The testimony and questioning this morning is rather interesting….

Ryan is going to town on him as I write this and I have to wonder if he reads Tickers, as he’s pointing out:

• He’s bailing out fiscal policy with near-zero interest rates.  That is, we are able to run trillion dollar plus deficits because he is playing with ZIRP and QE.  Ryan basically told Bernanke that Congress is not comprised of adults and that Bernanke must pull system liquidity in order to force Congress to do its job!
• He used the words stable prices.  What he did not do is bend him over the desk and give him one or two good ones from behind on the “2% inflation” game, but it’s a start.
• He’s pointing out that trashing saver’s investment income and forcing them into risk is counter-productive.  Mr. Ryan recognizes capital formation will get the job done?  THAT is a change.
• He called him out on creating the housing bubble.  Heh heh heh…..

There’s more — but this is a change, and a marked one, in how the questioning is unfolding.  With that, here’s my commentary on the testimony.

February 2, 2012

Chairman Ryan, Vice Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member Van Hollen, and other members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss my views on the economic outlook, monetary policy, and the challenges facing federal fiscal policymakers.

The Economic Outlook Over the past two and a half years, the U.S. economy has been gradually recovering from the recent deep recession. While conditions have certainly improved over this period, the pace of the recovery has been frustratingly slow, particularly from the perspective of the millions of workers who remain unemployed or underemployed. Moreover, the sluggish expansion has left the economy vulnerable to shocks. Indeed, last year, supply chain disruptions stemming from the earthquake in Japan, a surge in the prices of oil and other commodities, and spillovers from the European debt crisis risked derailing the recovery. Fortunately, over the past few months, indicators of spending, production, and job market activity have shown some signs of improvement; and, in economic projections just released, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants indicated that they expect somewhat stronger growth this year than in 2011. The outlook remains uncertain, however, and close monitoring of economic developments will remain necessary.

As is often the case, the ability and willingness of households to spend will be an important determinant of the pace at which the economy expands in coming quarters. Although real consumer spending rose moderately last quarter, households continue to face significant headwinds. Notably, real household income and wealth stagnated in 2011, and access to credit remained tight for many potential borrowers. Consumer sentiment has improved from the summer’s depressed levels but remains at levels that are still quite low by historical standards.

Note that nice hidden statement in there.  The entire problem with the last 30 years is that we have continually spent more than we made through the economy.  Again, for Mr. Ryan (who will get this by fax) and the rest of those on The Hill:

Over the last 30 years there was no actual growth funded by output.  It was all borrowed.

That’s the root of the problem and it must be addressed.  Addressing it will cause financial contraction for some period of time — it cannot be otherwise, as the demand represented by that excessive borrowing was not real and as such the withdrawal cannot do other than cause direct contraction in the economy itself.

Household spending will depend heavily on developments in the labor market. Overall, the jobs situation does appear to have improved modestly over the past year: Private payroll employment increased by about 160,000 jobs per month in 2011, the unemployment rate fell by about 1 percentage point, and new claims for unemployment insurance declined somewhat. Nevertheless, as shown by indicators like the rate of unemployment and the ratio of employment to population, we still have a long way to go before the labor market can be said to be operating normally. Particularly troubling is the unusually high level of long-term unemployment: More than 40 percent of the unemployed have been jobless for more than six months, roughly double the fraction during the economic expansion of the previous decade.

There as been no recovery in employment.

The key here is that tax receipts are inexorably tied to the Employment Rate.  But more tellingly the fact of the matter is that the US Government has never managed to extract materially more than 19% of GDP in taxes.  Expecting that we can do it now is naive — therefore, raising taxes will not raise revenue, but lowering taxes doesn’t spur actual revenue; the history is that what lower tax rates do is spur borrowing which in turn feeds bubbles instead of healthy economic growth!

The premise of continually borrowing more to create more and more fake demand is a Ponzi scheme.

Uncertain job prospects, along with tight mortgage credit conditions, continue to hold back the demand for housing. Although low interest rates on conventional mortgages and the drop in home prices in recent years have greatly improved the affordability of housing, both residential sales and construction remain depressed. A persistent excess supply of vacant homes, largely stemming from foreclosures, is keeping downward pressure on prices and limiting the demand for new construction.

The problem is not foreclosures.  It is the refusal of regulators to force actual values to be recognized by financial institutions, which in turn has prevented the market price from sinking to the level of actual value.

