman would have still been alive. Perhaps risking the cash access of 20% of US households and 80% of companies was not worth the few extra zeroes in Goldman’s EPS. But we will never know.

What we will know, is that now i) the government is all too aware that the market has become one huge ponzi, and that all investment vehicles, even the safest ones, are subject to bank runs, and ii) that said bank runs, will occur. It is only a matter of time. And just as the president told everyone directly to buy the market on March 3, so the SEC, the Group of 30, and Barney Frank are telling us all, much less directly, to get the hell out of Dodge. Alternatively, the game of “last fool in”, holding the burning hot potato, can continue indefinitely, until such time as the marginal utility of each and every dollar printed by Ben Bernanke is zero.”
This Is the Government: Your Legal Right To Redeem Your Money Market Account Has Been Denied – ZeroHedge

Stand your ground and wait. All is well. Someone has to take the big hit while the important people are transported to safety.

The only constraint on the Fed’s printing money is the acceptability (marginal value) of the Bond and the dollar, which is the bond of zero duration. And the people making the decisions about printing and distributing those dollars are more unworthy of holding such power than you might imagine, even in your lowest expectations.

And if, even now, you do not ‘get this’ then the next ten years could be particularly disappointing.

Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner
to Hill Leadership on Administration’s Exit Strategy for TARP

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury released the
text of identical letters sent today from Secretary Tim Geithner to
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senator Harry Reid outlining the
Administration’s exit strategy for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA). The text of the letter to Speaker Pelosi follows.

December 9, 2009

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker          
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker:

I am writing to update you on the status of the Obama
Administration’s financial policies, including programs initiated under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), the results they have
achieved, the challenges ahead, and our plan for exiting TARP.

These policies are working.  When the Obama Administration took
office, the financial system was extremely fragile and the economy was
contracting sharply.  The Administration’s financial and economic
policies have helped to shore up confidence in our financial system. 
Credit is starting to flow again to consumers and businesses, and the
economy is growing.  Further, private capital is replacing public
capital in our major institutions.

As a result of improved financial conditions and careful stewardship
of the program, losses on TARP investments are likely to be
significantly lower than previously expected.  We now expect a positive
return from the government’s investments in banks.  These banks will
soon have repaid nearly half of the TARP funds they received.  We also
expect to recover all but $42 billion of the $364 billion in TARP funds
disbursed in FY2009.  Further, we plan to use significantly less than
the full $700 billion in EESA authority.  As a result, we expect that
TARP will cost taxpayers at least $200 billion less than was projected
in the August Mid-Session Review of the President’s Budget.

But significant challenges remain.  Too many American families,
homeowners, and small businesses still face severe financial pressure. 
Although the economy is recovering, foreclosures are increasing, and
unemployment is unacceptably high.  Businesses are still cautious in
the face of uncertainty about the strength of the recovery, and many
small businesses face very difficult credit conditions.  Although bank
lending standards are starting to ease, many categories of bank lending
continue to contract.  This contraction has hit small businesses very
hard because they rely heavily on such lending, and do not have the
ability to substitute credit from securities issuance.  Commercial real
estate losses also weigh heavily on many small banks, impairing their
ability to extend new loans.

Further, the recovery of our financial system remains incomplete. 
And near-term shocks to that system could undermine the economic
recovery we have seen to date.

Exit Strategy for TARP

Our exit strategy for TARP balances the mandate of EESA to address
these challenges with the need to exercise fiscal discipline and reduce
the burden on current and future taxpayers.  There are four broad
elements to our strategy.

First, we will continue terminating and winding down many of the
government programs put in place last fall.  In September, Treasury
ended its Money Market Fund Guarantee Program, which guaranteed at its
peak over $3 trillion of assets.  The program incurred no losses, and
generated $1.2 billion in fees.  The Capital Purchase Program, through
which the majority of TARP investments in banks have been made, is
effectively closed.  Before this Administration took office, nearly
$240 billion in TARP funds had been committed to banks.  Since January
20, we have committed about $7 billion to banks, much of which went to
small institutions.  Major U.S. banks subject to the “stress test”
conducted last spring have raised over $110 billion in high-quality
capital from the private sector.  And banks will soon have repaid $116
billion of TARP funds

Second, we will limit new commitments in 2010 to three areas.

