FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘Performance’ Category

For some reason Zero Hedge is prone to take a great deal of heat (both directly radiated and reflected) whenever we opine on the (rather obvious to us) prospect that interest rates might actually (quelle surprise) rise in this environment.  Today, rather than engage in “we told you so” gloating, or endure the repetitive pleadings of commentators that this or that Treasury auction was really a success if you just look a little deeper at the figures, we’ll just quote Bloomberg quoting other fixed income observers on today’s auction of two years, in an article “ambiguously” titled “U.S. 2-Year Yields Highest Since October After $44 Billion Sale.”

Treasury two-year note yields reached the highest levels since October as an investor class that includes foreign central banks bought the least of the debt in five months at today’s record-tying $44 billion auction.

Indirect bidders purchased 34.8 percent of the notes, the lowest amount since July, and below the average for the past 10 sales of 45 percent. Treasuries of all maturities have fallen 3.6 percent this year, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch indexes. That would be the worst performance since at least 1978, when Merrill began collecting the data.

We aren’t really sure how this will be spun into a “good thing,”™ but we are sure that someone will find a way.  Back to you, CNBC.

Adam Smith, Charles Darwin and George Washington are not only rolling in their graves, they are dancing the macarena. A new study by the UMich School of Business has found what everyone has known since the crisis began, if not centuries prior: that the biggest, crappiest banks were guaranteed to get more bailout funding the more political ties they had (and more kickbacks they had offered). Is this sufficient to claim that capitalism in its purest sense has been corrupted beyond repair, courtesy of political intervention and constant pandering? Probably not, but it sure makes a damn good argument. In any case, the data is sufficient for all bears to start keeping a track of which banks are increasing their lobbying efforts and funding: those are the ones where the greatest weakness is likely still to be uncovered (if it hasn’t already). And while the political relationship probably is not a big surprise to any realistic readers, another finding of the study makes a solid case for abolition of the “apolitical” Federal Reserve:

A new study by Ross professors Ran Duchin and Denis Sosyura found that
banks with connections to members of congressional finance committees
and banks whose executives served on Federal Reserve boards were more
likely to receive funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the
federal government’s program to purchase assets and equity from
financial institutions to strengthen its financial sector.

The unsupervised Federal Reserve gets to make or break banks, presumably under the gun of its one and only master, Goldman Sachs, which has already destroyed its major historical competitors: Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. This is a sufficient condition to not only audit the central bank but to immediately seek its abolition, and also to commence anti-trust proceedings against Goldman Sachs which is not only a monopoly, but by extension has veto power over the very regulatory mechanism that is supposed to keep it “fair and honest.” The system is truly broken.

More findings from the study:

Further, their research shows that TARP investment amounts were
positively related to banks’ political contributions and lobbying
expenditures, and that, overall, the effect of political influence was
strongest for poorly performing banks.

Can someone reminds us what the core premise of capitalism is again, and why we pretend to live in anything other than a hard core socialist society?

One of the professors of the study had this to say:

“Our results show that political connections play an important role in
a firm’s access to capital. The effects of political ties on federal capital investment
are strongest for companies with weaker fundamentals, lower liquidity
and poorer performance — which suggests that political ties shift
capital allocation towards underperforming institutions.”

The US financial system now need a new four letter acronym: everyone knows TBTF. We hereby annoint the Too Blatantly Briby To Fail (TB²TF) category of financial institutions. We posit that in 5 years there will be two banks in the former group: JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs, while every single other bank will make up the latter.

Among the specific data findings:

The researchers used four variables to measure political influence: 1)
seats held by bank executives on the board of directors at any of the
12 Federal Reserve banks or their branches (the Federal Reserve is
involved in the initial review of CPP applications from the majority of
qualified banks); 2) banks with headquarters located in the district of
a U.S. House member serving on the Congressional Committee on Financial
Services or its subcommittees on Financial Institutions and Capital
Markets (which played a major role in the development of TARP and its
amendments); 3) banks’ campaign contributions to congressional
candidates; and 4) banks’ lobbying expenditures.

