FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘securities’ Category

Tomorrow at 10 am the House Oversight Committee will hold a hearing with SEC’s Robert Khuzami (oddly Mary Schapiro, together with Chris Cox, had been scheduled to appear initially, however “in a series of last minute negotiations, members settled on Khuzami”) to discuss what the SEC has already found to be a criminal transaction (and attempted to promptly bury under the rug if only if it weren’t for one Judge Jef Rakoff). Details of the hearing below:

Washington, DC – House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
Chairman Edolphus “Ed” Towns (D-NY) and Domestic Policy Subcommittee
Chairman Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) will convene a joint hearing entitled:
“Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a
Federal Bailout?  Part V?”  The hearing will examine the events
surrounding Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch and its
receipt of Federal financial assistance. 

The hearing will
take place at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, December 11, 2009 in room 2154
Rayburn House Office Building.  A webcast of the hearing will be
available on the Committee’s website: http://oversight.house.gov.

As for the actual hearing, Dow Jones presents this advance look of how Dennis Kucinich will approach the interrogation:

[Kucinich] plans to present Khuzami with a financial forecast
that had been prepared by Merrill Lynch a few weeks ahead of the December 2008
shareholder vote on the merger, according to subcommittee documents obtained
by Dow Jones.
The forecast omits projected losses from Merrill Lynch’s illiquid assets for
the month of December and underestimates by almost half the roughly $15
billion after-tax fourth quarter loss, the documents say.
Based on the subcommittee’s investigations, Kucinich says he believes Bank
of America executives were aware of the red flags raised by Merrill Lynch’s
forecast. But that didn’t stop them from presenting the document to their
lawyers at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

Kucinich says Bank of America’s decision not to investigate the Merrill
Lynch document and notify shareholders of any change in expectations amounts
to “an egregious violation of securities laws.”

Referring specifically to the Merrill Lynch forecast, [BofA spokesman Lawrence] Di Rita said, “The
matter of Merrill’s projected fourth-quarter 2008 losses was considered
carefully and the decisions were made in good faith at a time of unprecedented
economic and market upheaval.”

And while committtee chairman Edolphus Towns is allegedly satisfied with BofA’s behavior in the last year, “since it paid the last of its $45 billion debt to taxpayers” even though it does not have the ready sources for this outflow, and even though the deal was merely a front to allow BofA traders to scalp exorbitant bonuses one last time before everything collapses, Judge Rakoff may not share Towns’ utter lack of interest with due process and punsihment of criminal behavior, especially where said criminal behavior has already been proven.

Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner
to Hill Leadership on Administration’s Exit Strategy for TARP

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury released the
text of identical letters sent today from Secretary Tim Geithner to
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senator Harry Reid outlining the
Administration’s exit strategy for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA). The text of the letter to Speaker Pelosi follows.

December 9, 2009

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker          
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker:

I am writing to update you on the status of the Obama
Administration’s financial policies, including programs initiated under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), the results they have
achieved, the challenges ahead, and our plan for exiting TARP.

These policies are working.  When the Obama Administration took
office, the financial system was extremely fragile and the economy was
contracting sharply.  The Administration’s financial and economic
policies have helped to shore up confidence in our financial system. 
Credit is starting to flow again to consumers and businesses, and the
economy is growing.  Further, private capital is replacing public
capital in our major institutions.

As a result of improved financial conditions and careful stewardship
of the program, losses on TARP investments are likely to be
significantly lower than previously expected.  We now expect a positive
return from the government’s investments in banks.  These banks will
soon have repaid nearly half of the TARP funds they received.  We also
expect to recover all but $42 billion of the $364 billion in TARP funds
disbursed in FY2009.  Further, we plan to use significantly less than
the full $700 billion in EESA authority.  As a result, we expect that
TARP will cost taxpayers at least $200 billion less than was projected
in the August Mid-Session Review of the President’s Budget.

