FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘Securities Fraud’ Category

Lawsuit alleges the bank took extreme measures to defraud investors, and now JPMorgan may be on the hook

Former Bear Stearns mortgage executives who now run mortgage divisions of Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, and Ally Financial have been accused of cheating and defrauding investors through the mortgage securities they created and sold while at Bear. According to e-mails and internal audits, JPMorgan had known about this fraud since the spring of 2008, but hid it from the public eye through legal maneuvering. Last week a lawsuit filed in 2008 by mortgage insurer Ambac Assurance Corp against Bear Stearns and JPMorgan was unsealed. The lawsuit’s supporting e-mails, going back as far as 2005, highlight Bear traders telling their superiors they were selling investors like Ambac a “sack of shit.”

News of internal whistleblowers coming forward from Bear’s mortgage servicing division, EMC, was first reported by The Atlantic in May of last year. Ex-EMC analysts admitted they were sometimes told to falsify loan-level performance data provided to the ratings agencies who blessed Bear’s billion-dollar deals. But according to depositions and documents in the Ambac lawsuit, Bear’s misdeeds went even deeper. They say senior traders under Tom Marano, who was a Senior Managing Director and Global Head of Mortgages for Bear and is now CEO of Ally’s mortgage operations, were pocketing cash that should have gone to securities holders after Bear had already sold them bonds and moved the loans off its books.

Mike Nierenberg, who ran the adjustable-rate mortgage trading desk at Bear and is now the head of mortgages and securitization for Bank of America, was a key player ensuring the defaulting loans Bear was buying would move off their books right after they bought them, with little concern for the firm’s due diligence standards. He was joined in this scheme by Jeff Verschleiser, his peer and Senior Managing Director on the mortgage and asset-backed securities trading desk and head of whole loan trading. He is now an executive in Goldman Sachs’ mortgage division.

According to the lawsuit, the Bear traders would sell toxic mortgage securities to investors and then sell back the bad loans with early payment defaults to the banks that originated them at a discount. The traders would pocket the refund, and would not pass it on to the mortgage trust, which was where it should have gone to be distributed to the investors who owned the bonds. The Marano-led traders also cut the time allowed for early payment defaults, without telling the bond investors. That way, Bear could quickly securitize defective loans, without leaving enough time for investors to do their own due diligence after the bonds were sold and put-back any bad loans to Bear.

The traders were essentially double-dipping — getting paid twice on the deal. How was this possible? Once the security was sold, they didn’t have a legal claim to get cash back from the bad loans — that claim belonged to bond investors — but they did so anyway and kept the money. Thus, Bear was cheating the investors they promised to have sold a safe product out of their cash. According to former Bear Stearns and EMC traders and analysts who spoke with The Atlantic, Nierenberg and Verschleiser were the decision-makers for the double dipping scheme, and thus, are named as individual defendants in the suit.

Bear deal manager Nicolas Smith wrote an e-mail on August 11th, 2006 to Keith Lind, a Managing Director on the trading desk, referring to a particular bond, SACO 2006-8, as “SACK OF SHIT [2006-]8″ and said, “I hope your [sic] making a lot of money off this trade.”

It’s this blatant internal awareness inside the Bear mortgage trading division that the Ambac suits says led Bear to implement an across-the-board strategy to disregard its contractual promises and conceal the defective loans. By JPMorgan taking over Bear, it became the successor of interest in Bear Stearns. As the lawsuit lays out, JPMorgan is responsible for the flagrant accounting fraud started by Bear designed to avoid, and has continued to avoid, recognition of vast off-balance sheet exposure relating to its contractual repurchase agreements. This allowed executives to reap tens of millions of dollars in compensation from a bank that wouldn’t have been able to buy Bear without tax payer assistance.