The fact of the matter is that the total loss that has to be absorbed in the housing market has been stymied by these policies, which in any firm without such “blessing” would be flagged instantly as an act of fraud, that is causing the market to remain “inflated” and is thus preventing it from clearing.

Yes, I know, everyone “hates” foreclosures. Except, that is, for the person without a house who would like to buy one cheap!  Funny how we all like low prices — except when we’re sellers, or worse, when we’re municipal governments that built tax bases and rates on bubble prices that were utterly ridiculous and banks that loaned money on fictitious values that would be rendered instantly insolvent were the truth to be recognized.  Then it’s “bad”.

In contrast to the household sector, the business sector has been a relative bright spot in the current recovery. Manufacturing production has increased 15 percent since its trough, and capital spending by businesses has expanded briskly over the past two years, driven in part by the need to replace aging equipment and software. Moreover, many U.S. firms, notably in manufacturing but also in services, have benefited from strong demand from foreign markets over the past few years.

Uh huh.  Look at the GDP report and the import/export balance lately?

More recently, the pace of growth in business investment has slowed, likely reflecting concerns about both the domestic outlook and developments in Europe. However, there are signs that these concerns are abating somewhat. If business confidence continues to improve, U.S. firms should be well positioned to increase both capital spending and hiring: Larger businesses are still able to obtain credit at historically low interest rates, and corporate balance sheets are strong. And, though many smaller businesses continue to face difficulties in obtaining credit, surveys indicate that credit conditions have begun to improve modestly for those firms as well.

Economic growth does not come from credit.  Bubbles come from credit.

Economic growth comes from economic surplus, otherwise known as “profit.”  Borrowing suppresses economic surplus as the cost of borrowed funds, otherwise known as “interest” comes off the top line and thus is a dollar-for-dollar charge against profit.

So low interest rates may appear to reduce this impact but in fact all they do is produce uneconomic output — that for which there is no driver from profit.  This is otherwise known as “malinvestment” and it is bad, not good.

Globally, economic activity appears to be slowing, restrained in part by spillovers from fiscal and financial developments in Europe. The combination of high debt levels and weak growth prospects in a number of European countries has raised significant concerns about their fiscal situations, leading to substantial increases in sovereign borrowing costs, concerns about the health of European banks, and associated reductions in confidence and the availability of credit in the euro area. Resolving these problems will require concerted action on the part of European authorities. They are working hard to address their fiscal and financial challenges. Nonetheless, risks remain that developments in Europe or elsewhere may unfold unfavorably and could worsen economic prospects here at home. We are in frequent contact with European authorities, and we will continue to monitor the situation closely and take every available step to protect the U.S. financial system and the economy.

Short form:

Let me now turn to a discussion of inflation. As we had anticipated, overall consumer price inflation moderated considerably over the course of 2011. In the first half of the year, a surge in the prices of gasoline and food–along with some pass-through of these higher prices to other goods and services–had pushed consumer inflation higher. Around the same time, supply disruptions associated with the disaster in Japan put upward pressure on motor vehicle prices. As expected, however, the impetus from these influences faded in the second half of the year, leading inflation to decline from an annual rate of about 3-1/2 percent in the first half of 2011 to about 1-1/2 percent in the second half–close to its average pace in the preceding two years. In an environment of well-anchored inflation expectations, more-stable commodity prices, and substantial slack in labor and product markets, we expect inflation to remain subdued.

Against that backdrop, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided last week to maintain its highly accommodative stance of monetary policy. In particular, the Committee decided to continue its program to extend the average maturity of its securities holdings, to maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments on its portfolio of securities, and to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent. The Committee now anticipates that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.

As part of our ongoing effort to increase the transparency and predictability of monetary policy, following its January meeting the FOMC released a statement intended to provide greater clarity about the Committee’s longer-term goals and policy strategy.¹ The statement begins by emphasizing the Federal Reserve’s firm commitment to pursue its congressional mandate to foster stable prices and maximum employment. To clarify how it seeks to achieve these objectives, the FOMC stated its collective view that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate; and it indicated that the central tendency of FOMC participants’ current estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment is between 5.2 and 6.0 percent. The statement noted that these statutory objectives are generally complementary, but when they are not, the Committee will take a balanced approach in its efforts to return both inflation and employment to their desired levels.

Oh really Ben?  Your mandate is for stable prices.