But significant challenges remain.  Too many American families,
homeowners, and small businesses still face severe financial pressure. 
Although the economy is recovering, foreclosures are increasing, and
unemployment is unacceptably high.  Businesses are still cautious in
the face of uncertainty about the strength of the recovery, and many
small businesses face very difficult credit conditions.  Although bank
lending standards are starting to ease, many categories of bank lending
continue to contract.  This contraction has hit small businesses very
hard because they rely heavily on such lending, and do not have the
ability to substitute credit from securities issuance.  Commercial real
estate losses also weigh heavily on many small banks, impairing their
ability to extend new loans.

Further, the recovery of our financial system remains incomplete. 
And near-term shocks to that system could undermine the economic
recovery we have seen to date.

Exit Strategy for TARP

Our exit strategy for TARP balances the mandate of EESA to address
these challenges with the need to exercise fiscal discipline and reduce
the burden on current and future taxpayers.  There are four broad
elements to our strategy.

First, we will continue terminating and winding down many of the
government programs put in place last fall.  In September, Treasury
ended its Money Market Fund Guarantee Program, which guaranteed at its
peak over $3 trillion of assets.  The program incurred no losses, and
generated $1.2 billion in fees.  The Capital Purchase Program, through
which the majority of TARP investments in banks have been made, is
effectively closed.  Before this Administration took office, nearly
$240 billion in TARP funds had been committed to banks.  Since January
20, we have committed about $7 billion to banks, much of which went to
small institutions.  Major U.S. banks subject to the “stress test”
conducted last spring have raised over $110 billion in high-quality
capital from the private sector.  And banks will soon have repaid $116
billion of TARP funds

Second, we will limit new commitments in 2010 to three areas.

• We will continue to mitigate foreclosure for responsible American
  homeowners as we take the steps necessary to stabilize our housing
  market.
• We recently launched initiatives to provide capital to small
  and community banks, which are important sources of credit for small
  businesses.  We are also reserving funds for additional efforts to
  facilitate small business lending.
• Finally, we may increase our commitment to the Term
  Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which is improving
  securitization markets that facilitate consumer and small business
  loans, as well as commercial mortgage loans.  We expect that increasing
  our commitment to TALF would not result in additional cost to taxpayers.

Beyond these limited new commitments, we will not use remaining EESA
funds unless necessary to respond to an immediate and substantial
threat to the economy stemming from financial instability.  As a nation
we must maintain capacity to respond to such a threat.  Banks are still
experiencing significant new credit losses, and the pace of bank
failures, which tend to lag economic cycles, remains elevated.  At the
same time, many of the Federal Reserve and FDIC programs that have
complemented TARP investments are ending.  This creates a financial
environment in which new shocks could have an outsized effect –
especially if an adequate financial stability reserve is not
maintained.  As we wind down many of the government programs launched
initially to address the crisis, it is imperative that we maintain this
capacity to respond if financial conditions worsen and threaten our
economy.  However, before using EESA funds to respond to new financial
threats, I would consult with the President and Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board and submit written notification to the Congress.  This
capacity will bolster confidence and improve financial stability,
thereby decreasing the probability that it will need to be used.  This
is the third element of our exit strategy.

In order to accomplish these goals, pursuant to Section 120(b) of
EESA, I certify that I am hereby extending the authority provided under
the Act to October 3, 2010.  This extension is necessary to assist
American families and stabilize financial markets because it will,
among other things, enable us to continue to implement programs that
address housing markets and the needs of small businesses, and to
maintain the capacity to respond to unforeseen threats, as described
above.

While we are extending the $700 billion program, we do not expect to
deploy more than $550 billion.  We also expect up to $175 billion in
repayments by the end of next year, and substantial additional
repayments thereafter.  The combination of the reduced scale of TARP
commitments and substantial repayments should allow us to commit
significant resources to pay down the federal debt over time and slow
its growth rate.

Even with this extension, we expect that TARP will cost taxpayers at
least $200 billion less than was projected in the August Mid-Session
Review of the President’s Budget, including $25 billion in potential
costs from new TARP commitments in 2010.  We expect that the vast
majority of these potential costs would come from mitigating
foreclosure for responsible American homeowners as we take the steps
necessary to stabilize our housing market.