80% of Loans Went Bad Almost Immediately

In 2007, when Ambac started to realize something was very wrong with its high-rated bonds, it demanded Bear provide loan-level detail and reviewed 695 non-performing loans in its portfolio. Ambac’s audit concluded that 80 percent of the loans showed an early payment default. This meant they should have never have been packed in the bonds Bear sold and were required to be repurchased. Bear refused, and of course had already been pocketing buyback money for itself from the originators. Bear also never told investors that its auditor Price Waterhouse and Coopers submitted an internal review in August 2006 that this repurchase process was not in-line with its due diligence standards and not typical for the industry. By January 2007, a Bear internal audit also reported the firm had collected $1.7 billion in repurchase claims — a 227% increase over the previous year. Yet Marano’s group of traders continued their double-dip payment scheme and kept selling the toxic loans with full awareness of the poor quality of the due diligence.

Jeffrey Verschleiser even said in an e-mail that he knew this was an issue. He wrote to his peer Mike Nierenberg in March 2006, “[we] are wasting way too much money on Bad Due Diligence.” Yet a year later nothing had changed. In March 2007, Verschleiser wrote to Nierenberg again about the same due diligence firm, “[w]e are just burning money hiring them.”

Then in November 2007, Verschleiser wrote to his risk committee that he knew insurers for mortgage securities were going to have big financial problems. He suggested they multiply by ten times the short bet he’d just made against stocks like Ambac. These e-mails show Verschleiser’s trading desk bragging to firm leadership that he made $55 million off shorting insurers’ stock in just three weeks.

Eventually, as Ambac kept demanding a repurchase of the bad loans, Bear acknowledged in late 2007 it would have to buy some back. The lawsuit lists over $600 million in claims with $1.2 billion in damages from the soured mortgage securities it invested in and insured against. But according to the lawsuit, in the spring of 2008, JPMorgan dismissed an outside audit review of the loans’ need to be repurchased and once again refused to pay Ambac. The suit asserts JPMorgan knew a repurchase would result in a huge accounting liability that would put their balance sheet in serious trouble at that time.

Last week, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon said it will take years to get through mortgage litigation risk the bank inherited and had set aside around $9 billion for litigation-related risk. Yet in the bank’s January earnings call, Dimon suggested that the bank may not have to buy back any soured mortgages from private investors and said that the issue is “not that material” for JPMorgan. Still, Ambac recently won a court order in December to add accounting fraud against JPMorgan to its suit, which can double or triple lawsuit awards. So it’s hard to tell whether America’s largest bank is prepared to pay for the sins of Bear. JPMorgan did fight tooth and nail for the Ambac suit not to be made public, however, because the firm argued it could damage the reputations of senior bank executives currently working in the industry. Individuals named as defendants included: Jimmy Cayne, Alan “ACE” Greenberg, Warren Spector, Alan Schwartz, Thomas Marano, Jeffrey Mayer, Mary Haggerty, Baron Silverstein, Jeffrey Verschleiser, and Michael Nierenberg.

Ambac’s lawsuit is led by Eric Haas of Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP. Depositions show internal Bear executives saying Nierenberg and Verschleiser were responsible for deciding how much risk to take when acquiring loans and for aspects of the securitization process. They reported up to Marano. Testimony shows Marano would have known about the decisions his head traders were making. When asked about these accusations, Nierenberg’s, Marano’s, and Verschleiser’s current employers had no comment. The defendants’ lawyers at Greenberg Traurig LLP failed to respond to calls for comment.

A public hearing is currently scheduled to be held by the New York State assembly regarding whether legal action should be brought against banks for misleading insurers about mortgage related securities. If approved, the New York Attorney General will likely be asked to bring criminal fraud charges against these banks. Now we must wait and see if JPMorgan will settle or go to trial — or if the bank tries to claw back tens of millions of dollars in pay from the former Bear executives.

The Atlantic

Oh my, what do we have here?

Life Insurance Companies v Countrywide – filed Jan 24 2011

That would be a nasty little lawsuit (well, maybe not so little) against Countrywide (and its successor, Bank of America) in which it is alleged that Countrywide sold a lot of bogus paper to pretty much every large insurance company in the world.