I will note that 2% inflation produces this over the “longer term” for an item that costs $3.50 today (say, for example, a gallon of gasoline) and I’ve taken the liberty of extending it over a working man’s life (45 years)

That’s gas prices for you, Mr. 20 year old, by the time you’re 65.

How about your kids?  Let’s extend this out 100 years:

Oh yeah that’s gonna work out real well.

Now what if Ben is off by just 1%, and it’s 3% instead?

And over 100 years?

This is why a mandate of stable prices must be enforced as exactly that — stable, or unchanging, and we must start imprisoning those who “interpret” things otherwise.

Fiscal Policy Challenges In the remainder of my remarks, I would like to briefly discuss the fiscal challenges facing your Committee and the country. The federal budget deficit widened appreciably with the onset of the recent recession, and it has averaged around 9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the past three fiscal years. This exceptional increase in the deficit has mostly reflected the automatic cyclical response of revenues and spending to a weak economy as well as the fiscal actions taken to ease the recession and aid the recovery. As the economy continues to expand and stimulus policies are phased out, the budget deficit should narrow over the next few years.

That’s a nice theory.  It does not, however, fit with the facts.

Unfortunately, even after economic conditions have returned to normal, the nation will still face a sizable structural budget gap if current budget policies continue. Using information from the recent budget outlook by the Congressional Budget Office, one can construct a projection for the federal deficit assuming that most expiring tax provisions are extended and that Medicare’s physician payment rates are held at their current level. Under these assumptions, the budget deficit would be more than 4 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2017, assuming that the economy is then close to full employment.² Of even greater concern is that longer-run projections, based on plausible assumptions about the evolution of the economy and budget under current policies, show the structural budget gap increasing significantly further over time and the ratio of outstanding federal debt to GDP rising rapidly. This dynamic is clearly unsustainable.

The CBO estimates ridiculously large expansion of the economy as a whole, expiration of all of the tax cuts passed (and no new ones) and ridiculously small expansion in overall spending at a number of levels.  The one place they’re reasonably accurate is in their projection of health expense, which has grown by about 9% over the last 30 years (from $53 billion to ~$820 billion) and will continue to do so.  This is not a demographic problem either, as is often said — it also present in the private economy which is not subject to that distortion.

These structural fiscal imbalances did not emerge overnight. To a significant extent, they are the result of an aging population and, especially, fast-rising health-care costs, both of which have been predicted for decades. Notably, the Congressional Budget Office projects that net federal outlays for health-care entitlements–which were about 5 percent of GDP in fiscal 2011–could rise to more than 9 percent of GDP by 2035.³ Although we have been warned about such developments for many years, the time when projections become reality is coming closer.

Actually it’s coming now.  With a 9% rate of growth the rule of 72 tells us that health spending doubles every eight years!  If you think we can keep doing this for even one more eight year cycle, you’re wrong.

We are literally a few years — three or four at the outside — from hitting the wall at 120mph as within four years we will have added $410 billion a year to deficits and in eight nearly one trillion per year.  That’s not a one-year deal, it’s every year and it will utterly destroy any attempt to bring balance to the budgetary process.

This must be stopped right now or it will kill us and we do not have time to address it.  Those are the facts.

Having a large and increasing level of government debt relative to national income runs the risk of serious economic consequences. Over the longer term, the current trajectory of federal debt threatens to crowd out private capital formation and thus reduce productivity growth. To the extent that increasing debt is financed by borrowing from abroad, a growing share of our future income would be devoted to interest payments on foreign-held federal debt. High levels of debt also impair the ability of policymakers to respond effectively to future economic shocks and other adverse events.

No.  This grossly understates the case; we will not make it through the next one cycle (eight years) say much less two.  To believe we can manage to spend over three trillion dollars at the Federal level in 16 years is an outrageous lie and the idea that we can absorb another $400+ billion annually in deficits before 2016 and $800+ billion annually by 2020 is preposterous. 

That which cannot happen will not happen.

This puts the lie to claims by Ryan, Southerland, Miller and others that “those over 50 will not see their Medicare tampered with.”  Oh yes they will, as for them to “not have it tampered with” they’d have to make it through four cycles of doubling, not two, which would increase Federal health spending at present rates of acceleration to more than $13 trillion by the time that person reaches 85, or some 16 times the present amount.

I have put forward a number of points on this issue and how to address it under the Health Care topic — we have to stop bleating and start doing, right here and right now.  Look particularly at my postings on this topic from 2009 and 2010.