The final element to our exit strategy is how we manage equity
investments acquired through EESA while protecting taxpayers.  We will
continue to manage those investments in a commercial manner and seek to
dispose of them as soon as practicable.  We will exercise our voting
rights only on core issues such as election of directors, and we will
not interfere in the day-to-day management of individual companies.  In
addition, as the steward of taxpayers’ funds, Treasury will continue to
manage investments in a manner that ensures accountability,
transparency and oversight.  And we will work with recipients of EESA
funds and their supervisors to accelerate repayment where appropriate. 
We want to see the capital base of our financial system return to
private hands as quickly as possible, while preserving financial
stability and promoting economic recovery.

History suggests that exiting prematurely from policies designed to
contain a financial crisis can significantly prolong an economic
downturn.  We must not waver in our resolve to ensure the stability of
the financial system and to support the nascent recovery that the
Administration and the Congress have worked so hard to achieve. 
Improvements in the financial performance of EESA programs put us in a
better position to address the economic and financial challenges many
Americans still face.  I look forward to continuing to work with you to
achieve these
goals.                                                               

Sincerely,

Timothy F. Geithner

Identical copy of this letter sent to:
            The Honorable Harry Reid

cc:       The Honorable Barney Frank
           The Honorable Spencer Bachus
           The Honorable David Obey
           The Honorable Jerry Lewis

I have written hundreds of articles documenting that unregulated, speculative derivatives (especially credit default swaps) are a primary cause of the economic crisis.

And I have pointed out that (1) the giant banks will make a killing on carbon trading, (2) while the leading scientist
crusading against global warming says it won’t work, and (3) there is a
very high probability of massive fraud and insider trading in the
carbon trading markets.

Now, Bloomberg notes that the carbon trading scheme will be centered around derivatives:

The
banks are preparing to do with carbon what they’ve done before: design
and market derivatives contracts that will help client companies hedge
their price risk over the long term. They’re also ready to sell
carbon-related financial products to outside investors.

 

[Blythe]
Masters says banks must be allowed to lead the way if a mandatory
carbon-trading system is going to help save the planet at the lowest
possible cost. And derivatives related to carbon must be part of the
mix, she says. Derivatives are securities whose value is derived from
the value of an underlying commodity — in this case, CO2 and other
greenhouse gases…

 

 

Who is Blythe Masters?

She is the JP Morgan employee who invented credit
default swaps, and is now heading JPM’s carbon trading efforts. As
Bloomberg notes (this and all remaining quotes are from the
above-linked Bloomberg article):

Masters, 40, oversees the New York bank’s environmental businesses as the firm’s global head of commodities…

 

As
a young London banker in the early 1990s, Masters was part of
JPMorgan’s team developing ideas for transferring risk to third
parties. She went on to manage credit risk for JPMorgan’s investment
bank.

Among the credit derivatives that grew from the bank’s early efforts was the credit-default swap.

Some in congress are fighting against carbon derivatives:

“People
are going to be cutting up carbon futures, and we’ll be in trouble,”
says Maria Cantwell, a Democratic senator from Washington state. “You
can’t stay ahead of the next tool they’re going to create.”

 

Cantwell,
51, proposed in November that U.S. state governments be given the right
to ban unregulated financial products. “The derivatives market has done
so much damage to our economy and is nothing more than a
very-high-stakes casino — except that casinos have to abide by
regulations,” she wrote in a press release…

However, Congress may cave in to industry pressure to let carbon derivatives trade over-the-counter:

The
House cap-and-trade bill bans OTC derivatives, requiring that all
carbon trading be done on exchanges…The bankers say such a ban would
be a mistake…The banks and companies may get their way on carbon
derivatives in separate legislation now being worked out in Congress…

Financial experts are also opposed to cap and trade:

Even
George Soros, the billionaire hedge fund operator, says money managers
would find ways to manipulate cap-and-trade markets. “The system can be
gamed,” Soros, 79, remarked at a London School of Economics seminar in
July. “That’s why financial types like me like it — because there are
financial opportunities”…

 

Hedge fund manager Michael Masters,
founder of Masters Capital Management LLC, based in St. Croix, U.S.
Virgin Islands [and unrelated to Blythe Masters] says speculators will
end up controlling U.S. carbon prices, and their participation could
trigger the same type of boom-and-bust cycles that have buffeted other
commodities…

 

The hedge fund manager says that banks will
attempt to inflate the carbon market by recruiting investors from hedge
funds and pension funds.