In point, here’s the salient section:

1. This action concerns a massive fraud perpetrated by Defendant Countrywide Financial and certain of its officers and affiliates against the Plaintiffs, which are investors in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by Countrywides subsidiaries. The Plaintiffs are institutional investors that wanted conservative, low-risk investments and thus bought Countrywide MBS (the Certificates) that were represented to be backed by mortgages issued pursuant to specific underwriting guidelines and rated investment-grade (primarily AAA). In purchasing the Certificates, the Plaintiffs and their investment managers relied on term sheets, prospectuses and other materials prepared by and provided to them by the Defendants, which made representations about the Countrywide Defendants purportedly conservative mortgage underwriting standards, the appraisals of the mortgaged properties, the mortgages loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, and other facts that were material to Plaintiffs investment decisions. Plaintiffs and their investment managers also relied on Defendants public statements concerning the Countrywide Defendants adherence to prudent underwriting guidelines and careful credit analysis. These representations by Defendants were recklessly or knowingly false when made. In reality, Countrywide was an enterprise driven by only one purpose to originate and securitize as many mortgage loans as possible into MBS to generate profits for the Countrywide Defendants, without regard to the investors that relied on the critical, false information provided to them with respect to the related Certificates.

If you want it distilled down into one sentence, it’s this: You told us you were selling us good paper, and in fact you were knowingly selling us a box of dogcrap.

We’ve seen a couple of these before.  But this one adds a new twist, and leads me to run up the

sign again….

Read starting at page 62.  Oh I’ll do it for you…

H. Countrywide Failed To Ensure That Title To The Underlying Loans Was Effectively Transferred

147. The rules for these transfers are governed by the law of the state where the property is located, by the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement (PSA) for each securitization, and by the law governing the issuing trust (with respect to matters of trust law). Generally, state laws and the PSAs require the promissory note and security instrument to be transferred by indorsement, in the same way that a check can be transferred by indorsement, or by sale. In addition, state laws generally require that the trustee have physical possession of the original, manually signed note in order for the loan to be enforceable by the trustee against the borrower in case of default.

148. In order to preserve the bankruptcy-remote status of the issuing trusts in RMBS transactions, the notes and security instruments are generally not transferred directly from the mortgage loan originator to the trust. Rather, the notes and security instruments are generally initially transferred from the originator (e.g., Countrywide Home) to the depositor (e.g., CWALT), either directly or via one or more special-purpose entities established by Countrywide Financial. After this initial transfer to the depositor, the depositor transfers the notes and security interests to the issuing trust for the particular securitization. Each of these transfers must be valid under applicable state law in order for the trust to have good title to the mortgage loans.

149. In addition, the PSA generally requires the transfers of the mortgage loans to the trust to be completed within a strict time limit after formation of the trust in order to ensure that the trust qualifies as a tax-free real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC).

150. The applicable state trust law generally requires strict compliance with the trust documents, including the PSA, so that failure to comply strictly with the timeliness, indorsement, physical delivery, and other requirements of the PSA with respect to the transfers of the notes and security instruments means that the transfers would be void and the trust would not havegood title to the mortgage loans.

151. The Offering Documents for each offering of the Certificates represented in substance that the issuing trust for that offering had obtained good title to the mortgage loans comprising the pool for the offering. In reality, however, Countrywide routinely failed to comply with the requirements of applicable state laws and the PSAs for valid transfers of the notes and security instruments to the issuing trusts. In Kemp .v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Bkrtcy. No. 08-18700 (D.N.J.), Countrywide sought to prove that the Bank of New York, as trustee for an RMBS issuing trust that purportedly held Mr. Kemps mortgage, was entitled to enforce the mortgage. Countrywide presented testimony by Linda DeMartini, who had been employed by Countrywide Servicing for almost ten years as of August 2009 and was then a supervisor and operational team leader for the Litigation Management Department of Countrywide Servicing. Ms. DeMartini testified that, in her extensive career in the mortgage loan servicing business of Countrywide, I had to know about everything . . . . She testified that Countrywide Home originated Kemps loan in 2006 and transferred it to the Bank of New York as trustee for the issuing trust, but that Countrywide Servicing retained the original note in its own possession and never delivered it to the Bank of New York because Countrywide Servicing was the servicer for the loan.