Even the prospect of unsustainable deficits has costs, including an increased possibility of a sudden fiscal crisis. As we have seen in a number of countries recently, interest rates can soar quickly if investors lose confidence in the ability of a government to manage its fiscal policy. Although historical experience and economic theory do not indicate the exact threshold at which the perceived risks associated with the U.S. public debt would increase markedly, we can be sure that, without corrective action, our fiscal trajectory will move the nation ever closer to that point.

No, we will go off the cliff.  Stop mincing words Ben — see above, and that’s just health care; it ignores everything else.

To achieve economic and financial stability, U.S. fiscal policy must be placed on a sustainable path that ensures that debt relative to national income is at least stable or, preferably, declining over time. Attaining this goal should be a top priority.

Even as fiscal policymakers address the urgent issue of fiscal sustainability, they should take care not to unnecessarily impede the current economic recovery. Fortunately, the two goals of achieving long-term fiscal sustainability and avoiding additional fiscal headwinds for the current recovery are fully compatible–indeed, they are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, a more robust recovery will lead to lower deficits and debt in coming years. On the other hand, a plan that clearly and credibly puts fiscal policy on a path to sustainability could help keep longer-term interest rates low and improve household and business confidence, thereby supporting improved economic performance today.

Nonsense. Again, we have never managed to grow the economy faster than we’ve accumulated debt over the last 30 years.  We must accept this and reduce debt, which means we must accept economic contraction.  I know nobody wants to, myself included, but what I want and what I must do are two different things.

Fiscal policymakers can also promote stronger economic performance in the medium term through the careful design of tax policies and spending programs. To the fullest extent possible, our nation’s tax and spending policies should increase incentives to work and save, encourage investments in the skills of our workforce, stimulate private capital formation, promote research and development, and provide necessary public infrastructure. Although we cannot expect our economy to grow its way out of our fiscal imbalances, a more productive economy will ease the tradeoffs that we face and increase the likelihood that we leave a healthy economy to our children and grandchildren.

You cannot both add to debt and support capital formation (which is saving.)

It’s really that simple — we must accept the economic adjustment that has to be made, and we must accept it now.

The Market-Ticker

Discussion (registration required to post)

One of the conclusions that I try to coax, lead, and/or nudge people towards is acceptance of the fact that the economy can’t be fixed.  By this I mean that the old regime of general economic stability and rising standards of living fueled by excessive credit are a thing of the past.  At least they are for the debt-encrusted developed nations over the short haul — and, over the long haul, across the entire soon-to-be energy-starved globe.

The sooner we can accept that idea and make other plans the better.  To paraphrase a famous saying, Anything that can’t be fixed, won’t. 

The basis for this view stems from understanding that debt-based money systems operate best when they can grow exponentially forever. Of course, nothing can, which means that even without natural limits, such systems are prone to increasingly chaotic behavior, until the money that undergirds them collapses into utter worthlessness, allowing the cycle to begin anew.

All economic depressions share the same root cause. Too much credit that does not lead to enhanced future cash flows is extended.  In other words, this means lending without regard for the ability of the loan to repay both the principal and interest from enhanced production; money is loaned for consumption, and poor investment decisions are made. Eventually gravity takes over, debts are defaulted upon, no more borrowers can be found, and the system is rather painfully scrubbed clean. It’s a very normal and usual process.

When we bring in natural limits, however, (such as is the case for petroleum right now), what emerges is a forcing function that pushes a debt-based, exponential money system over the brink all that much faster and harder. 

But for the moment, let’s ignore the imminent energy crisis.  On a pure debt, deficit, and liability basis, the US, much of Europe, and Japan are all well past the point of no return.  No matter what policy tweaks, tax and benefit adjustments, or spending cuts are made — individually or in combination — nothing really pencils out to anything that remotely resembles a solution that would allow us to return to business as usual.

At the heart of it all, the developed nations blew themselves a gigantic credit bubble, which fed all kinds of grotesque distortions, of which housing is perhaps the most visible poster child.  However, outsized government budgets and promises, overconsumption of nearly everything imaginable, bloated college tuition costs, and rising prices in healthcare utterly disconnected from economics are other symptoms, too. This report will examine the deficits, debts, and liabilities in such a way as to make the case that there’s no possibility of a return of generally rising living standards for most of the developed world.  A new era is upon us.  There’s always a slight chance , should some transformative technology come along, like another Internet, or perhaps the equivalent of another Industrial Revolution, but no such catalysts are on the horizon, let alone at the ready.