 

“Wall Street is going to
sell it as an investment product to people that have nothing to do with
carbon,” he says. “Then suddenly investment managers are dominating the
asset class, and nothing is related to actual supply and demand. We
have seen this movie before.”

Indeed, as I have previously pointed out, many environmentalists are opposed to cap and trade as well. For example:

Michelle Chan, a senior policy analyst in San Francisco for Friends of the Earth, isn’t convinced.

 

“Should
we really create a new $2 trillion market when we haven’t yet finished
the job of revamping and testing new financial regulation?” she asks.
Chan says that, given their recent history, the banks’ ability to turn
climate change into a new commodities market should be curbed…

 

“What
we have just been woken up to in the credit crisis — to a jarring and
shocking degree — is what happens in the real world,” she says…

 

Friends
of the Earth’s Chan is working hard to prevent the banks from adding
carbon to their repertoire. She titled a March FOE report “Subprime
Carbon?” In testimony on Capitol Hill, she warned, “Wall Street won’t
just be brokering in plain carbon derivatives — they’ll get creative.”

Yes,
they’ll get creative, and we have seen this movie before …an
inadequately-regulated carbon derivatives boom will destabilize the
economy and lead to another crash.

The degree of insider trading in this market is getting ridiculous. And the strangest thing is those who are executing on blatantly obvious material, non-public insider information, are no longer concerned the least bit about getting caught as they realize that the “mighty” SEC will do nothing against them, courtesy of the example the SEC has set by finding absolutely nobody “responsible” (except, of course, the regulator’s own future employers who thus get immunity from prosecution) for the greatest market heist in history in which over $5 trillion has been transferred from the middle class to the Wall Street oligarchy (future providers of paychecks for SEC staffers).

Today’s grotesque example of the SEC’s futility to act as even a modest deterrent to insider trading activity: New York Community Bancorp (which, just so happens, is a $602 million recipient of TLGP debt), whose stock surged in the final minutes of trading for reasons (then) unknown. As reader QevolveQ pointed out at 5:30 pm, the activity in both the stock and the calls of the company was many standard deviations away from average and raised major red flags. Those questions were quickly put to rest when it became known at 6:33 pm that NYB would in fact receive FDIC subsidies to acquire newly failed AmTrust Bank in a transaction that would be “immediately accretive to earnings.” And how wouldn’t it be:

Under the terms of the agreement, the Community Bank did not acquire any
of AmTrust Bank’s  non-performing loans serviced by AmTrust Bank or any
other real estate owned; construction, land, or development loans;
private-label securities, or mortgage servicing rights, nor did it
acquire any of the assets or assume any of the obligations of the
holding company.

No, those would conveniently be funded by Ms. Bair herself. The cost to the FDIC, and US taxpayers, to make NYB a richer enterprise: $2 billion. This is value that will go straight to the bank’s bottom line. As a result of this middle-class subsidy it was a certainty that its shares would spike.

The smoking gun here comes straight from a quick observation of NYB’s intraday P/V chart: the jump at 3:24pm on statistically significant volume is a clear signal that someone was fully aware of the soon to be announced transaction:

Furthermore, as QeQ highlights, “8,933 of the Dec 12 calls traded vs. 2,244 OI, finishing +300% on the day.” A very solid return for a few hours of trading. The block trades are visible below: one set of 2,500 Dec $12 calls bought at $0.20, followed promptly by two more 2,500 blocks around $0.25. With the stock poised to open much higher than its closing price, someone is sure to make a killing.