What have I been prattling on for over a year about?  This exact point.

How many people have said this didn’t matter and wouldn’t be a problem?  Remember all the apologists for the banksters that said this wouldn’t lead to liability, it didn’t represent a void transfer, and that all this would be swept under the rug and be ok?

Care to rethink that position…. just a wee bit?

Looks to me like as the Statute of Limitations approaches and the firms in question that have gotten screwed have faced the choice of “shut up or sue” they’ve decided that the correct response is “Ok, I’ll sue.”

I doubt they’ll be interested in settling for a tiny amount of money either, given the default and economic harm numbers put forward in the complaint.

Nor do I think this will be a singular complaint – drop in your name and play “template” with this one folks.

The Market-Ticker

Origins of an American Kleptocracy

Submitted by Marla Singer

Some days ago we wondered aloud at the blank check extended to Fannie and Freddie along with the suspiciously convenient timing of those announcements on Christmas Day.  Back then we wondered if we had been told the entire story.  To wit:

So.  Let us summarize:

We do not expect the GSEs to grow their portfolios at all, so we are fixing the bloated portfolio problem by easing the portfolio caps to permit a quarter trillion dollar expansion thereof.

We do not expect either of the GSEs to need more help from the Treasury, so we are responding to the underutilized $400 billion “lifeline” the GSEs have with the Treasury ($111 of which is currently used) by expanding it to… infinity.

Oh, and though they have collectively lost nearly $200 billion, we are paying the CEOs around $6 million each.

Great work team!  It’s already almost 11:00.  Let’s go to lunch.

The other shoe having now dropped, Bloomberg has joined in our skepticism:

Taxpayer losses from supporting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will top $400 billion, according to Peter Wallison, a former general counsel at the Treasury who is now a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

“The situation is they are losing gobs of money, up to $400 billion in mortgages,” Wallison said in a Bloomberg Television interview. The Treasury Department recognized last week that losses will be more than $400 billion when it raised its limit on federal support for the two government-sponsored enterprises, he said.

Wallison continues:

“It was always safe to buy these notes,” he said. The U.S. government was always going to stand behind them. They’re as good as Treasury notes.”

We are no longer sure this is the most inspiring comparison. Wallison also chimes in via the Wall Street Journal and points to a darker vein shot through the GSE story:

New research by Edward Pinto, a former chief credit officer for Fannie Mae and a housing expert, has found that from the time Fannie and Freddie began buying risky loans as early as 1993, they routinely misrepresented the mortgages they were acquiring, reporting them as prime when they had characteristics that made them clearly subprime or Alt-A.

In general, a subprime mortgage refers to the credit of the borrower. A FICO score of less than 660 is the dividing line between prime and subprime, but Fannie and Freddie were reporting these mortgages as prime, according to Mr. Pinto. Fannie has admitted this in a third-quarter 10-Q report in 2008.

But because of Fannie and Freddie’s mislabeling, there were millions more high-risk loans outstanding. That meant default rates as well as the actual losses after foreclosure were going to be outside all prior experience. When these rates began to show up early in 2007, it was apparent something was seriously wrong with assumptions on which AAA ratings had been based.

Losses, it was now certain, would invade the AAA tranches of the mortgage-backed securities outstanding. Investors, having lost confidence in the ratings, fled the MBS market and ultimately the market for all asset-backed securities. They have not yet returned.

It has become conventional wisdom, perhaps even cliche, to pin the origins of the credit crisis on the big banks or, AIG or even the practice of financial modeling.  Certainly, these actors have received the most play in the media, and have now endured the focus of populist ire for more than a year.  We now think that the analysis leading commentators to focus blame on these entities is fatally flawed.