They found that a board seat at a Federal Reserve Bank was
associated with a 31 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving
CPP funds, while a bank’s connection to a House member on key finance
committees was associated with a 26 percent increase, controlling for
other bank characteristics such as size and various financial
indicators.

The last data point is truly troubling: while it is one thing to pander to corrupt politicians, at least when their transgressions are made public they can and will be booted out. Yet what checks and balances exist to punish current and former Fed staffers who endorse near-bankrupt companies, in self-evident conflict of interest acts, for enhanced survival? As the Fed is accountable to nothing and nobody, save Goldman Sachs, one can argue that Goldman decides the fate of the very core of the US financial system: which firms get the thumbs up and down treatment. This is an unbelievalbe travesty of both the constitutional and the tenets of capitalism and must be rectified immediately. It certainly helps that the president, being a Constitutional law professor, will surely get right on it.

“Our findings also suggest that qualified financial institutions were
more likely to receive an investment from CPP if they were bigger and
had lower earnings and lower capital,” said Duchin, U-M assistant
professor of finance. “This is consistent with an investment strategy
seeking to support systematically important institutions experiencing
financial distress.”

If this study’s finding are confirmed and repeated independently by other research teams, it is safe to say that any pretense America has to being an efficient capitalism system (where those who can no longer compete, disappear) can be used to wipe the nation’s collective backside. Between this, and a choice of US dollars and Treasuries, Cottonelle is starting to see some serious competition.

h/t Geoffrey Batt

Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner
to Hill Leadership on Administration’s Exit Strategy for TARP

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury released the
text of identical letters sent today from Secretary Tim Geithner to
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senator Harry Reid outlining the
Administration’s exit strategy for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA). The text of the letter to Speaker Pelosi follows.

December 9, 2009

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker          
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker:

I am writing to update you on the status of the Obama
Administration’s financial policies, including programs initiated under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), the results they have
achieved, the challenges ahead, and our plan for exiting TARP.

These policies are working.  When the Obama Administration took
office, the financial system was extremely fragile and the economy was
contracting sharply.  The Administration’s financial and economic
policies have helped to shore up confidence in our financial system. 
Credit is starting to flow again to consumers and businesses, and the
economy is growing.  Further, private capital is replacing public
capital in our major institutions.

As a result of improved financial conditions and careful stewardship
of the program, losses on TARP investments are likely to be
significantly lower than previously expected.  We now expect a positive
return from the government’s investments in banks.  These banks will
soon have repaid nearly half of the TARP funds they received.  We also
expect to recover all but $42 billion of the $364 billion in TARP funds
disbursed in FY2009.  Further, we plan to use significantly less than
the full $700 billion in EESA authority.  As a result, we expect that
TARP will cost taxpayers at least $200 billion less than was projected
in the August Mid-Session Review of the President’s Budget.

But significant challenges remain.  Too many American families,
homeowners, and small businesses still face severe financial pressure. 
Although the economy is recovering, foreclosures are increasing, and
unemployment is unacceptably high.  Businesses are still cautious in
the face of uncertainty about the strength of the recovery, and many
small businesses face very difficult credit conditions.  Although bank
lending standards are starting to ease, many categories of bank lending
continue to contract.  This contraction has hit small businesses very
hard because they rely heavily on such lending, and do not have the
ability to substitute credit from securities issuance.  Commercial real
estate losses also weigh heavily on many small banks, impairing their
ability to extend new loans.

Further, the recovery of our financial system remains incomplete. 
And near-term shocks to that system could undermine the economic
recovery we have seen to date.

Exit Strategy for TARP

Our exit strategy for TARP balances the mandate of EESA to address
these challenges with the need to exercise fiscal discipline and reduce
the burden on current and future taxpayers.  There are four broad
elements to our strategy.

First, we will continue terminating and winding down many of the
government programs put in place last fall.  In September, Treasury
ended its Money Market Fund Guarantee Program, which guaranteed at its
peak over $3 trillion of assets.  The program incurred no losses, and
generated $1.2 billion in fees.  The Capital Purchase Program, through
which the majority of TARP investments in banks have been made, is
effectively closed.  Before this Administration took office, nearly
$240 billion in TARP funds had been committed to banks.  Since January
20, we have committed about $7 billion to banks, much of which went to
small institutions.  Major U.S. banks subject to the “stress test”
conducted last spring have raised over $110 billion in high-quality
capital from the private sector.  And banks will soon have repaid $116
billion of TARP funds

Second, we will limit new commitments in 2010 to three areas.