It is practically certain that the NYB stock and option transactions came courtesy of a insider tip. And as NYB is both a ward of the state, courtesy of its TLGP umbilical cord, and as the bank would soon become $2 billion richer as a result of some more middle class-to-Wall Street fund flows, it is very likely that the FDIC itself is the source of such leak. We truly hope that one of D.C.’s most ineffective and useless females (if grossly, grossly overpaid for her “work” in 2008) will analyze whether the agency headed by another such female has been responsible for yet more illegal insider trading activity. That the government is only capable of promoting unpunished criminal activity would not surprise anyone at this point. And as this will be one of those cases when everything is handed to the SEC on a silver platter, we don’t doubt that some minor scapegoat will be put away to make it seem like the most worthless organization in the world earns its $1 billion annual budget fair and square. What is chilling is the complete disdain that insider traders now flaunt when it comes to fear of retribution by the “regulators.” And when Ms. Mary “$3.3 Million” Schapiro is done catching any and all masterminds behind this dastardly deed, we would all be very grateful if she could leave her keys, her chauffeur, and her masseuse as she packs her banker box full of Wall Street indulgences on the way out of public office once and for all – Ms. Schapiro, the public does not want you betraying its trust any longer. Now please go work for Goldman Sachs where your continued betrayal of U.S. interests will be welcome and compensated much better than the meager $3.3 million you made at Finra. The sooner you get into a job that requires efforts more consummate with your diminished capacity, the sooner you can continue counting the $5-$25 million in cash payouts you slurped up from FINRA’s defined benefit plans.

From The Daily Capitalist
December 3, 2009

Since the biggest financial collapse in world history was built on credit related to housing, it is pretty obvious that we should be paying very close attention to that market. The reasons are complex, but a recovery must be based on the liquidation of bad debt. The sooner that happens the quicker a recovery will happen.

When we mean “liquidation of debt” we are talking about a mountain of credit built on the housing bubble. This phony bubble wealth permeated the entire economy. When home owners saw the price of their home rising, they saw it as a source of capital to use for a variety of things, but let’s face it, most people spent it.

New stores opened, malls were built, financial institutions grew, cars and boats, second homes, vacations, and restaurants all flourished. Credit card debt mushroomed. Home mortgages were increased to pull cash out for spending. Yes, some of it went to good things, like our children’s education, helping our aged parents, and paying off bills. But the reality was that our debt kept growing.

The clever lads created even more phony wealth under the guise of insurance, but as we found out, companies like AIG really had no idea how large their obligations were for credit default swaps written against almost any financial risk. And these instruments were further leveraged without understanding the magnitude of these triple-counted obligations or their relationship to housing.

It all comes back to housing as the fuel for the 70% of our economy that was consumer spending. The thought was that housing has always gone up, and if it went down, it really never went down if you averaged growth since the post-WWII-period. A drop of 10%? Never has happened. 20%? Not even a 6th deviation possibility.

My thesis has been that this was all fueled by the Fed through monetary policies that created and supported the bubble. Aided and abetted by governmental policies and financing schemes that favored housing and risky loans. This was not a “free market” phenomenon. Far, far from it.

My thesis has also been that we can’t recover until all this bad debt is liquidated, and capital generated by savings is created and ultimately invested in profitable enterprises. It would be a mistake to rekindle the bubble. But, as we know, that’s what our government is trying to do. The government creates uncertainty as it flails around with programs, spending, and debt schemes to revive the economy. As a result mark-to-market accounting is thing of the past and banks are guarding their balance sheets, corporations are sitting on a lot of cash, cutting costs, and becoming leaner, and Mr. and Mrs. America still favor savings and debt instruments over equities and spending.

The big question: is the housing market bottoming out? Because once it does, debtors and debt holders will then have a handle on how great their losses are. When the bottom is falling out, it is difficult to get lenders to lend if they are afraid their remaining cash reserves will be needed to shore up the bank because of loan losses. The holders of subprime debt find it difficult to value their assets while housing values are still dropping.

Lenders have been shepherding their cash, reducing debt obligations, and cutting back lending and new investments because they do not know how deep their hole will be until housing bottoms out. Keynes called this a “liquidity trap.” More reasonable people, especially the Austrian school economists, call this a reasonable and necessary response to uncertainty.

The Fed and the federal government have been flogging this liquidity trap issue without let up and basically credit is still drying up. A 0.25% Fed Funds rate is basically a negative rate and they still can’t get banks to lend. The Fed’s balance sheet is at a record high. They have bought $850 million of mortgage backed securities. They are injecting cash into lenders. They have basically suspended mark-to-market accounting.