At the end, we will tie this understanding of the debt predicament to the energy situation raised in my prior report to fully develop the conclusion that we can — and really should – seriously entertain the premise that there’s just no way for all the debts to be paid back.  There are many implications  to this line of thinking, not the least of which is the risk that the debt-based, fiat money system itself is in danger of failing.

Too Little Debt! (or, Your One Chart That Explains Everything)

[Note: this next section is an excerpt from a recent Martenson Blog entry, so if this seems familiar to any site members, it's because you've seen it before.]

If I were to be given just one chart, by which I had to explain everything about why Bernanke’s printed efforts have so far failed to actually cure anything and why I am pessimistic that further efforts will fall short, it is this one:

There’s a lot going on in this deceptively simple chart so let’s take it one step at a time.  First, “Total Credit Market Debt” is everything – financial sector debt, government debt (federal, state, and local), household debt, and corporate debt – and that is the bold red line (data from the Federal Reserve). 

Next, if we start in January 1970 and ask the question, “How long before that debt doubled and then doubled again?” we find that debt has doubled five times in four decades (blue triangles).  

Then if we perform an exponential curve fit (blue line) and round up, we find a nearly perfect fit with a R² of 0.99.  This means that debt has been growing in a nearly perfect exponential fashion through the 1970′s, the 1980′s, the 1990′s and the 2000′s.  In order for the 2010 decade to mirror, match, or in any way resemble the prior four decades, credit market debt will need to double again, from $52 trillion to $104 trillion. 

Finally, note that the most serious departure between the idealized exponential curve fit and the data occurred beginning in 2008, and it has not yet even remotely begun to return to its former trajectory.

This explains everything.

It explains why Bernanke’s $2 trillion has not created a spectacular party in anything other than a few select areas (banking, corporate profits), which were positioned to directly benefit from the money.  It explains why things don’t feel right, or the same, and why most people are still feeling quite queasy about the state of the economy.  It explains why the massive disconnects between government pensions and promises, all developed and doled out during the prior four decades, cannot be met by current budget realities.

Our entire system of money, and by extension our sense of entitlement and expectations of future growth, were formed during and are utterly dependent on exponential credit growth.   Of course, as you know, money is loaned into existence and is therefore really just the other side of the credit coin.  This is why Bernanke can print a few trillion and not really accomplish all that much, because the main engine of growth expects, requires, and is otherwise dependent on credit doubling over the next decade.

To put this into perspective, a doubling will take us from $52 to $104 trillion, requiring close to $5 trillion in new credit creation each year of that decade.  Nearly three years has passed without any appreciable increase in total credit market debt, which puts us roughly $15 trillion behind the curve.

What will happen when credit cannot grow exponentially?  We already have our answers; it’s been the reality for the past three years.  Debts cannot be serviced, the weaker and more highly leveraged participants get clobbered first (Lehman, Greece, Las Vegas housing, etc.), and the dominoes topple from the outside in towards the center.  Money is dumped in, but traction is weak.  What begins as a temporary program of providing liquidity becomes a permanent program of printing money needed in order for the system to merely function.

Debt and Europe

The debt situation in Europe is fairly typical of the developed world and mirrors the debt chart of the US seen above.  There’s entirely too much debt, and most of the unserviceable amounts are concentrated in certain spots (i.e., PIIGS), while the amounts owed are concentrated in the German, French, and British banks.

This New York Times graphic did an excellent job of summing everything up:

(Source - click to view larger graphic at source) 

Here is a slightly less-complicated image that expresses the same dynamic:

If everybody owes everybody else, then kicking the can down the road only works if there’s more wealth, more growth, and sufficient economic activity down that road to service the past debts. If any one participant drops the baton in the debt relay race, the absurdity of the situation becomes unavoidable and the cause is lost.

When we hold this view, it is abundantly clear that adding more debt along the way only increases the burdens and is therefore ultimately counterproductive, although it does grant the gift of additional time to avoid facing the truth.  

When all of the most indebted countries are stacked up, we see that all but Russia carry a total indebtedness greater than 100% of GDP and that nine are carrying debt levels higher than any that have ever been repaid historically.

(Source) Note: 260% debt-to-GDP is the all time record for repayment, accomplished by England between 1815 and 1900, but required both massive cuts in spending and an industrial revolution. 

