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Archive for the ‘Moody’s’ Category

Well now Moody’s has gone and done it.

They just hit BAC, C and WFC with downgrades, saying that the government is “more likely” to allow a large bank to fail if they get in trouble.

This belies the truth, which is that the government doesn’t have the capacity to bail out a trillion-dollar boondoggle any more.  There’s no way to get another TARP through Congress and there’s no back-door way to fund it either.

So Moody’s is correct, in a round-about sort of fashion.  Let’s not conflate desire with capacity, eh?

The entire banking sector took an instant dive on that, with BAC now down more than 5% and Wells, which was up, back to even.

Bank of America’s insular, CEO-blowing board needs to do some firing in the executive suite.  May I suggest a Howitzer for the means of that “firing”?

Frankly I’m not sure it matters at this point.  Countrywide was a monstrous mistake, and a very expensive one on top of it. Tangelo should have been peeled in 2008 if not before rather than riding off into the sunset with a civil penalty that Bank of America paid a huge chunk of. Nobody seems to care much about the fact that all of these banks have been implicated in various schemes and frauds related to foreclosures – not that this is new, of course, in that they did the same thing on the way up with appraisals and similar, blacklisting honest appraisers and essentially demanding overvaluations to “support” their reckless lending.

Now let’s add to that: Nevada is apparently preparing to criminally charge some of these institutions.  That’s not sue, it’s prosecute.  We don’t yet know who the targets are but this will mark the first actual criminal indictments of note should they actually appear.  For my part I’m not going to believe it until I see it, considering how overdue such an action is in the context of anything even lightly-related to the concept of ”justice.”

Are we finally going to “Stop the looting and start prosecuting”?  Hope springs eternal.

Here’s the rub, when you get down to it:  Every one of these institutions should have been a zero in 2008 and the executives should have been brought up on indictments.  As such the alleged “value” in these firms is nothing more than government support for the same sort of business model as Full Tilt Poker is accused of – that is, claiming value in assets that does not in fact exist, relying on the belief that everyone will not show up and demand their money at the same time.  Proof of this is readily available every day in the market in that these firms are selling at a fraction of their claimed book value; if there was anyone who believed that the accounting was honest they’d instantly buy the firm in question as that would be fastest and most-certain money ever made in M&A.

That it hasn’t happened is all the proof you need that the accounting is absolute and utter crap.

Oh Mr. Buffett?  How’s your position in BAC working out?

I told you this was going to happen…… you have not heard this on bubble vision, but all you had to do was use your brain:

Q: “There’s been a figure of $4 trillion dollars circulating as an example of the scope of  fiscal consolidation measures that could work to stabilize the U.S. debt-gdp ratios. Could you explain how that figure was arrived at since it was mentioned in S&P’s reports and where it figures in S&P analysis?”

A: “First of all, that figure comes initially from the Bowles-Simpson fiscal commission, and it was embraced by President Obama  in his April 13 speech and Paul Ryan in his counter-budget proposal. And so you had policy makers converging around the amount. Now actually the $4 trillion, depending on whether it is front-loaded or back-loaded, is not going to do the trick in terms of stabilizing U.S. government debt-to GDP ratios. But it takes you pretty far along. And I think a grand bargain of that nature would signal, you know, the seriousness of policy makers to address the fiscal issues of the United States, to actually stabilize the debt-to-GDP. The IMF says it takes  7.5% of GDP consolidation. I think we have more than that.”

For perspective: That means cutting the deficit by more than one trillion dollars a year at present run rates.

And that’s not enough either.  GDP will contract dollar for dollar as the deficit spending comes off and taxes will contract too, which means that the actual cut in spending (or increase in taxes) will be have to more that one trillion a year.

It does not matter how that difference between revenues and spending comes off.  It does not matter if you cut spending, raise taxes or some combination of the two.  The GDP impact is inescapable as is the tax receipts impact.

But so, at this point, is the downgrade.

The “most-recent” proposals cut anywhere from nothing in actual spending (Democrat proposal) for 2012 to $90 billion (Republican.)  And neither contains any actual cuts on a forward basis – the Republicans are at least honest about it and say they just “hold discretionary non-defense spending at 2011 levels.”

That’s not a cut in spending.