In Q3, the FDIC reported that bank lending still contracted by 3%:

Loans and leases held by U.S. commercial banks have declined for 10 straight months, falling to $6.7 trillion as of Oct. 28 from $7.2 trillion at the end of 2008, according to a separate statistical release from the Fed.

 

Commercial and industrial loans have dropped to $1.37 trillion from $1.6 trillion, commercial real-estate loans have declined to $1.66 trillion from $1.72 trillion, and consumer loans have fallen to $847 billion from $857 billion at the end of last year.

What do banks do? They have decided they would rather hold Treasury paper instead of make loans. This chart shows what’s been happening. No wonder T-rates have stayed so low despite massive deficit financing.

This is what makes Bernanke, Geithner, and Summers lose sleep at night. “It’s supposed to work, dammit!” Maybe this is why Summers is always falling asleep. No matter what they’ve tried, they can’t get banks to lend. I think they are very worried about this and while they say the economy is recovering nicely, they are crossing their fingers at the same time.

Back to housing.

I have been saying that I think the housing market is finding a bottom. I thought that low prices and rising affordability was the main driver of the housing market. If this were so, then housing prices would reflect real market valuations and this would finally bring about the liquidation of assets and debt wastefully invested during the prior artificial credit cycle. Lenders would know where they stood financially and would liquidate bad assets and rebuild their balance sheets. No more waiting around wondering what the Fed or the government would do to save housing.

I was wrong.

The housing market I now believe is being sustained almost entirely by the Fed and the federal government. This rekindling of the housing bubble is counterproductive and will hinder a real recovery of the economy because an artificially backed market will delay the necessary liquidation of the prior cycle’s malinvestment of capital.

Here is why I changed my mind:

First, 59% of new home buyers are relying on government-backed FHA, the Veterans Administration, and the Department of Agriculture loans. Most of these sales are driven by the first-time home buyers tax credit. The tax credit program has been extended through April, 2010.

Second, existing home sales are being driven by the tax credit and by foreclosure and short sales. Existing home sales are up 10.1%. Distressed sales — mainly foreclosures and short sales — accounted for 30% of transactions in the third quarter. And. according to the NAR, home sales are being driven by first time home buyers trying to make the previous November deadline.

This will have a negative impact on future sales. Like Cash for Clunkers, these government-driven sales may just be eating into sales that would have occurred in 2010. Many economists are referring to this phenomenon as “payback.”

Third, mortgage rates are now at 30 year lows. Another Fed related gift to home buyers. The average 30-year mortgage rate was 4.95% in October, down from 5.06% in September, according to Freddie Mac. Today, Freddie said the rate was down to 4.7%.

But … home prices are still falling. The S&P/Case-Shiller index of prices fell 8.9% for the July-through-September period from a year earlier. That was an improvement from the 14.7% drop in the second quarter and the 19% decline in the first three months of 2009. Median prices of existing homes fell in 123 of 153 metropolitan areas during the third quarter compared with a year earlier. The national median price was $177,900, down 11.2% from the third quarter of 2008. [Don't ask me to explain the disparity. Case-Shiller and NAR measure this differently.] Last month the median price for an existing home was $173,100, down 7.1% from $186,400 in October 2008.

Thus, despite record interference in the housing market by the government, home prices are still falling. There are several reasons why it is likely that home prices will continue to fall.

Almost 25% of home owners are upside down with their mortgages. Nearly 10.7 million households had negative equity in their homes in the third quarter, according to First American CoreLogic. This shadow market is huge:

Home prices have fallen so far that 5.3 million U.S. households are tied to mortgages that are at least 20% higher than their home’s value, the First American report said. More than 520,000 of these borrowers have received a notice of default, according to First American. …

 

But negative equity “is an outstanding risk hanging over the mortgage market,” said Mark Fleming, chief economist of First American Core Logic. “It lowers homeowners’ mobility because they can’t sell, even if they want to move to get a new job.” Borrowers who owe more than 120% of their home’s value, he said, were more likely to default.