• We will continue to mitigate foreclosure for responsible American
  homeowners as we take the steps necessary to stabilize our housing
  market.
• We recently launched initiatives to provide capital to small
  and community banks, which are important sources of credit for small
  businesses.  We are also reserving funds for additional efforts to
  facilitate small business lending.
• Finally, we may increase our commitment to the Term
  Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which is improving
  securitization markets that facilitate consumer and small business
  loans, as well as commercial mortgage loans.  We expect that increasing
  our commitment to TALF would not result in additional cost to taxpayers.

Beyond these limited new commitments, we will not use remaining EESA
funds unless necessary to respond to an immediate and substantial
threat to the economy stemming from financial instability.  As a nation
we must maintain capacity to respond to such a threat.  Banks are still
experiencing significant new credit losses, and the pace of bank
failures, which tend to lag economic cycles, remains elevated.  At the
same time, many of the Federal Reserve and FDIC programs that have
complemented TARP investments are ending.  This creates a financial
environment in which new shocks could have an outsized effect –
especially if an adequate financial stability reserve is not
maintained.  As we wind down many of the government programs launched
initially to address the crisis, it is imperative that we maintain this
capacity to respond if financial conditions worsen and threaten our
economy.  However, before using EESA funds to respond to new financial
threats, I would consult with the President and Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board and submit written notification to the Congress.  This
capacity will bolster confidence and improve financial stability,
thereby decreasing the probability that it will need to be used.  This
is the third element of our exit strategy.

In order to accomplish these goals, pursuant to Section 120(b) of
EESA, I certify that I am hereby extending the authority provided under
the Act to October 3, 2010.  This extension is necessary to assist
American families and stabilize financial markets because it will,
among other things, enable us to continue to implement programs that
address housing markets and the needs of small businesses, and to
maintain the capacity to respond to unforeseen threats, as described
above.

While we are extending the $700 billion program, we do not expect to
deploy more than $550 billion.  We also expect up to $175 billion in
repayments by the end of next year, and substantial additional
repayments thereafter.  The combination of the reduced scale of TARP
commitments and substantial repayments should allow us to commit
significant resources to pay down the federal debt over time and slow
its growth rate.

Even with this extension, we expect that TARP will cost taxpayers at
least $200 billion less than was projected in the August Mid-Session
Review of the President’s Budget, including $25 billion in potential
costs from new TARP commitments in 2010.  We expect that the vast
majority of these potential costs would come from mitigating
foreclosure for responsible American homeowners as we take the steps
necessary to stabilize our housing market.

The final element to our exit strategy is how we manage equity
investments acquired through EESA while protecting taxpayers.  We will
continue to manage those investments in a commercial manner and seek to
dispose of them as soon as practicable.  We will exercise our voting
rights only on core issues such as election of directors, and we will
not interfere in the day-to-day management of individual companies.  In
addition, as the steward of taxpayers’ funds, Treasury will continue to
manage investments in a manner that ensures accountability,
transparency and oversight.  And we will work with recipients of EESA
funds and their supervisors to accelerate repayment where appropriate. 
We want to see the capital base of our financial system return to
private hands as quickly as possible, while preserving financial
stability and promoting economic recovery.