We have seen no credible data that any of the large banks or other underwriters of mortgage backed securities (“MBSs”) or collaterized debt obligations (“CDOs”) or firms like AIG selling protection on same actually misrepresented the character of underlying collateral.  This is in direct contrast to the allegations of Edward Pinto as printed by the Wall Street Journal.  If Pinto is correct such that the mis-marking of mortgages by the GSEs and the discovery thereof destroyed confidence in the accuracy of ratings in mortgage backed securities and their derivatives (and it seems probable to suspect that he is) then it seems almost beyond question that the policies (or policy malfeasance) of Fannie and Freddie, and not the actions of large banks or firms like AIG are the proximate cause of not just the credit crisis, but also the continuing multi-act, multi-bailout farce that continues to be passed off to the public as necessary “stimulus.”

It takes only a cursory examination to suspect that misdirection plays a key part in the latest act of the ongoing crisis theater of the absurd.  Misdirection to distract attention from the key complicity of GSEs in the crisis.  Misdirection to deflect scrutiny away from the political personalities from both sides of the aisle responsible.  Misdirection to conceal what could only be described as the most damaging acts of accounting and securities fraud in the history of accounting, securities or fraud.

Precious few assumptions are required to come to conclusions laying responsibility for the largest economic disaster in recent memory at the feet of the GSEs.

First, that the GSEs had substantial influence over the mortgage market.

This is a no-brainer with the GSEs either holding or guaranteeing 51% of outstanding home mortgage debt in 2003.  To put this in perspective, that figure was around 33% of the GDP of the entire United States in 2003.  Read that last line again.  Anyone wishing to play in the market had to compete with the rates set by Fannie and Freddie.

Second, that the GSEs artificially depressed rates (read: underpriced risk).

This is equally trivial to find given that this precise mandate has been the express purpose of the GSEs since at least 1993.  The GSEs were not tasked with increasing the capacity for mortgage lending.  They were tasked with making loans “affordable.”  They used a number of tools to do so, but the key elements were acting as a proxy for quasi-government guarantees and bundling mortgages into risk tiers to act as a sort of clearing house for securitization pools.  It is often said that providing a guarantee (particularly governmental) reduces risk.  This is, of course, a fantasy.  All that explicitly or implicitly tax dollar backed guarantees do is socialize risk.  However, they manage to do so without requiring consolidation of the resulting liabilities on the government’s balance sheet.  Convenient that, yes?  A guarantee is a subsidy.  Period.  Failing to understand this is what permitted the political class to mislead the American public into thinking that cheap loans for everything from housing to small businesses to education (the next fiscal disaster on the horizon) come with no cost.  (Or that cheap debt wouldn’t pump up the price of everything from education to housing).  Today’s pundits seem to enjoy blaming “moral hazard” (by which they mean “corporate moral hazard”) for the crisis.  Oddly, government guarantees, particularly those that everyone assumes will be costless, are not typically part of this definition.

These assumptions, on their own should be sufficient to indict the GSEs, the totally unqualified and unaccountable recipients of political payoffs who occupied the executive offices of these fiscal singularities1 and their other supporters (including the voters who continued year after year to return these jokers to public office) on charges of gross negligence.

If, as Pinto suggests, we add purposeful misrepresentation of underlying collateral to the mix three things become apparent:

First, absent some intervening criminal act by actors farther downstream (and we may yet find some), we have isolated absolutely the cause of all that followed.

Second, it becomes quite easy to construct a criminal case for literally millions of counts of accounting, securities, wire and mail fraud against the GSEs.  To the extent executives at Fannie and Freddie signed off on financial statements disclosing the portion of their balance sheets that held “AAA” securities and these had been purposefully misidentified we should be exploring prosecution for violations under e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley.  (Given, however, Rham Emanuel’s involvement in Freddie and Fannie, we aren’t holding our breath).

Third, given the presence of blatant government price fixing in more than a third of the entire economy, the United States hasn’t been anything like a “free market” since before 2003.