• We will continue to mitigate foreclosure for responsible American
  homeowners as we take the steps necessary to stabilize our housing
  market.
• We recently launched initiatives to provide capital to small
  and community banks, which are important sources of credit for small
  businesses.  We are also reserving funds for additional efforts to
  facilitate small business lending.
• Finally, we may increase our commitment to the Term
  Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which is improving
  securitization markets that facilitate consumer and small business
  loans, as well as commercial mortgage loans.  We expect that increasing
  our commitment to TALF would not result in additional cost to taxpayers.

Beyond these limited new commitments, we will not use remaining EESA
funds unless necessary to respond to an immediate and substantial
threat to the economy stemming from financial instability.  As a nation
we must maintain capacity to respond to such a threat.  Banks are still
experiencing significant new credit losses, and the pace of bank
failures, which tend to lag economic cycles, remains elevated.  At the
same time, many of the Federal Reserve and FDIC programs that have
complemented TARP investments are ending.  This creates a financial
environment in which new shocks could have an outsized effect –
especially if an adequate financial stability reserve is not
maintained.  As we wind down many of the government programs launched
initially to address the crisis, it is imperative that we maintain this
capacity to respond if financial conditions worsen and threaten our
economy.  However, before using EESA funds to respond to new financial
threats, I would consult with the President and Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board and submit written notification to the Congress.  This
capacity will bolster confidence and improve financial stability,
thereby decreasing the probability that it will need to be used.  This
is the third element of our exit strategy.

In order to accomplish these goals, pursuant to Section 120(b) of
EESA, I certify that I am hereby extending the authority provided under
the Act to October 3, 2010.  This extension is necessary to assist
American families and stabilize financial markets because it will,
among other things, enable us to continue to implement programs that
address housing markets and the needs of small businesses, and to
maintain the capacity to respond to unforeseen threats, as described
above.

While we are extending the $700 billion program, we do not expect to
deploy more than $550 billion.  We also expect up to $175 billion in
repayments by the end of next year, and substantial additional
repayments thereafter.  The combination of the reduced scale of TARP
commitments and substantial repayments should allow us to commit
significant resources to pay down the federal debt over time and slow
its growth rate.

Even with this extension, we expect that TARP will cost taxpayers at
least $200 billion less than was projected in the August Mid-Session
Review of the President’s Budget, including $25 billion in potential
costs from new TARP commitments in 2010.  We expect that the vast
majority of these potential costs would come from mitigating
foreclosure for responsible American homeowners as we take the steps
necessary to stabilize our housing market.

The final element to our exit strategy is how we manage equity
investments acquired through EESA while protecting taxpayers.  We will
continue to manage those investments in a commercial manner and seek to
dispose of them as soon as practicable.  We will exercise our voting
rights only on core issues such as election of directors, and we will
not interfere in the day-to-day management of individual companies.  In
addition, as the steward of taxpayers’ funds, Treasury will continue to
manage investments in a manner that ensures accountability,
transparency and oversight.  And we will work with recipients of EESA
funds and their supervisors to accelerate repayment where appropriate. 
We want to see the capital base of our financial system return to
private hands as quickly as possible, while preserving financial
stability and promoting economic recovery.

History suggests that exiting prematurely from policies designed to
contain a financial crisis can significantly prolong an economic
downturn.  We must not waver in our resolve to ensure the stability of
the financial system and to support the nascent recovery that the
Administration and the Congress have worked so hard to achieve. 
Improvements in the financial performance of EESA programs put us in a
better position to address the economic and financial challenges many
Americans still face.  I look forward to continuing to work with you to
achieve these
goals.                                                               

Sincerely,

Timothy F. Geithner

Identical copy of this letter sent to:
            The Honorable Harry Reid

cc:       The Honorable Barney Frank
           The Honorable Spencer Bachus
           The Honorable David Obey
           The Honorable Jerry Lewis