History suggests that exiting prematurely from policies designed to
contain a financial crisis can significantly prolong an economic
downturn.  We must not waver in our resolve to ensure the stability of
the financial system and to support the nascent recovery that the
Administration and the Congress have worked so hard to achieve. 
Improvements in the financial performance of EESA programs put us in a
better position to address the economic and financial challenges many
Americans still face.  I look forward to continuing to work with you to
achieve these
goals.                                                               

Sincerely,

Timothy F. Geithner

Identical copy of this letter sent to:
            The Honorable Harry Reid

cc:       The Honorable Barney Frank
           The Honorable Spencer Bachus
           The Honorable David Obey
           The Honorable Jerry Lewis

As Zero Hedge presented previously, the sharp divergence between the Nikkei and the S&P indexed in gold continues. The two reindexed indexes, which have correlated 0.91 since March, have diverged sharply in the past three weeks, and now stand at an over 11% divergence in performance since the year lows. Whether this is due to the “shocking” recent realization that Japan is caught in an ever increasing deflationary vortex (which the US likely will not avoid, at least not in the near term), or simply due to momo quants deciding that the Nikkei is no longer fun to chase, a convergence trade on the two broad indexes (long Nikkei, short S&P) seems like a rather painless way to pick 10%. Then again, ask Boaz Weinstein about “surething” convergence trades.

US consumers keeps on purchasing Kindles on credit cards which they apparently have no intention of every paying off.  The most recent Fitch report disclosed that October delinquencies have continued their steady climb, and together with charge-offs, are at near record highs: “Consumer credit quality remains under significant strain as a result of the  persistent weakness in the labor markets,” noted managing director Michael Dean. The Labor Department will report unemployment data Friday; the jobless rate is expected to hold steady at 10.2%, the highest level in decades, while the decline in payrolls is seen mitigating from the previous month.

Dow Jones reports:

All types of consumer lending have worsened the past several years, with borrowers falling increasingly behind and lenders writing off many billions of dollars of owed loans.

Fitch’s credit-card performance indexes show late payments rising to their highest levels in five months and indicate higher charge-offs in the months to come.

Fitch’s index on delinquencies of at least 60 days rose to 4.41% from 4.22% in September. Late-stage delinquencies are now 31% higher than year-earlier levels and just below the record high of 4.45% in June. Delinquencies of at least 30 days rose as well.

As Zero Hedge pointed out, and as Meredith Whitney has voiced her concernes about, the biggest threat to the economic going into 2010 may be that not only are banks dropping reducing overall credit availability, but that ongoing credit contraction to the tune of almost $2 trillion over the next several years will mean existing credit limits are tapped out as existing ones become increasingly maxed out.

This will likely further entrench the consumer into an accelerated deleveraging mindset, and no matter what the incremental liquidity from the Fed is, the deflationary pressures will likely continue. Which means that markets will continue in full melt-up mode to compensate for real economic losses, which benefit exlusively the top percentile of the US population as the middle and lower classes continue experiencing the brunt of the credit contraction. At some point the economic reality is sure to catch up with the market surreality. That will be the point when all the flawed market policies by the Administration and Bernanke become exposed for the clothesless emperors they are.

Albert Edwards and Dylan Grice’s latest must read slideshow:

We have just had the worst decade’s performance for equity investors on record. Relative to government bonds, equities have been an even bigger disaster. Surely after such a terrible decade for equity investors things can only get better?

On a ten year view, equities may indeed prove to be a good investment. On a 1-2 year view, however, we still see much pain to come. After what we have been though so far, where the bulls? optimism has been crushed in 2001/2 and in 2007/8 surely there must be a heavy weight of self-doubt yoked onto the shoulders of the bulls ? but apparently not!

The lesson from Japan is that while de-leveraging plays itself out, the global economy will remain extremely vulnerable. The Great Moderation is dead. It was built on a super-cycle of private sector debt. We know from Japan, we now return to what was before, i.e. highly volatile and unpredictable cycles. Recession will quickly follow recovery.

US equity valuations did not reach revulsion levels in March this year. After some 15 years of gross overvaluation do we really believe that this valuation bear market that has been in place since 2000 will finish with equities looking cheap for only three months? Long term-valuation measures suggest equities will fall substantially below March lows.

Government bonds are now an extremely poor investment. On a 10-year view, the insolvency of government finances will surely end in substantially higher inflation. Yet on a 1-2 year view, we believe the key threat remains deflation. Markets will react aggressively to this as the cycle stalls in 2010. Expect sub-2% bond yields to accompany new lows on the equity market next year. Thinking the unthinkable has paid off over the last decade and should continue to do so.

Edwards Slideshow –