Without mincing words, the world does not face a crisis of liquidity, nor a crisis of insufficient debt, but one of entirely too much debt.  That’s the entire predicament in three words:  too much debt. 

More debt is only going to compound the predicament, yet that is what the world’s central banks and political structures are busy manufacturing.  More debt.

Of course, debt is only one component of the story; there are also liabilities to consider.  The above chart merely graphs the legally defined debts involved.  If we bother to add back in the liability components, which are pensions, social security and government medical plans, the predicament is seen to be three to six times larger: 

Whereas the prior chart showed all debts incurred by all sectors of each nation, the above chart only displays government debt and liabilities.  For reference, the red bars, above, are the amounts that you read about in the paper when commentators note that the US, for example, still has a debt-to-GDP ratio that is under 100%. It’s a comforting tale, but not an accurate description of the situation.

Again, there are no historical examples of any country ever digging itself out from so deep a hole, and yet we find that the entire developed world has bravely pushed itself deep into unknown territory, seemingly without any serious discussions about whether or not this made sense.

Where We Are Now

So here we are, just a few weeks away from the end of the second round of quantitative easing (QE II) , with massive public debts and liabilities having only grown larger instead of shrinking during the Great Recession, everybody in nearly the same boat, and no clear plan for how all the sovereign debts will be funded from current productive cash flows (i.e., existing GDP).

This is why so many commentators, myself included, are convinced that more thin-air money printing is on the way. My thesis, laid out back in early March is that the Fed will stop QE II on schedule and that the financial markets will react exceptionally poorly to this loss of support. Commodities will tank first, then stocks, then bonds; from riskiest and most-leveraged to least.

It is time to face the music; the levels of indebtedness now require permanent support from thin-air money in order to avoid a deflationary collapse. Given this reality, we explore key questions in detail in Part II of this report: Understanding the Endgame:

• How will the global debt crisis play out?
• What does a world economy without growth look like?
• What steps should we, as individuals, need to take in preparation?
• How can investors safeguard their purchasing power during the coming rout in the finanical markets?

Click here to access Part II of this report (free executive summary; paid enrollment required)  

Chris Martenson

Submitted by Leo Kolivakis, publisher of Pension Pulse.

Henny Sender of the FT reports that top hedge funds bet on big rise in yields:

The
recent rise in long-term US interest rates comes as good news for
several leading hedge fund managers, including John Paulson, who have
positioned their trading books to benefit from higher yields on US
Treasury securities.

 

Mr Paulson, who
made big gains earlier this decade by betting against the subprime
mortgage market and whose firm, Paulson & Co, manages $33bn, has
said he believes that government stimulus efforts would inevitably lead
to higher inflation and a corresponding rise in rates.

 

“It will
be difficult for the government to withdraw the economic stimulus,” Mr
Paulson said in a speech. “An increase in the monetary base leads to an
increase in the money supply, which leads to inflation.”

Bond
prices fall as yields rise, and Mr Paulson told the Financial Times
last week that he has been hoping to benefit in the Treasury market by
buying options that would become profitable if rates headed higher.
TPG-Axon’s Dinakar Singh has been making similar options trades,
according to a person familiar with the matter.

Julian Robertson,
the hedge fund manager, has pursued a related strategy, hoping to
benefit from a bigger difference between short-term and long-term
interest rates, known as a steeper yield curve, a person familiar with
his trades said.

The yield on the 10-year Treasury, which hit a
crisis low of 2.055 per cent last year, has moved from 3.2 per cent
last month to 3.75 per cent on Tuesday.

Hedge fund managers,
however, have been hesitant to engage in short sales of Treasury bonds
to profit from the rising yields – and falling prices – because of the
Federal Reserve’s heavy involvement in the market. This has led some to
buy options – dubbed “high strike receivers” – that would enable them
to profit from sharply higher Treasury yields, hedge fund managers say.
These trades, which are relatively cheap to execute because they are so
out of the money, are based on the thesis that yields could hit 7 or 8
per cent.

“If they are right, and the world ends, they will make
a fortune,” said one fund manager who is sceptical of the idea. “If
they are wrong, they haven’t lost much.”

Some traders are
cautious because many peers lost large sums betting that rates would
rise in Japan in the 1990s – as yields fell to less than half a
percentage point. The trade was termed the “black widow” because it left so many victims.