 

Mortgage troubles are not limited to the unemployed. About 588,000 borrowers defaulted on mortgages last year even though they could afford to pay — more than double the number in 2007, according to a study by Experian and consulting firm Oliver Wyman. “The American consumer has had a long-held taboo against walking away from the home, and this crisis seems to be eroding that,” the study said.

This overhang will continue to drive prices down. There is no way the Feds can force lenders to modify enough loans to make a serious dent in this overhang. It’s imply too big. Eventually the losses from forced modifications will mount and the FHA or any other agency will not be able to pay off their guarantees to lender. Nor should they try.

Mark Zandi, who correctly predicted a crisis in the housing market, but not the Crash, said on Wednesday, “The housing crash is not over.” He said the lull in foreclosure sales for the past few months, due to the government’s pressure on lenders to modify loans, has resulting in higher prices. He expects Case-Shiller to bottom by Q3 2010 with an overall price decline of 38% (now at 32%).

“Foreclosure sales will increase, and home prices will resume their decline by early 2010 as mortgage servicers figure out who will not qualify for a modification,” he said.

 

Zandi said 7.5 million foreclosure sales will have taken place between 2006 and 2011. The majority of these sales, however, have not emerged yet, with 4.8 million foreclosure sales expected between 2009 and 2011.

What this means is that the housing supply, now down to a 7+ months supply, will rise again, and prices will continue to decline. We haven’t seen the bottom yet.

By Economic Forecasts & Opinions

Stock markets around the world cracked on Friday with the Dow Jones industrial average down more than 150 points (Fig. 1), and commodities plunging as Dubai debt woes unnerved investors, and sent tremors of uncertainty throughout all markets.

The crisis flared after Dubai, a part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) federation, asked to delay interest payment for six months on $60 billion of debt issued by the state-run conglomerate Dubai World and its main property unit Nakheel.

Concerns that a government-backed investment company risked default ripped through world markets. Investors read it as a sign of yet another sovereign implosion after Iceland and Ireland, and recoiled from risk and piled into dollars.

Las Vegas on Steroids

Dubai World has served as Dubai’s main driver of growth, operating ports, transportation groups, spearheading real-estate & infrastructure projects both at home and abroad. Its real-estate subsidiary Nakheel built Dubai’s iconic palm-tree-shaped island, packed with luxury villas and hotels, many still under construction. Real estate and construction accounts for about 23% of Dubai’s GDP.

With little oil, Dubai financed much of this rapid real estate development with debt. After incurring its estimated $80-$90 billion of debt in a four-year construction boom to transform its economy into a regional financial and tourism hub, Dubai suffered the world’s steepest property slump in the first global recession since World War II.

Deutsche Bank estimates that Dubai’s property prices, both commercial and residential, have halved since August last year, and could fall a further 15-20% this year.

U.S. Banks Less Exposed

Most analysts believe U.S. banks are probably less exposed than European rivals to a potential debt default by Dubai World, but a lack of transparency and the interconnection of the modern financial system make it difficult to know which institutions are ultimately exposed.

Dubai World’s largest creditors are reportedly domestic banks in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. MarketWatch noted data from the Bank for International Settlements which put cross-border banking exposure for the UAE as a whole at $123 billion at the end of June. Of that total, European banks hold 72%, with the United States and Japan only holding 9% and 7% of the exposure, respectively. The United Kingdom is by far the biggest creditor with a share of 41%.

Reminder of Other Risks

On a global scale, Dubai World’s debt problem seems relatively minor, but it illustrates the impact from one tiny country in an increasingly interconnected world. The Dubai news also cast doubt over the strength of the U.S. economic recovery, and the prospects for a bottoming of property prices.

Commercial Real Estate

As pointed out in my previous article that the commercial real estate sector posed a much greater threat than the over-hyped “mother of all carry trades.”  The Dubai debt crisis further reinforces this viewpoint.

The potential for contagion from Dubai’s debt woes could further unhinge an already fragile U.S. commercial real estate sector, whose values have already fallen 42.9% from their 2007 peak, close to the lowest since 2002, according to Moody’s. (Fig. 2) The latest Moody’s projection is for prices to bottom at 45-55% below their peak, but could drop as much as 65% from their peak in a “stress case”.