So here’s how it’s going to go down.  We will get downgraded, probably within days or weeks after this “short-term” blip passes Congress, however it does.  And when we do, interest rates will ratchet, at least a bit.  If the Congress refuses to respond to that downgrade with real budget cuts including the cost of the increased interest now, which means they have to be another $100 billion or so (that is, 10% more than if they did it now) we’ll get downgraded after a period (probably six to twelve months) again.

Note: I’m talking one trillion a year in cuts and/or tax receipt (not rate) increases.

Not over ten years, per year.

Somewhere between now and that second move by the ratings agencies the market will figure it out and the squeeze will begin.

By then it will probably be too late for Congress to avoid the “coffin corner.”

The door is closing fast and we’re about to be left out in the cold.

I know this is claimed to be “politically impossible.”  But mathematics – specifically, exponents and subtraction – do not care about politics.  They just are.

They are determining this outcome, not politics, and those who are in Congress had damn well better wise up and start demanding from their advisors who say we can manage to muddle through strict proof – not a claim, but an examination of borrowing expense and tax receipts until they project an actual balanced budget, whenever that projection is for them. If the answer is “never” those people need to be tossed out of the nearest Capitol office building window – sans parachute.

Where does this take the stock market?  That depends on whether Congress responds before the downward spiral starts.  If they do the correction will be nasty, but we’ll get through it.  But if not…..

If what I heard today in the so-called “debate” on the floor of the House is an honest indication of what we can expect from Congress we’re just plain screwed.

I’m sorry.

By Economic Forecasts & Opinions

Stock markets around the world cracked on Friday with the Dow Jones industrial average down more than 150 points (Fig. 1), and commodities plunging as Dubai debt woes unnerved investors, and sent tremors of uncertainty throughout all markets.

The crisis flared after Dubai, a part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) federation, asked to delay interest payment for six months on $60 billion of debt issued by the state-run conglomerate Dubai World and its main property unit Nakheel.

Concerns that a government-backed investment company risked default ripped through world markets. Investors read it as a sign of yet another sovereign implosion after Iceland and Ireland, and recoiled from risk and piled into dollars.

Las Vegas on Steroids

Dubai World has served as Dubai’s main driver of growth, operating ports, transportation groups, spearheading real-estate & infrastructure projects both at home and abroad. Its real-estate subsidiary Nakheel built Dubai’s iconic palm-tree-shaped island, packed with luxury villas and hotels, many still under construction. Real estate and construction accounts for about 23% of Dubai’s GDP.

With little oil, Dubai financed much of this rapid real estate development with debt. After incurring its estimated $80-$90 billion of debt in a four-year construction boom to transform its economy into a regional financial and tourism hub, Dubai suffered the world’s steepest property slump in the first global recession since World War II.

Deutsche Bank estimates that Dubai’s property prices, both commercial and residential, have halved since August last year, and could fall a further 15-20% this year.

U.S. Banks Less Exposed

Most analysts believe U.S. banks are probably less exposed than European rivals to a potential debt default by Dubai World, but a lack of transparency and the interconnection of the modern financial system make it difficult to know which institutions are ultimately exposed.

Dubai World’s largest creditors are reportedly domestic banks in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. MarketWatch noted data from the Bank for International Settlements which put cross-border banking exposure for the UAE as a whole at $123 billion at the end of June. Of that total, European banks hold 72%, with the United States and Japan only holding 9% and 7% of the exposure, respectively. The United Kingdom is by far the biggest creditor with a share of 41%.

Reminder of Other Risks

On a global scale, Dubai World’s debt problem seems relatively minor, but it illustrates the impact from one tiny country in an increasingly interconnected world. The Dubai news also cast doubt over the strength of the U.S. economic recovery, and the prospects for a bottoming of property prices.

Commercial Real Estate

As pointed out in my previous article that the commercial real estate sector posed a much greater threat than the over-hyped “mother of all carry trades.”  The Dubai debt crisis further reinforces this viewpoint.

The potential for contagion from Dubai’s debt woes could further unhinge an already fragile U.S. commercial real estate sector, whose values have already fallen 42.9% from their 2007 peak, close to the lowest since 2002, according to Moody’s. (Fig. 2) The latest Moody’s projection is for prices to bottom at 45-55% below their peak, but could drop as much as 65% from their peak in a “stress case”.