It should shock you that literally a third of the U.S. economy should become a playground for the social experiments of any political group of any party affiliation.

It probably will not shock you (since you are reading Zero Hedge) to find what may be the largest example of securities fraud ever directly connected to elected officials of the United States and their cronies.

Taking a step back, it should shock you that power over literally a third of the U.S. economy should ever have been allowed to become concentrated in two entities with blatantly socialist aims and under the control of executives with no relevant qualifications of any note other than loose purse strings on their political contribution satchels.

What should grip readers with even more substantial alarm is the combination of blank checking for Fannie and Freddie backstops, and the shifty manner in which these disclosures were made.  Is it possible anymore to doubt that the administration simply lied through its teeth while promising us it expects no need of increased credit lines for the GSEs while simultaneously expanding same literally to infinity?

Given that Fannie, Freddie and the FHA have now taken up the mandate of supporting housing prices at any cost (to the taxpayer via endless bailouts and unlimited credit) is it possible in any way to credit the current “upturn” to fundamentals?  When we factor in similar capture of the FDIC and the like, where does this leave us, exactly?

Permit us to ask a few questions:

1.  Why are Fannie and Freddie still operating in any way whatsoever?

2.  Given that their credibility for reliable (or even remotely non-fiction) financial disclosure nears complete obliteration, who is likely to buy anything from these entities in the future?  (If you said “The Fed” you may advance to the bonus round).  Surely the conflict of interest implicit in government ownership does nothing to improve the situation.  Perhaps the news that the Fed plans to issue securities to shrink its balance sheet and reverse “quantitative easing” describes an attempt to securitize the tattered reputation of the GSEs?  Will the Fed simply aggregate its balance sheet and issue tranches?  Does that make the Fed simple the collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) of last resort?  Who will do the rating?  Who will be writing protection on CDO Fed Tranch A-1 (AAA)?

3.  Given that neither entity is currently monitored by an Inspector General (despite what used to be statutory language so mandating) and both entities are completely captured by the current administration, how can it be anything other than insanity to expect any result from these entities other than the formation (or expansion) of a ravenous fiscal black hole?

4.  Given increasing government control beyond Fannie and Freddie that now extends far beyond 33% of GDP, what can we expect if we continue to permit political parties of any stripe to exercise command and control influence over what is now probably a simple majority of our economy?

There was a time when we hoped that the United States would learn its lesson with respect to permitting political control over large swaths of private markets.  Today that time seems very long ago, and somewhat naive.

Perhaps we are being too harsh on the likes of Barney Frank and other GSE proponents.  Adopting a slighty more relativistic economic morality, we might count Frank as one of the greatest legislators of all time.  Consider:

To the extent Mr. Frank and his ilk self-identify as advocates for low-cost housing for those ill-able to afford it, or beset by poor credit, the last 20 years have represented the largest single wealth transfer (composed primarily of real estate and flat screen TVs) to that sector known to us.  Not only that, but given the de facto nationalization of MBS portfolios (we’ll give you three guesses who have been the largest MBS buyers over the last several quarters) the GSEs and their supporters have managed to get taxpayers to pay for it all.  Of course, had they simply proposed such a measure in Congress it would have been laughed from the chamber.  And yet, it almost seems as if these individuals simply wrote a multi-trillion dollar check to their constituents that happened to be drawn on the United States Treasury.

It almost seems this way because it was this way.

1. 1. Just consider Fannie Mae’s torrid leadership history: James A. Johnson (Fannie CEO 1991-1998, Democratic luminary, Obama fundraiser, John Kerry vice presidential selection committee chair, $21 million in Fannie compensation). Franklin Raines (Fannie CEO 1999-2004, Clinton’s Director Office of Management and Budget, $90 million+ in Fannie compensation later the subject of a civil suit) Daniel Mudd (Fannie CEO 2005-2008, $80 million in Fannie compensation) Herbert M. Allison (Fannie CEO 2008-2009, National Finance Chair, John McCain Campaign).  Freddie’s record is no better.