As commercial property values fall, debt defaults rise. The $3.4 trillion outstanding in debt backed by commercial real estate poses a real threat to the recovery. Trepp LLC reported that last month, delinquencies on U.S. commercial real estate loans that were packaged into commercial mortgage-backed securities reached 4.8%, more than six times the year earlier level. Hotel loans, at 8.7% distressed, have begun falling into delinquency faster than any other kind of commercial real estate debt.

Write-downs and losses at banks around the world have risen to more than $1.7 trillion since 2007 as the credit crisis undermined the value of assets owned by financial institutions, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Any further deleveraging and the resulting credit tightening from commercial real estate would impede the financial sector and probably derail the U.S. economy sending it into another recession. 

Housing Market Mortgage Crisis

So far, the appearance of recovery in the housing sector is being driven primarily by reduced prices combined with federal programs to lower mortgage rates with the goal of bringing more buyers into the market.

Based on a study released by Zillow.com, the foreclosure crisis has moved beyond subprime mortgages and into the prime mortgage market. (Fig. 3) While subprime borrowers are still a factor in the current foreclosure epidemic, it’s becoming increasingly apparent that the weak labor market is the driving force behind the mortgage crisis we face today.

According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, one in seven U.S. home loans was past due or in foreclosure as of Sept. 30, putting that quarterly delinquency measure at its highest level since t

he report’s inception, 1972, and up from one in ten at the beginning of the year.

The continued surge in delinquencies suggests that a recovery in the housing market could be hindered by the weak job market as well as by further fallout from the easy money and loose lending practices of the past. The foreclosures and delinquencies are expected to keep rising well into 2010, not leveling off until the unemployment rate starts to moderate.

In a study by First American CoreLogic found that one in four of all U.S. mortgage-borrowers owe more than the value of their properties in the 3rd quarter. And many experts didn’t expect U.S. home prices to hit bottom until early 2011, perhaps falling another 5-10%, as more foreclosures get pushed onto the market.

Negative equity is another outstanding risk hanging over the mortgage market.

Dubai Is No Lehman

The circumstances behind Dubai’s moves are murky, making it hard to gauge the exact risk to the pertaining bonds and Dubai’s own general creditworthiness. UBS cautioned that Dubai’s overall debt “might be higher than the generally assumed $80 billion to $90 billion, due to potential off-balance sheet liabilities. These could include unlimited and unquantifiable amount of credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives against the underlying assets, and once unraveled, could potentially erupt into a subprime-like crisis.

The current expectation; however, is that there’s a good chance that Dubai’s problems will probably prove a local issue. Most likely, Dubai, or its neighboring emirate, Abu Dhabi, won’t risk tarnishing their images and reputation further, and will come up with a reasonable resolution.

Even if Dubai goes into sovereign default, the amount is probably not enough on its own to threaten the financial system since any actual losses would be a fraction of the total. So, the problems in Dubai are unlikely to be as serious as last year’s Lehman Brothers collapse, nor is it a reflection on the ability of emerging markets to lead a global economic recovery.

Rational Expectations?

But Dubai could well spur a broader crisis of investor confidence in overly leveraged economies as market confidence world-wide is still fragile from the severity of the financial crisis.  The debts of many emerging markets have risen even further as the countries governments have fought the ravages of the global recession by issuing more stimulus debt to fill the gap voided by private investment.

The spread of credit-default swaps on developing-nation’s bonds jumped 14 basis points after the Dubai news broke, the most in a month, to 3.24 percentage points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI+ Index. There is also a clear sign of potential contagion effects of global risk aversion on basically all risky assets, with the dollar and yen being the prime beneficiaries.

Rational expectations or not, for now, the Dubai crisis is simply a reminder that the severe global recession has relegated much debt to near junk status, and there still remains a high degree of uncertainty as to the percentage recoverable on all outstanding debt which is going to be coming due over the next 5 years.

Despite some seminal signs of green shoots in the news headlines during this 9 month liquidity driven rally in many asset classes around the globe, we should be reminded that all that glitters is not gold, and that the global economic recovery is still on shaky ground.

#  “I know the odds are against me, but if there’s a win I’m gonna find it!”  ~Goku  #

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