“Nobody
understood the extent of deflation and economic weakness in Japan,”
said Dino Kos of Portales Partners, a research consultancy, who was
then a Fed official. “More money was lost on that trade than on any
other single trade. Everyone piled in when rates were at 3 per cent and
then at 2.5 per cent and then at 2 per cent.”

So
is it time to place big bets on rising yields? I could easily see a
backup in yields in the near term as economic reports surprise to the
upside, but I don’t believe that bonds have entered a long-term secular
bear market. I think the hedgies are right, best to play interest rate
directional calls though options.

Also, given the increase in
liability-driven investing by pension funds worried about their funding
status, there is an upper cap on bond yields. I don’t know what the
exact magic number is, but at a certain level (say 7%), you’ll have
pensions scambling to lock in rates. Bond bears tend to ignore this
when predicting doom and gloom on bonds. All they do is focus on the
“pending collapse” of the US dollar, which won’t happen .

These days catching the Fed chairman telling the truth as opposed to a b(a)ld faced lie is in itself a six sigma event. Sadly this post will continue with hugging the median. Some observations on the most recent fabrications by the chief money printer himself, which go to show just how willing Bernanke is willing to bend reality and/or his perception of it as the occasion suits.

A week ago Zimbabwe Ben wrote an op-ed in Washington Post last week in which he said:

“Now more than ever, America needs a strong, nonpolitical and independent central bank with the tools to promote financial stability and to help steer our economy to recovery without inflation.”

Recovery without inflation is another way of articulating the Fed’s quixotic dual mandate.  Of course, everyone knows the Fed does not care about inflation, or, it seems, the economy, unless of course Goldman Sachs recently changed its name to Inflation Economy, Inc. But what’s striking about this sentence (the last sentence, no less, of a decidedly political op-ed), is that it directly contradicts what he says about QE in two papers in 2004.
 
In the May 2004 edition of The American Economic Review, Bernanke and Reinhart published “Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates.”  ZH cited this paper before as evidence that Bernanke considered monetizing equities viable in a debt deflation.  This time, however, it’s useful because he claims aggressive QE may “have expansionary fiscal effects.” 

Furthermore:

“So long as market participants expect a positive short-term interest rate at some date in the future, the existence of government debt implies a current or future tax liability for the public. In expanding its balance sheet by open-market purchases, the central bank replaces public holdings of interest-bearing government debt with non-interest-bearing currency or reserves. If the increase in the monetary base is expected to persist, then the expected interest costs of the government and, hence, the public’s expected tax burden decline. (Effectively, this process replaces a direct tax, say on labor, with the inflation tax.)”

Then in the Fed Minutes from Nov 4th we get:

“Participants noted that the recent fall in the foreign exchange value of the dollar had been orderly and appeared to reflect an unwinding of safe-haven demand in light of the recovery in financial market conditions this year, but that any tendency for dollar depreciation to intensify or to put significant upward pressure on inflation would bear close watching.”

An odd remark considering what Bernanke et al said in Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment Author(s): Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, Brian P. Sack Source: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2004, No. 2 (2004), pp. 1-78. More specifically:

…quantitative easing may work through a signaling channel if its implementation marks a general willingness of the central bank to break from the cautious and conventional policies of the past. A historical episode that may illustrate this channel at work (although the policymaker in question was the executive rather than the central bank) was the period following Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inauguration as U.S. president in 1933. During 1933 and 1934 the extreme deflation seen earlier in the decade suddenly reversed, stock prices jumped, and the economy grew rapidly.Christina Romer has argued persuasively that this surprisingly sharp recovery was closely associated with the rapid growth in the money supply that arose from Roosevelt’s devaluation of the dollar, capital inflows from an increasingly unstable Europe, and other factors. Because short-term interest rates remained near zero throughout the period, the episode is reasonably characterized as a successful application of quantitative easing.

It appears despite Bernanke (and Geithner’s) repeated appearances, admonitions and Fed Minute posturings to the contrary, Bernanke is fully aware of what his actions will do to both inflation and the dollar, and that the devaluation of the greenback is critical to the success of his campaign of bailing out CREs laden bank balance sheets. Yet in the meantime on every TV and congressional appearance the Chairman will eagerly lie and prevaricate, hoping his listeners have short memories, and have not bought a Kindle yet (difficult to imagine judging by Amazon’s 1,000,000,000,000,000 (non)inflation adjusted P/E) to have read his own scribblings on the matter of impending dollar devaluation. America deserves all it gets if it allows its Senators to reconfirm this human being for the most important post in the world.