As commercial property values fall, debt defaults rise. The $3.4 trillion outstanding in debt backed by commercial real estate poses a real threat to the recovery. Trepp LLC reported that last month, delinquencies on U.S. commercial real estate loans that were packaged into commercial mortgage-backed securities reached 4.8%, more than six times the year earlier level. Hotel loans, at 8.7% distressed, have begun falling into delinquency faster than any other kind of commercial real estate debt.

Write-downs and losses at banks around the world have risen to more than $1.7 trillion since 2007 as the credit crisis undermined the value of assets owned by financial institutions, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Any further deleveraging and the resulting credit tightening from commercial real estate would impede the financial sector and probably derail the U.S. economy sending it into another recession. 

Housing Market Mortgage Crisis

So far, the appearance of recovery in the housing sector is being driven primarily by reduced prices combined with federal programs to lower mortgage rates with the goal of bringing more buyers into the market.

Based on a study released by Zillow.com, the foreclosure crisis has moved beyond subprime mortgages and into the prime mortgage market. (Fig. 3) While subprime borrowers are still a factor in the current foreclosure epidemic, it’s becoming increasingly apparent that the weak labor market is the driving force behind the mortgage crisis we face today.

According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, one in seven U.S. home loans was past due or in foreclosure as of Sept. 30, putting that quarterly delinquency measure at its highest level since t

he report’s inception, 1972, and up from one in ten at the beginning of the year.

The continued surge in delinquencies suggests that a recovery in the housing market could be hindered by the weak job market as well as by further fallout from the easy money and loose lending practices of the past. The foreclosures and delinquencies are expected to keep rising well into 2010, not leveling off until the unemployment rate starts to moderate.

In a study by First American CoreLogic found that one in four of all U.S. mortgage-borrowers owe more than the value of their properties in the 3rd quarter. And many experts didn’t expect U.S. home prices to hit bottom until early 2011, perhaps falling another 5-10%, as more foreclosures get pushed onto the market.

Negative equity is another outstanding risk hanging over the mortgage market.

Dubai Is No Lehman

The circumstances behind Dubai’s moves are murky, making it hard to gauge the exact risk to the pertaining bonds and Dubai’s own general creditworthiness. UBS cautioned that Dubai’s overall debt “might be higher than the generally assumed $80 billion to $90 billion, due to potential off-balance sheet liabilities. These could include unlimited and unquantifiable amount of credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives against the underlying assets, and once unraveled, could potentially erupt into a subprime-like crisis.

The current expectation; however, is that there’s a good chance that Dubai’s problems will probably prove a local issue. Most likely, Dubai, or its neighboring emirate, Abu Dhabi, won’t risk tarnishing their images and reputation further, and will come up with a reasonable resolution.

Even if Dubai goes into sovereign default, the amount is probably not enough on its own to threaten the financial system since any actual losses would be a fraction of the total. So, the problems in Dubai are unlikely to be as serious as last year’s Lehman Brothers collapse, nor is it a reflection on the ability of emerging markets to lead a global economic recovery.

Rational Expectations?

But Dubai could well spur a broader crisis of investor confidence in overly leveraged economies as market confidence world-wide is still fragile from the severity of the financial crisis.  The debts of many emerging markets have risen even further as the countries governments have fought the ravages of the global recession by issuing more stimulus debt to fill the gap voided by private investment.

The spread of credit-default swaps on developing-nation’s bonds jumped 14 basis points after the Dubai news broke, the most in a month, to 3.24 percentage points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI+ Index. There is also a clear sign of potential contagion effects of global risk aversion on basically all risky assets, with the dollar and yen being the prime beneficiaries.

Rational expectations or not, for now, the Dubai crisis is simply a reminder that the severe global recession has relegated much debt to near junk status, and there still remains a high degree of uncertainty as to the percentage recoverable on all outstanding debt which is going to be coming due over the next 5 years.

Despite some seminal signs of green shoots in the news headlines during this 9 month liquidity driven rally in many asset classes around the globe, we should be reminded that all that glitters is not gold, and that the global economic recovery is still on shaky ground.

#  “I know the odds are against me, but if there’s a win I’m gonna find it!”  ~Goku  #

Economic Forecasts & Opinions